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owers brought into play by this representation are here engaged in a free play； since no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition。 Hence the mental state in this representation must be one of a feeling of the free play of the powers of representation in a given representation for a cognition in general。 Now a representation； whereby an object is given； involves； in order that it may become a source of cognition at all； imagination for bringing together the manifold of intuition； and understanding for the unity of the concept uniting the representations。 This state of free play of the cognitive faculties attending a representation by which an object is given must admit of universal communication： because cognition； as a definition of the object with which given representations （in any subject whatever） are to accord； is the one and only representation which is valid for everyone。 As the subjective universal communicability of the mode of representation in a judgement of taste is to subsist apart from the presupposition of any definite concept； it can be nothing else than the mental state present in the free play of imagination and understanding （so far as these are in mutual accord； as is requisite for cognition in general）； for we are conscious that this subjective relation suitable for a cognition in general must be just as valid for every one； and consequently as universally communicable； as is any indeterminate cognition； which always rests upon that relation as its subjective condition。 Now this purely subjective （aesthetic） estimating of the object； or of the representation through which it is given； is antecedent to the pleasure in it； and is the basis of this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive faculties。 Again； the above…described universality of the subjective conditions of estimating objects forms the sole foundation of this universal subjective validity of the delight which we connect with the representation of the object that we call beautiful。 That an ability to communicate one's mental state； even though it be only in respect of our cognitive faculties； is attended with a pleasure； is a fact which might easily be demonstrated from the natural propensity of mankind to social life； i。e。； empirically and psychologically。 But what we have here in view calls for something more than this。 In a judgement of taste； the pleasure felt by us is exacted from every one else as necessary； just as if； when we call something beautiful； beauty was to be regarded as a quality of the object forming part of its inherent determination according to concepts； although beauty is for itself； apart from any reference to the feeling of the subject； nothing。 But the discussion of this question must be reserved until we have answered the further one of whether； and how； aesthetic judgements are possible a priori。 At present we are exercised with the lesser question of the way in which we become conscious； in a judgement of taste； of a reciprocal subjective common accord of the powers of cognition。 Is it aesthetically by sensation and our mere internal sense？ Or is it intellectually by consciousness of our intentional activity in bringing these powers into play？ Now if the given representation occasioning the judgement of taste were a concept which united understanding and imagination in the estimate of the object so as to give a cognition of the object； the consciousness of this relation would be intellectual （as in the objective schematism of judgement dealt with in the Critique）。 But； then； in that case the judgement would not be laid down with respect to pleasure and displeasure； and so would not be a judgement of taste。 But； now； the judgement of taste determines the object； independently of concepts； in respect of delight and of the predicate of beauty。 There is； therefore； no other way for the subjective unity of the relation in question to make itself known than by sensation。 The quickening of both faculties （imagination and understanding） to an indefinite； but yet； thanks to the given representation； harmonious activity； such as belongs to cognition generally； is the sensation whose universal communicability is postulated by the judgement of taste。 An objective relation can； of course； only be thought； yet in so far as； in respect of its conditions； it is subjective； it may be felt in its effect upon the mind； and； in the case of a relation （like that of the powers of representation to a faculty of cognition generally） which does not rest on any concept； no other consciousness of it is possible beyond that through sensation of its effect upon the mind …an effect consisting in the more facile play of both mental powers （imagination and understanding） as quickened by their mutual accord。 A representation which is singular and independent of comparison with other representations； and； being such； yet accords with the conditions of the universality that is the general concern of understanding； is one that brings the cognitive faculties into that proportionate accord which we require for all cognition and which we therefore deem valid for every one who is so constituted as to judge by means of understanding and sense conjointly （i。e。； for every man）。
Definition of the Beautiful drawn from the Second Moment。
The beautiful is that which； apart from a concept； pleases universally。
THIRD MOMENT。 Of Judgements of Taste： Moment of the relation of the Ends brought under Review in such Judgements。
SS 10。 Finality in general。
Let us define the meaning of 〃an end〃 in transcendental terms （i。e。； without presupposing anything empirical； such as the feeling of pleasure）。 An end is the object of a concept so far as this concept is regarded as the cause of the object （the real ground of its possibility）； and the causality of a concept in respect of its object is finality （forma finalis）。 Where； then； not the cognition of an object merely； but the object itself （its form or real existence） as an effect； is thought to be possible only through a concept of it； there we imagine an end。 The representation of the effect is here the determining ground of its cause and takes the lead of it。 The consciousness of the causality of a representation in respect of the state of the subject as one tending to preserve a continuance of that state； may here be said to denote in a general way what is called pleasure； whereas displeasure is that representation which contains the ground for converting the state of the representations into their opposite （for hindering or removing them）。 The faculty of desire； so far as determinable only through concepts； i。e。； so as to act in conformity with the representation of an end； would be the Will。 But an object； or state of mind； or even an action may； although its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of an end； be called final simply on account of its possibility being only explicable and intelligible for us by virtue of an assumption on our part of fundamental causality according to ends； i。e。； a will that would have so ordained it according to a certain represented rule。 Finality； therefore； may exist apart from an end； in so far as we do not locate the causes of this form in a will； but yet are able to render the explanation of its possibility intelligible to ourselves only by deriving it from a will。 Now we are not always obliged to look with the eye of reason into what we observe （i。e。； to consider it in its possibility）。 So we may at least observe a finality of form； and trace it in objects…though by reflection only…without resting it on an end （as the material of the nexus finalis）。
SS 11。 The sole foundation of the judgement of taste is the form of finality of an object （or mode of representing it）。
Whenever an end is regarded as a source of delight； it always imports an interest as determining ground of the judgement on the object of pleasure。 Hence the judgement of taste cannot rest on any subjective end as its ground。 But neither can any representation of an objective end； i。e。； of the possibility of the object itself on principles of final connection； determine the judgement of taste； and； consequently； neither can any concept of the good。 For the judgement of taste is an aesthetic and not a cognitive judgement； and so does not deal with any concept of the nature or of the internal or external possibility； by this or that cause； of the object； but simply with the relative bearing of the representative powers so far as determined by a representation。 Now this relation； present when an object is characterized as beautiful； is coupled with the feeling of pleasure。 This pleasure is by the judgement of taste pronounced valid for every one； hence an agreeableness attending the representation is just as incapable of containing the determining ground of the judgement as the representation of the perfection of the object or the concept of the good。 We are thus left with the subjective finality in the representation of an object； exclusive of any end （objective or subjective）…consequently the bare form of finality in the representation whereby an object i