按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
and of itself conformable to law； i。 e。； carry autonomy with it； is a contradiction。 The understanding alone gives the law。 Where； however； the imagination is compelled to follow a course laid down by a definite law； then what the form of the product is to be is determined by concepts； but； in that case； as already shown； the delight is not delight in the beautiful； but in the good （in perfection； though it be no more than formal perfection）； and the judgement is not one due to taste。 Hence it is only a conformity to law without a law； and a subjective harmonizing of the imagination and the understanding without an objective one…which latter would mean that the representation was referred to a definite concept of the object…that can consist with the free conformity to law of the understanding （which has also been called finality apart from an end） and with the specific character of a judgement of taste。 Now geometrically regular figures； a circle； a square； a cube； and the like； are commonly brought forward by critics of taste as the most simple and unquestionable examples of beauty。 And yet the very reason why they are called regular； is because the only way of representing them is by looking on them as mere presentations of a determinate concept by which the figure has its rule （according to which alone it is possible） prescribed for it。 One or other of these two views must； therefore； be wrong： either the verdict of the critics that attributes beauty to such figures； or else our own； which makes finality apart from any concept necessary for beauty。 One would scarce think it necessary for a man to have taste to take more delight in a circle than in a scrawled outline； in an equilateral and equiangular quadrilateral than in one that is all lop…sided； and； as it were； deformed。 The requirements of common understanding ensure such a preference without the least demand upon taste。 Where some purpose is perceived； as； for instance； that of forming an estimate of the area of a plot of land； or rendering intelligible the relation of divided parts to one another and to the whole； then regular figures； and those of the simplest kind； are needed； and the delight does not rest immediately upon the way the figure strikes the eye； but upon its serviceability for all manner of possible purposes。 A room with the walls making oblique angles； a plot laid out in a garden in a similar way； even any violation of symmetry； as well in the figure of animals （e。g。； being one…eyed） as in that of buildings； or of flower…beds； is displeasing because of its perversity of form； not alone in a practical way in respect of some definite use to which the thing may be put； but for an estimate that looks to all manner of possible purposes。 With the judgement of taste the case is different。 For； when it is pure； it combines delight or aversion immediately with the bare contemplation of the object irrespective of its use or of any end。 The regularity that conduces to the concept of an object is； in fact； the indispensable condition （conditio sine qua non） of grasping the object as a single representation and giving to the manifold its determinate form。 This determination is an end in respect of knowledge； and in this connection it is invariably coupled with delight （such as attends the accomplishment of any； even problematical； purpose）。 Here； however； we have merely the value set upon the solution that satisfies the problem； and not a free and indeterminately final entertainment of the mental powers with what is called beautiful。 In the latter case； understanding is at the service of imagination； in the former； this relation is reversed。 With a thing that owes its possibility to a purpose； a building； or even an animal； its regularity； which consists in symmetry； must express the unity of the intuition accompanying the concept of its end； and belongs with it to cognition。 But where all that is intended is the maintenance of a free play of the powers of representation （subject； however； to the condition that there is to be nothing for understanding to take exception to）； in ornamental gardens； in the decoration of rooms； in all kinds of furniture that shows good taste； etc。； regularity in the shape of constraint is to be avoided as far as possible。 Thus English taste in gardens； and fantastic taste in furniture； push the freedom of imagination to the verge of what is grotesque the idea being that in this divorce from all constraint of rules the precise instance is being afforded where taste can exhibit its perfection in projects of the imagination to the fullest extent。 All stiff regularity （such as borders on mathematical regularity） is inherently repugnant to taste； in that the contemplation of it affords us no lasting entertainment。 Indeed； where it has neither cognition nor some definite practical end expressly in view； we get heartily tired of it。 On the other hand； anything that gives the imagination scope for unstudied and final play is always fresh to us。 We do not grow to hate the very sight of it。 Marsden； in his description of Sumatra； observes that the free beauties of nature so surround the beholder on all sides that they cease to have much attraction for him。 On the other band he found a pepper garden full of charm； on coming across it in mid…forest with its rows of parallel stakes on which the plant twines itself。 From all this he infers that wild； and in its appearance quite irregular beauty； is only pleasing as a change to one whose eyes have become surfeited with regular beauty。 But he need only have made the experiment of passing one day in his pepper garden to realize that once the regularity has enabled the understanding to put itself in accord with the order that is the constant requirement； instead of the object diverting him any longer； it imposes an irksome constraint upon the imagination： whereas nature subject to no constraint of artificial rules； and lavish； as it there is； in its luxuriant variety can supply constant food for his taste。 Even a bird's song； which we can reduce to no musical rule； seems to have more freedom in it； and thus to be richer for taste； than the human voice singing in accordance with all the rules that the art of music prescribes； for we grow tired much sooner of frequent and lengthy repetitions of the latter。 Yet here most likely our sympathy with the mirth of a dear little creature is confused with the beauty of its song； for if exactly imitated by man （as has been sometimes done with the notes of the nightingale） it would strike our ear as wholly destitute of taste。 Further； beautiful objects have to be distinguished from beautiful views of objects （where the distance often prevents a clear perception）。 In the latter case； taste appears to fasten； not so much on what the imagination grasps in this field； as on the incentive it receives to indulge in poetic fiction； i。 e。； in the peculiar fancies with which the mind entertains itself as it is being continually stirred by the variety that strikes the eye。 It is just as when we watch the changing shapes of the fire or of a rippling brook： neither of which are things of beauty； but they convey a charm to the imagination； because they sustain its free play。
SEC1｜BK2 FIRST PART CRITIQUE OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT SECTION I。 ANALYTIC OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT。 BOOK II。 Analytic of the Sublime。
SS 23。 Transition from the faculty of estimating the beautiful to that of estimating the sublime。
The beautiful and the sublime agree on the point of pleasing on their own account。 Further they agree in not presupposing either a judgement of sense or one logically determinant； but one of reflection。 Hence it follows that the delight does not depend upon a sensation； as with the agreeable； nor upon a definite concept； as does the delight in the good； although it has； for all that； an indeterminate reference to concepts。 Consequently the delight is connected with the mere presentation or faculty of presentation； and is thus taken to express the accord； in a given intuition； of the faculty of presentation； or the imagination； with the faculty of concepts that belongs to understanding or reason； in the sense of the former assisting the latter。 Hence both kinds of judgements are singular； and yet such as profess to be universally valid in respect of every subject； despite the fact that their claims are directed merely to the feeling of pleasure and not to any knowledge of the object。 There are； however； also important and striking differences between the two。 The beautiful in nature is a question of the form of object； and this consists in limitation； whereas the sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of form； so far as it immediately involves； or else by its presence provokes a representation of limitlessness； yet with a superadded thought of its totality。 Accordingly； the beautiful seems to be regarded as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of understanding； the sublime as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of reason。 Hence the delight is in the former case coupled with the representation of quality； but in this case with that of quantity。 Moreover； the former delight is very different from the