the critique of judgement-第26章

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presentation　of　this　as　sublime；　or　even　as　beautiful；　without　forfeiting　its　purity…an　impossible　result　were　one　to　make　it　naturally　bound　up　with　the　feeling　of　the　agreeable。　　　The　net　result　to　be　extracted　from　the　exposition　so　far　given　of　both　kinds　of　aesthetic　judgements　may　be　summed　up　in　the　following　brief　definitions：　　　The　beautiful　is　what　pleases　in　the　mere　estimate　formed　of　it　（consequently　not　by　intervention　of　any　feeling　of　sense　in　accordance　with　a　concept　of　the　understanding）。　From　this　it　follows　at　once　that　it　must　please　apart　from　all　interest。　　　The　sublime　is　what　pleases　immediately　by　reason　of　its　opposition　to　the　interest　of　sense。　　　Both；　as　definitions　of　aesthetic　universally　valid　estimates；　have　reference　to　subjective　grounds。　In　the　one　case　the　reference　is　to　grounds　of　sensibility；　in　so　far　as　these　are　final　on　behalf　of　the　contemplative　understanding；　in　the　other　case　in　so　far　as；　in　their　opposition　to　sensibility；　they　are；　on　the　contrary；　final　in　reference　to　the　ends　of　practical　reason。　Both；　however；　as　united　in　the　same　subject；　are　final　in　reference　to　the　moral　feeling。　The　beautiful　prepares　us　to　love　something；　even　nature；　apart　from　any　interest：　the　sublime　to　esteem　something　highly　even　in　opposition　to　our　（sensible）　interest　object；　　　The　sublime　may　be　described　in　this　way：　It　is　an　object　（of　nature）　the　representation　of　which　determines　the　mind　to　regard　the　elevation　of　nature　beyond　our　reach　as　equivalent　to　a　presentation　of　ideas。　　　In　a　literal　sense　and　according　to　their　logical　import；　ideas　cannot　be　presented。　But　if　we　enlarge　our　empirical　faculty　of　representation　（mathematical　or　dynamical）　with　a　view　to　the　intuition　of　nature；　reason　inevitably　steps　forward；　as　the　faculty　concerned　with　the　independence　of　the　absolute　totality；　and　calls　forth　the　effort　of　the　mind；　unavailing　though　it　be；　to　make　representation　of　sense　adequate　to　this　totality。　This　effort；　and　the　feeling　of　the　unattainability　of　the　idea　by　means　of　imagination；　is　itself　a　presentation　of　the　subjective　finality　of　our　mind　in　the　employment　of　the　imagination　in　the　interests　of　the　mind's　supersensible　province；　and　compels　us　subjectively　to　think　nature　itself　in　its　totality　as　a　presentation　of　something　supersensible；　without　our　being　able　to　effectuate　this　presentation　objectively。　　　For　we　readily　see　that　nature　in　space　and　time　falls　entirely　short　of　the　unconditioned；　consequently　also　of　the　absolutely　great；　which　still　the　commonest　reason　demands。　And　by　this　we　are　also　reminded　that　we　have　only　to　do　with　nature　as　phenomenon；　and　that　this　itself　must　be　regarded　as　the　mere　presentation　of　a　nature…in…itself　（which　exists　in　the　idea　of　reason）。　But　this　idea　of　the　supersensible；　which　no　doubt　we　cannot　further　determine　so　that　we　cannot　cognize　nature　as　its　presentation；　but　only　think　it　as　such…is　awakened　in　us　by　an　object　the　aesthetic　estimating　of　which　strains　the　imagination　to　its　utmost；　whether　in　respect　of　its　extension　（mathematical）；　or　of　its　might　over　the　mind　（dynamical）。　For　it　is　founded　upon　the　feeling　of　a　sphere　of　the　mind　which　altogether　exceeds　the　realm　of　nature　（i。e。；　upon　the　moral　feeling）；　with　regard　to　which　the　representation　of　the　object　is　estimated　as　subjectively　final。　　　As　a　matter　of　fact；　a　feeling　for　the　sublime　in　nature　is　hardly　thinkable　unless　in　association　with　an　attitude　of　mind　resembling　the　moral。　And　though；　like　that　feeling；　the　immediate　pleasure　in　the　beautiful　in　nature　presupposes　and　cultivates　a　certain　liberality　of　thought；　i。e。；　makes　our　delight　independent　of　any　mere　enjoyment　of　sense；　still　it　represents　freedom　rather　as　in　play　than　as　exercising　a　law…ordained　function；　which　is　the　genuine　characteristic　of　human　morality；　where　reason　has　to　impose　its　dominion　upon　sensibility。　There　is；　however；　this　qualification；　that　in　the　aesthetic　judgement　upon　the　sublime　this　dominion　is　represented　as　exercised　through　the　imagination　itself　as　an　instrument　of　reason。　　　Thus；　too；　delight　in　the　sublime　in　nature　is　only　negative　（whereas　that　in　the　beautiful　is　positive）：　that　is　to　say；　it　is　a　feeling　of　imagination　by　its　own　act　depriving　itself　of　its　freedom　by　receiving　a　final　determination　in　accordance　with　a　law　other　than　that　of　its　empirical　employment。　In　this　way　it　gains　an　extension　and　a　might　greater　than　that　which　it　sacrifices。　But　the　ground　of　this　is　concealed　from　it；　and　in　its　place　it　feels　the　sacrifice　or　deprivation；　as　well　as　its　cause；　to　which　it　is　subjected。　The　astonishment　amounting　almost　to　terror；　the　awe　and　thrill　of　devout　feeling；　that　takes　hold　of　one　when　gazing　upon　the　prospect　of　mountains　ascending　to　heaven；　deep　ravines　and　torrents　raging　there；　deep　shadowed　solitudes　that　invite　to　brooding　melancholy；　and　the　like…all　this；　when　we　are　assured　of　our　own　safety；　is　not　actual　fear。　Rather　is　it　an　attempt　to　gain　access　to　it　through　imagination；　for　the　purpose　of　feeling　the　might　of　this　faculty　in　combining　the　movement　of　the　mind　thereby　aroused　with　its　serenity；　and　of　thus　being　superior　to　internal　and；　therefore；　to　external；　nature；　so　far　as　the　latter　can　have　any　bearing　upon　our　feeling　of　well…being。　For　the　imagination；　in　accordance　with　laws　of　association；　makes　our　state　of　contentment　dependent　upon　physical　conditions。　But　acting　in　accordance　with　principles　of　the　schematism　of　judgement　（consequently　so　far　as　it　is　subordinated　to　freedom）；　it　is　at　the　same　time　an　instrument　of　reason　and　its　ideas。　But　in　this　capacity　it　is　a　might　enabling　us　to　assert　our　independence　as　against　the　influences　of　nature；　to　degrade　what　is　great　in　respect　of　the　latter　to　the　level　of　what　is　little；　and　thus　to　locate　the　absolutely　great　only　in　the　proper　estate　of　the　subject。　This　reflection　of　aesthetic　judgement　by　which　it　raises　itself　to　the　point　of　adequacy　with　reason；　though　without　any　determinate　concept　of　reason；　is　still　a　representation　of　the　object　as　subjectively　final；　by　virtue　even　of　the　objective　inadequacy　of　the　imagination　in　its　greatest　extension　for　meeting　the　demands　of　reason　（as　the　faculty　of　ideas）。　　　Here　we　have　to　attend　generally　to　what　has　been　already　adverted　to；　that　in　the　transcendental　aesthetic　of　judgement　there　must　be　no　question　of　anything　but　pure　aesthetic　judgements。　Consequently　examples　are　not　to　be　selected　from　such　beautiful；　or　sublime　objects　as　presuppose　the　concept　of　an　end。　For　then　the　finality　would　be　either　teleological；　or　based　upon　mere　sensations　of　an　object：　（gratification　or　pain）　and　so；　in　the　first　case；　not　aesthetic；　and；　in　the　second；　not　merely　formal。　So；　if　we　call　the　sight　of　the　starry　heaven　sublime；　we　must　not　found　our　estimate　of　it　upon　any　concepts　of　worlds　inhabited　by　rational　beings；　with　the　bright　spots；　which　we　see　filling　the　space　above　us；　as　their　suns　moving　in　orbits　prescribed　for　them　with　the　wisest　regard　to　ends。　But　we　must　take　it；　just　as　it　strikes　the　eye；　as　a　broad　and　all…embracing　canopy：　and　it　is　merely　under　such　a　representation　that　we　may　posit　the　sublimity　which　the　pure　aesthetic　judgement　attributes　to　this　object。　Similarly；　as　to　the　prospect　of　the　ocean；　we　are　not　to　regard　it　as　we；　with　our　minds　stored　with　knowledge　on　a　variety　of　matters　（which；　however；　is　not　contained　in　the　immediate　intuition）；　are　wont　to　represent　it　in　thought；　as；　let　us　say；　a　spacious　realm　of　aquatic　creatures；　or　as　the　mighty　reservoirs　from　which　are　drawn　the　vapours　that　fill　the　air　with　clouds　of　moisture　for　the　good　of　the　land；　or　yet　as　an　element　which　no　doubt　divides　continent　from　continent；　but　at　the　same　time　affords　the　means　of　the　greatest　commercial　intercourse　between　them…for　in　this　way　we　get　nothing　beyond　teleological　judgements。　Instead　of　this　we　must　be　able　to　see　sublimity　in　the　ocean；　regarding　it；　as　the　poets　do；　according　to　what　the　impression　upon　the　eye　reveals；　as；　let　us　say；　in　its　calm　a　clear　mirror　of　water　bounded　only　by　the　heavens；　or；　be　it　disturbed；　as　threatening　to　overwhelm　and　engulf　everything。　The　same　is　to　be　said　of　the　sublime　and　beautiful　in　the　human　form。　Here；　for　determining　grounds　of　the　judgement；　we　must　not　have　recourse　to　concepts　of　ends　subserved　by　all：　all　its　and　members；　or　allow　their　accordance　with　these　ends　to　influence　our　aesthetic　judgement　（in　such　case　no　longer　pure）；　although　it　is　certainly　also　a　also　a　necessary　condition　of　aesthetic　delight　that　they　should　not　conflict。　With　these　ends。　Aesthetic　finality　is　the　conformity　to　law　of　judgement　in　its　freedom。　The　delight　in　the　object　depends　on　the　reference　which　we　seek　to　give　to　the　imagination；　subject　to　the　proviso　that　it　is　to　entertain　the　mind　in　a　free　activity。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　something　else…be　it　sensation　or　concept　of　the　understanding…determines　the　judgement；　it　is　then　conformable　to　law；　no　doubt；　but　not　an　act　of　free　judgement。　　　Hence　to　speak　of　intellectual　beauty　or　sublimity　is　to　use　expressions　which；　in　the　first　place；　are　not　quite　correct。　For　thes