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Constitution of the clergy。〃 Cf。 sitting of January 2； 1791；
speech by the Bishop of Clermont。
＇75＇ Duvergier； law of May 7； 1791； to maintain the right of
nonjuring priests to perform mass in national or private edifices。
（Demanded by Talleyrand and Sieyès。）
＇76＇ 〃Archives Nationales；〃 F7； 3235。 Letter of M。 de Chateau…
Randon； deputy of la Lozère； May 28； 1791。 After the decree of May
23rd； all the functionaries of the department handed in their
resignations。
＇77＇ Duvergier； law of May 21…29； 1791。
＇78＇ Sauzay； I。 366； 538 to 593； 750。 Archives Nationales；〃 F7；
3235； Letter of M。 de Chanteau…Randon； May 10； 1791。 Mercure；
April 23rd； and April 16； 1701。 Articles of Mallet du Pan； letter
from Bordeaux； March 20； 1791。
＇79＇ Buchez and Roux； XII； 77。 Report of Gallois and Gensonné sent
to La Vendée and the Deux Sévres （July 25； 1791）。 〃 Archives
Nationales；〃 F7； 3253； letter of the Directory of the Bas…Rhin
（letter of January 7； 1792）。 〃 Le District de Machecoul de 1788
à 1793；〃 by Lallier。 〃 Histoire de Joseph Lebon；〃 by Paris。
Sauzay； vol。 I。 and II。 in full。
＇80＇ Mercure； January 15th； April 23rd； May 16th and 30th； June 1st；
November 23rd； 1791。 〃Le District de Machecoul；〃 by Lallier；
173。 Sauzay； I。 295。 Lavirotte； 〃Annales d'Arnay…le…Duc
（February 5； 1792）。 〃Archives Nationales；〃 F7； 3223。 Petition
of a number of the inhabitants of Montpellier； November 17； 1791。
＇81＇ Duvergier； decree of November 29； 1791。 Mercure； November
30； 1791 （article by Mallet du Pan）。
CHAPTER III。 THE CONSTRUCTIONS … THE CONSTITUTION OF 1791。。
That which is called a Government is a concert of powers； each with
a distinct function； and all working towards a final and complete
end。 The merit of a Government consists in the attainment of this
end； the worth of a machine depends upon the work it accomplishes。
The important thing is not to produce a good mechanical design on
paper； but to see that the machine works well when set up on the
ground。 In vain might its founders allege the beauty of their plan
and the logical connection of their theorems； they are not required
to furnish either plan or theorems； but an instrument。
Two conditions are requisite to render this instrument serviceable
and effective。 In the first place； the public powers must harmonize
with each other； if not； one will neutralize the other； in the
second place they must be obeyed； or they are null。
The Constituent Assembly made no provision for securing this harmony
or this obedience。 In the machine which it constructed the motions
all counteract each other； the impulse is not transmitted； the
gearing is not complete between the center and the extremities； the
large central and upper wheels turn to no purpose； the innumerable
small wheels near the ground break or get out of order： the machine；
by virtue of its own mechanism； remains useless； over…heated； under
clouds of waste steam； creaking and thumping in such a matter as to
show clearly that it must explode。
I。
Powers of the Central Government。 … The Assembly on the partition of
power。 … Rupture of every tie between the Legislature and the King。
… The Assembly on the subordination of the executive power。 … How
this is nullified。 … Certainty of a conflict。 … The deposition of
the King is inevitable。
Let us first consider the two central powers； the Assembly and the
King。 … Ordinarily when distinct powers of different origin are
established by a Constitution； it makes； in the case of conflict
between them； a provision for an arbiter in the institution of an
Upper Chamber。 Each of these powers； at least； has a hold on the
other。 The Assembly must have one on the King： which is the right
to refuse taxation。 The King must have one on the Assembly： which
is the right of dissolving it。 Otherwise； one of the two being
disarmed； the other becomes omnipotent； and； consequently； insane。
The peril here is as great for an omnipotent Assembly as it is for
an absolute King。 If the former is desirous of remaining in its
right mind； it needs repression and control as much as the latter。
If it is proper for the Assembly to restrain the King by refusing
him subsidies； it is proper for him to be able to defend himself by
appealing to the electors。 … But； besides these extreme measures；
which are dangerous and rarely resorted to； there is another which
is ordinarily employed and is safe； that is； the right for the King
to take his ministers from the Chamber。 Generally； the leaders of
the majority form the ministry； their nomination being the means of
restoring harmony between the King and Assembly； they are at once
men belonging to the Assembly and men belonging to the King。
Through this expedient not only is the confidence of the Assembly
assured； since the Government remains in the hands of its leaders；
but also it is under restraint because these become simultaneously
both powerful and responsible。 Placed at the head of all branches
of the service； they are； before proposing it or accepting it； in a
position to judge whether a law is useful and practicable。 Nothing
is so healthy for a majority as a ministry composed of its own
chiefs； nothing is so effective in repressing rashness or
intemperance。 A railway conductor is not willing that his
locomotive should be deprived of coal； nor to have the rails he is
about to run on broken up。 … This arrangement； with all its
drawbacks and inconveniences； is the best one yet arrived at by
human experience for the security of societies against despotism and
anarchy。 For the absolute power which establishes or saves them may
also oppress or exhaust them； there is a gradual substitution of
differentiated powers； held together through the mediation of a
third umpire； caused by reciprocal dependence and an which is common
to both。
Experience； however； is unimportant to the members of the
Constituent Assembly； under the banner of principles they sunder one
after another all the ties which keep the two powers together
harmoniously。 … There must not be an Upper Chamber； because this
would be an asylum or a nursery for aristocrats。 Moreover； 〃the
nation being of one mind；〃 it is averse to 〃the creation of
different organs。〃 So； applying ready…made formulas and metaphors；
they continue to produce ideological definitions and distinctions。
The King must not have a hold on the legislative body： the executive
is an arm； whose business it is to obey； it is absurd for the arm to
constrain or direct the head。 Scarcely is the monarch allowed a
delaying veto。 Sieyès here enters with his protest declaring that
this is a 〃lettre de cachet＇1＇ launched against the universal will；〃
and there is excluded from the action of the veto the articles of
the Constitution； all money…bills； and some other laws。 … …Neither
the monarch nor the electors of the Assembly are to convoke the
Assembly； he has no voice in or oversight of the details of its
formation； the electors are to meet together and vote without his
summons or supervision。 Once the Assembly is elected he can neither
adjourn nor dissolve it。 He cannot even propose a law；＇2＇ per…
mission is only granted to him 〃to invite it to take a subject into
consideration。〃 He is limited to his executive duties； and still
more； a sort of wall is built up between him and the Assembly； and
the opening in it； by which each could take the other's hand； is
carefully closed up。 The deputies are forbidden to become ministers
throughout the term of their service and for two years afterwards。
This is because fears are entertained that they might be corrupted
through contact with the Court； and； again； whoever the ministers
might be； there is no disposition to accept their ascendancy。＇3＇ If
one of them is admitted into the Assembly it is not for the purpose
of giving advice； but to furnish information； reply to
interrogatories； and make protestations of his zeal in humble terms
and in a dubious position。＇4＇ By virtue of being a royal agent he
is under suspicion like the King himself； and he is sequestered in
his bureau as the King is sequestered in his palace。… Such is the
spirit of the Constitution： by force of the theory； and the better
to secure a separation of the powers；＇5＇ a common understanding
between them is for ever rendered impossible； and to make up for
this impossibility there remains nothing but to make one the master
and the other the clerk。
This they did not fail to do； and for greater security； the latter
is made an honorary clerk； The executive power is conferred on him
nominally and in appearance； he does not possess it in fact； care
having been taken to place it in other hands。 … In effect； all
executive agents and all secondary and local powers are elective。
The King has no voice； directly or indirectly； in the choice of
judge