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BRIGADIER…GENERAL BUELL。
MY DEAR SIR：Your despatch of yesterday has been received； and it
disappoints and distresses me。 I have shown it to General McClellan；
who says he will write you to…day。 I am not competent to criticize
your views； and therefore what I offer is in justification of myself。
Of the two； I would rather have a point on the railroad south of
Cumberland Gap than Nashville。 First； because it cuts a great artery
of the enemy's communication； which Nashville does not； and secondly；
because it is in the midst of loyal people who would rally around it；
while Nashville is not。 Again； I cannot see why the movement on East
Tennessee would not be a diversion in your favor rather than a
disadvantage； assuming that a movement toward Nashville is the main
object。 But my distress is that our friends in East Tennessee are
being hanged and driven to despair； and even now； I fear； are
thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection。
In this we lose the most valuable stake we have in the South。 My
despatch； to which yours is an answer； was sent with the knowledge of
Senator Johnson and Representative Maynard of East Tennessee； and
they will be upon me to know the answer； which I cannot safely show
them。 They would despair； possibly resign to go and save their
families somehow； or die with them。 I do not intend this to be an
order in any sense； but merely； as intimated before； to show you the
grounds of my anxiety。
Yours very truly；
A。 LINCOLN。
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL BUELL。
WASHINGTON； January 7； 1862。
BRIGADIER…GENERAL D。C。 BUELL； Louisville：
Please name as early a day as you safely can on or before which you
can be ready to move southward in concert with Major…General Halleck。
Delay is ruining us； and it is indispensable for me to have something
definite。 I send a like despatch to Major…General Halleck。
A。 LINCOLN。
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS。
WASHINGTON； January 10； 1862
TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES：
I transmit to Congress a translation of an instruction to the
minister of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria accredited to this
government； and a copy of a note to that minister from the Secretary
of State relative to the questions involved in the taking from the
British steamer Trent of certain citizens of the United States by
order of Captain Wilkes of the United States Navy。 This
correspondence may be considered as a sequel to that previously
communicated to Congress relating to the same subject。
ABRAHAM LINCOLN。
INDORSEMENT ON LETTER FROM GENERAL HALLECK；
JANUARY 10； 1862。
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI
ST。 Louis； January 6； 1862。
To His EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT：
In reply to your Excellency's letter of the 1st instant； I have to
state that on receiving your telegram I immediately communicated with
General Buell and have since sent him all the information I could
obtain of the enemy's movements about Columbus and Camp Beauregard。
No considerable force has been sent from those places to Bowling
Green。 They have about 22；000 men at Columbus； and the place is
strongly fortified。 I have at Cairo； Port Holt； and Paducah only
about 15；000； which； after leaving guards at these places； would give
me but little over 10；000 men with which to assist General Buell。 It
would be madness to attempt anything serious with such a force； and I
cannot at the present time withdraw any from Missouri without risking
the loss of this State。 The troops recently raised in other States
of this department have； without my knowledge； been sent to Kentucky
and Kansas。
I am satisfied that the authorities at Washington do not appreciate
the difficulties with which we have to contend here。 The operations
of Lane； Jennison； and others have so enraged the people of Missouri
that it is estimated that there is a majority of 8o；ooo against the
government。 We are virtually in an enemy's country。 Price and
others have a considerable army in the southwest； against which I am
operating with all my available force。
This city and most of the middle and northern counties are
insurrectionary；burning bridges； destroying telegraph lines； etc。；…
…and can be kept down only by the presence of troops。 A large
portion of the foreign troops organized by General Fremont are
unreliable； indeed； many of them are already mutinous。 They have
been tampered with by politicians； and made to believe that if they
get up a mutiny and demand Fremont's return the government will be
forced to restore him to duty here。 It is believed that some high
officers are in the plot I have already been obliged to disarm
several of these organizations； and I am daily expecting more serious
outbreaks。 Another grave difficulty is the want of proper general
officers to command the troops and enforce order and discipline； and
especially to protect public property from robbery and plunder。 Some
of the brigadier…generals assigned to this department are entirely
ignorant of their duties and unfit for any command。 I assure you；
Mr。 President； it is very difficult to accomplish much with such
means。 I am in the condition of a carpenter who is required to build
a bridge with a dull axe； a broken saw； and rotten timber。 It is
true that I have some very good green timber； which will answer the
purpose as soon as I can get it into shape and season it a little。
I know nothing of General Buell's intended operations； never having
received any information in regard to the general plan of campaign。
If it be intended that his column shall move on Bowling Green while
another moves from Cairo or Paducah on Columbus or Camp Beauregard；
it will be a repetition of the same strategic error which produced
the disaster of Bull Run。 To operate on exterior lines against an
enemy occupying a central position will fail； as it always has
failed； in ninety…nine cases out of a hundred。 It is condemned by
every military authority I have ever read。
General Buell's army and the forces at Paducah occupy precisely the
same position in relation to each other and to the enemy as did the
armies of McDowell and Patterson before the battle of Bull Run。
Very respectfully； your obedient servant；
H。 W。 HALLECK； Major…General
＇Indorsement＇
The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck。
It is exceedingly discouraging。 As everywhere else； nothing can be
done。
A。 LINCOLN。
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR ANDREW。
WASHINGTON； D。 C。；
January 11； 1862
GOVERNOR JOHN A。 ANDREW； Boston：
I will be greatly obliged if you will arrange； somehow with General
Butler to officer his two un…officered regiments。
A。 LINCOLN
TO GENERAL D。 C。 BUELL。
EXECUTIVE MANSION； WASHINGTON； January 13； 1861
BRIGADIER…GENERAL BUELL。
MY DEAR SIR …Your despatch of yesterday is received； in which you
say； 〃I received your letter and General McClellan's； and will at
once devote my efforts to your views and his。〃 In the midst of my
many cares I have not seen； nor asked to see； General McClellan's
letter to you。 For my own views； I have not offered and do not now
offer them as orders； and while I am glad to have them respectfully
considered； I would blame you to follow them contrary to your own
clear judgment； unless I should put them in the form of orders。 As
to General McClellan's views； you understand your duty in regard to
them better than I do。
With this preliminary I state my general idea of this war to be； that
we have the greater numbers and the enemy has the greater facility of
concentrating forces upon points of collision； that we must fail
unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for
his； and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior
forces at different points at the same time； so that we can safely
attack one or both if he makes no change； and if he weakens one to
strengthen the other； forbear to attack the strengthened one； but
seize and hold the weakened one； gaining so much。
To illustrate： Suppose last summer； when Winchester ran away to
reinforce Manassas； we had forborne to attack Manassas； but had
seized and held Winchester。 I mention this to illustrate and not to
criticise。 I did not lose confidence in McDowell； and I think less
harshly of Patterson than some others seem to。 。 。 。 Applying the
principle to your case； my idea is that Halleck shall menace Columbus
and 〃down river〃 generally； while you menace Bowling Green and East
Tennessee。 If the enemy shall concentrate at Bowling Green； do not
retire from his front； yet do not fight him there either； but seize
Columbus and East Tennessee； one or both； left exposed by the
concentration at Bowling Green。 It is a matter of no small anxiety
to me； and which I am sure