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object with something present to the memory or senses： I
believe that it will not be difficult； upon these
suppositions； to find other operations of the mind analogous
to it； and to trace up these phenomena to principles still
more general。
We have already observed that nature has established
connexions among particular ideas； and that no sooner one
idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its
correlative； and carries our attention towards it； by a
gentle and insensible movement。 These principles of
connexion or association we have reduced to three； namely；
； and ； which are the
only bonds that unite our thoughts together； and beget that
regular train of reflection or discourse； which； in a
greater or less degree； takes place among all mankind。 Now
here arises a question； on which the solution of the present
difficulty will depend。 Does it happen； in all these
relations； that； when one of the objects is presented to the
senses or memory； the mind is not only carried to the
conception of the correlative； but reaches a steadier and
stronger conception of it than what otherwise it would have
been able to attain？ This seems to be the case with that
belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect。
And if the case be the same with the other relations or
principles of associations； this may be established as a
general law； which takes place in all the operations of the
mind。
We may； therefore； observe； as the first experiment to
our present purpose； that； upon the appearance of the
picture of an absent friend； our idea of him is evidently
enlivened by the ； and that every passion；
which that idea occasions； whether of joy or sorrow；
acquires new force and vigour。 In producing this effect；
there concur both a relation and a present impression。 Where
the picture bears him no resemblance； at least was not
intended for him； it never so much as conveys our thought to
him： And where it is absent； as well as the person； though
the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the
other； it feels its idea to be rather weakened than
enlivened by that transition。 We take a pleasure in viewing
the picture of a friend； when it is set before us； but when
it is removed； rather choose to consider him directly than
by reflection in an image； which is equally distant and
obscure。
The ceremonies of the R/OMAN C/ATHOLIC religion may
be considered as instances of the same nature。 The devotees
of that superstition usually plead in excuse for the
mummeries； with which they are upbraided； that they feel the
good effect of those external motions； and postures； and
actions； in enlivening their devotion and quickening their
fervour； which otherwise would decay； if directed entirely
to distant and immaterial objects。 We shadow out the objects
of our faith； say they； in sensible types and images； and
render them more present to us by the immediate presence of
these types； than it is possible for us to do merely by an
intellectual view and contemplation。 Sensible objects have
always a greater influence on the fancy than any other； and
this influence they readily convey to those ideas to which
they are related； and which they resemble。 I shall only
infer from these practices； and this reasoning； that the
effect of resemblance in enlivening the ideas is very
common； and as in every case a resemblance and a present
impression must concur； we are abundantly supplied with
experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle。
We may add force to these experiments by others of a
different kind； in considering the effects of
as well as of 。 It is certain that distance
diminishes the force of every idea； and that； upon our
approach to any object； though it does not discover itself
to our senses； it operates upon the mind with an influence；
which imitates an immediate impression。 The thinking on any
object readily transports the mind to what is contiguous；
but it is only the actual presence of an object； that
transports it with a superior vivacity。 When I am a few
miles from home； whatever relates to it touches me more
nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distant； though
even at that distance the reflecting on any thing in the
neighbourhood of my friends or family naturally produces an
idea of them。 But as in this latter case； both the objects
of the mind are ideas； notwithstanding there is an easy
transition between them； that transition alone is not able
to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas； for want of
some immediate impression。＇13＇
No one can doubt but causation has the same influence
as the other two relations of resemblance and contiguity。
Superstitious people are fond of the reliques of saints and
holy men； for the same reason； that they seek after types or
images； in order to enliven their devotion； and give them a
more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary
lives； which they desire to imitate。 Now it is evident； that
one of the best reliques； which a devotee could procure；
would be the handywork of a saint； and if his cloaths and
furniture are ever to be considered in this light； it is
because they were once at his disposal； and were moved and
affected by him； in which respect they are to be considered
as imperfect effects； and as connected with him by a shorter
chain of consequences than any of those； by which we learn
the reality of his existence。
Suppose； that the son of a friend； who had been long
dead or absent； were presented to us； it is evident； that
this object would instantly revive its correlative idea； and
recall to our thoughts all past intimacies and
familiarities； in more lively colours than they would
otherwise have appeared to us。 This is another phaenomenon；
which seems to prove the principle above mentioned。
We may observe； that； in these phaenomena； the belief
of the correlative object is always presupposed； without
which the relation could have no effect。 The influence of
the picture supposes； that we our friend to have
once existed。 Contiguity to home can never excite our ideas
of home； unless we that it really exists。 Now I
assert； that this belief； where it reaches beyond the memory
or senses； is of a similar nature； and arises from similar
causes； with the transition of thought and vivacity of
conception here explained。 When I throw a piece of dry wood
into a fire； my mind is immediately carried to conceive；
that it augments； not extinguishes the flame。 This
transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds
not from reason。 It derives its origin altogether from
custom and experience。 And as it first begins from an
object； present to the senses； it renders the idea or
conception of flame more strong and lively than any loose；
floating reverie of the imagination。 That idea arises
immediately。 The thought moves instantly towards it； and
conveys to it all that force of conception； which is derived
from the impression present to the senses。 When a sword is
levelled at my breast； does not the idea of wound and pain
strike me more strongly； than when a glass of wine is
presented to me； even though by accident this idea should
occur after the appearance of the latter object？ But what is
there in this whole matter to cause such a strong
conception； except only a present object and a customary
transition of the idea of another object； which we have been
accustomed to conjoin with the former？ This is the whole
operation of the mind； in all our conclusions concerning
matter of fact and existence； and it is a satisfaction to
find some analogies； by which it may be explained。 The
transition from a present object does in all cases give
strength and solidity to the related idea。
Here； then； is a kind of pre…established harmony
between the course of nature and the succession of our
ideas； and though the powers and forces； by which the former
is governed； be wholly unknown to us； yet our thoughts and
conceptions have still； we find； gone on in the same train
with the other works of nature。 Custom is that principle； by
which this correspondence has been effected； so necessary to
the subsistence of our species； and the regulation of our
conduct； in every circumstance and occurrence of human life。
Had not the presence of an object； instantly excited the
idea of those objects； commonly conjoined with it； all our
knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our
memory and senses； and we should never have been able to
adjust means to ends； or employ our natural powers； either
to the producing of good； or avoiding of evil。 Those； who
delight in the discovery and contemplation of ； have here ample subject to employ their wonder and
admiration。
I shall add； for a further confirmation of the
foregoing theory； that； as this operation of the mind； by
which we infer like effects from like causes； and ； is so essential to the subsistence of all human
creatures； it is not probable； that it could be trusted to
the fallacious deductions of our reason； which is slow