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which》？ Had it been said； that a cause is after which
； we should have understood the
terms。 For this is； indeed； all we know of the matter。 And
this constantly forms the very essence of necessity； nor
have we any other idea of it。
＇24＇S/INCE all reasoning concerning facts or causes is
derived merely from custom； it may be asked how it happens；
that men so much surpass animals in reasoning； and one man
so much surpasses another？ Has not the same custom the same
influence on all？
We shall here endeavour briefly to explain the great
difference in human understandings： After which the reason
of the difference between men and animals will easily be
comprehended。
1。 When we have lived any time； and have been
accustomed to the uniformity of nature； we acquire a general
habit； by which we always transfer the known to the unknown；
and conceive the latter to resemble the former。 By means of
this general habitual principle； we regard even one
experiment as the foundation of reasoning； and expect a
similar event with some degree of certainty； where the
experiment has been made accurately； and free from all
foreign circumstances。 It is therefore considered as a
matter of great importance to observe the consequences of
things； and as one man may very much surpass another in
attention and memory and observation； this will make a very
great difference in their reasoning。
2。 Where there is a complication of causes to produce
any effect； one mind may be much larger than another； and
better able to comprehend the whole system of objects； and
to infer justly their consequences。
3。 One man is able to carry on a chain of consequences
to a greater length than another。
4。 Few men can think long without running into a
confusion of ideas； and mistaking one for another； and there
are various degrees of this infirmity。
5。 The circumstance； on which the effect depends； is
frequently involved in other circumstances； which are
foreign and extrinsic。 The separation of it often requires
great attention； accuracy； and subtility。
6。 The forming of general maxims from particular
observation is a very nice operation； and nothing is more
usual； from haste or a narrowness of mind； which sees not on
all sides； than to commit mistakes in this particular。
7。 When we reason from analogies； the man； who has the
greater experience or the greater promptitude of suggesting
analogies； will be the better reasoner。
8。 Biases from prejudice； education； passion； party；
&c。 hang more upon one mind than another。
9。 After we have acquired a confidence in human
testimony； books and conversation enlarge much more the
sphere of one man's experience and thought than those of
another。
It would be easy to discover many other circumstances
that make a difference in the understandings of men。
＇25＇P/LUTARCH； in vita Catonis。
＇26＇N/O I/NDIAN； it is evident； could have experience
that water did not freeze in cold climates。 This is placing
nature in a situation quite unknown to him； and it is
impossible for him to tell what will result from
it。 It is making a new experiment； the consequence of which
is always uncertain。 One may sometimes conjecture from
analogy what will follow； but still this is but conjecture。
And it must be confessed； that； in the present case of
freezing； the event follows contrary to the rules of
analogy； and is such as a rational I/NDIAN would not look
for。 The operations of cold upon water are not gradual；
according to the degrees of cold； but whenever it comes to
the freezing point； the water passes in a moment； from the
utmost liquidity to perfect hardness。 Such an event；
therefore； may be denominated ； and requires
a pretty strong testimony； to render it credible to people
in a warm climate： But still it is not ； nor
contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in
cases where all the circumstances are the same。 The
inhabitants of S/UMATRA have always seen water fluid in
their own climate； and the freezing of their rivers ought to
be deemed a prodigy： But they never saw water in M/USCOVY
during the winter； and therefore they cannot reasonably be
positive what would there be the consequence。
＇27＇S/OMETIMES an event may not； ；
to be contrary to the laws of nature； and yet； if it were
real； it might； by reason of some circumstances； be
denominated a miracle； because； in ； it is contrary to
these laws。 Thus if a person； claiming a divine authority；
should command a sick person to be well； a healthful man to
fall down dead； the clouds to pour rain； the winds to blow；
in short； should order many natural events； which
immediately follow upon his command； these might justly be
esteemed miracles； because they are really； in this case；
contrary to the laws of nature。 For if any suspicion remain；
that the event and command concurred by accident there is no
miracle and no transgression of the laws of nature。 If this
suspicion be removed； there is evidently a miracle； and a
transgression of these laws； because nothing can be more
contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man
should have such an influence。 A miracle may be accurately
defined； 。 A miracle may either be discoverable by
men or not。 This alters not its nature and essence。 The
raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible
miracle。 The raising of a feather； when the wind wants ever
so little of a force requisite for that purpose； is as real
a miracle； though not so sensible with regard to us。
＇28＇It may perhaps be objected that I proceed rashly
and from my notions of A/LEXANDER merely from the account
given of him by Lucian； a professed enemy。 It were indeed to
be wished that some of the accounts published by his
followers and accomplices had remained。 The opposition and
contrast betwixt the character and conduct of the same man
as drawn by a friend or an enemy is as strong； even in
common life； much more in these religious matters； as that
betwixt any to men in the world； betwixt A/LEXANDER and St。
Paul； for instance。 See a Letter to Gilbert West； Esq。； on
the Conversion and Apostleship of St。 Paul。 ＇This note was
removed by Hume from later editions of the 。
J。F。＇
＇29＇Hist。 lib。 v。 cap。 8； S/UETONIUS gives nearly the
same account in vita V/ESP。
＇30＇T/HIS book was by Mons。 M/ONTGERON； counsellor or
judge of the parliament of P/ARIS； a man of figure and
character； who was also a martyr to the cause； and is now
said to be somewhere in a dungeon on account of his book。
There is another book in three volumes （called