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thinking are derived either from our outward or inward
sentiment： The mixture and composition of these belongs
alone to the mind and will。 Or； to express myself in
philosophical language； all our ideas or more feeble
perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively
ones。
To prove this； the two following arguments will； I
hope； be sufficient。 First； when we analyze our thoughts or
ideas； however compounded or sublime； we always find that
they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were
copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment。 Even those
ideas； which； at first view； seem the most wide of this
origin； are found； upon a nearer scrutiny； to be derived
from it。 The idea of God； as meaning an infinitely
intelligent； wise； and good Being； arises from reflecting on
the operations of our own mind； and augmenting； without
limit； those qualities of goodness and wisdom。 We may
prosecute this enquiry to what length we please； where we
shall always find； that every idea which we examine is
copied from a similar impression。 Those who would assert
that this position is not universally true nor without
exception； have only one； and that an easy method of
refuting it； by producing that idea； which； in their
opinion； is not derived from this source。 It will then be
incumbent on us； if we would maintain our doctrine； to
produce the impression； or lively perception； which
corresponds to it。
Secondly。 If it happen； from a defect of the organ；
that a man is not susceptible of any species of sensation；
we always find that he is as little susceptible of the
correspondent ideas。 A blind man can form no notion of
colours； a deaf man of sounds。 Restore either of them that
sense in which he is deficient； by opening this new inlet
for his sensations； you also open an inlet for the ideas；
and he finds no difficulty in conceiving these objects。 The
case is the same； if the object； proper for exciting any
sensation； has never been applied to the organ。 A
L/APLANDER or N/EGROE has no notion of the relish of wine。
And though there are few or no instances of a like
deficiency in the mind； where a person has never felt or is
wholly incapable of a sentiment or passion that belongs to
his species； yet we find the same observation to take place
in a less degree。 A man of mild manners can form no idea of
inveterate revenge or cruelty； nor can a selfish heart
easily conceive the heights of friendship and generosity。 It
is readily allowed； that other beings may possess many
senses of which we can have no conception； because the ideas
of them have never been introduced to us in the only manner
by which an idea can have access to the mind； to wit； by the
actual feeling and sensation。
There is； however； one contradictory phenomenon； which
may prove that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to
arise； independent of their correspondent impressions。 I
believe it will readily be allowed； that the several
distinct ideas of colour； which enter by the eye； or those
of sound； which are conveyed by the ear； are really
different from each other； though； at the same time；
resembling。 Now if this be true of different colours； it
must be no less so of the different shades of the same
colour； and each shade produces a distinct idea； independent
of the rest。 For if this should be denied； it is possible；
by the continual gradation of shades； to run a colour
insensibly into what is most remote from it； and if you will
not allow any of the means to be different； you cannot；
without absurdity； deny the extremes to be the same。
Suppose； therefore； a person to have enjoyed his sight for
thirty years； and to have become perfectly acquainted with
colours of all kinds except one particular shade of blue；
for instance； which it never has been his fortune to meet
with。 Let all the different shades of that colour； except
that single one； be placed before him； descending gradually
from the deepest to the lightest； it is plain that he will
perceive a blank； where that shade is wanting； and will be
sensible that there is a greater distance in that place
between the contiguous colour than in any other。 Now I ask；
whether it be possible for him； from his own imagination； to
supply this deficiency； and raise up to himself the idea of
that particular shade； though it had never been conveyed to
him by his senses？ I believe there are few but will be of
opinion that he can： And this may serve as a proof that the
simple ideas are not always； in every instance； derived from
the correspondent impressions； though this instance is so
singular； that it is scarcely worth our observing； and does
not merit that for it alone we should alter our general
maxim。
Here； therefore； is a proposition； which not only
seems； in itself； simple and intelligible； but； if a proper
use were made of it； might render every dispute equally
intelligible； and banish all that jargon； which has so long
taken possession of metaphysical reasonings； and drawn
disgrace upon them。 All ideas； especially abstract ones； are
naturally faint and obscure： The mind has but a slender hold
of them： They are apt to be confounded with other resembling
ideas； and when we have often employed any term； though
without a distinct meaning； we are apt to imagine it has a
determinate idea annexed to it。 On the contrary； all
impressions； that is； all sensations； either outward or
inward； are strong and vivid： The limits between them are
more exactly determined： Nor is it easy to fall into any
error or mistake with regard to them。 When we entertain；
therefore； any suspicion that a philosophical term is
employed without any meaning or idea （as is but too
frequent）； we need but enquire； ？ And if it be impossible to
assign any； this will serve to confirm our suspicion。 By
bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope
to remove all dispute； which may arise； concerning their
nature and reality。＇4＇
* * * *
SECTION III。
Of the Association of Ideas。
I/T is evident that there is a principle of connexion
between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind； and
that in their appearance to the memory or imagination； they
introduce each other with a certain degree of method and
regularity。 In our more serious thinking or discourse this
is so observable that any particular thought； which breaks
in upon the regular tract or chain of ideas； is immediately
remarked and rejected。 And even in our wildest and most
wandering reveries； nay in our very dreams； we shall find；
if we reflect； that the imagination ran not altogether at
adventures； but that there was still a connexion upheld
among the different ideas； which succeeded each other。 Were
the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed； there
would immediately be observed something which connected it
in all its transitions。 Or where this is wanting； the person
who broke the thread of discourse might still inform you；
that there had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of
thought； which had gradually led him from the subject of
conversation。 Among different languages； even where we
cannot suspect the least connexion or communication； it is
found； that the words； expressive of ideas； the most
compounded； do yet nearly correspond to each other： A
certain proof that the simple ideas； comprehended in the
compound ones； were bound together by some universal
principle； which had an equal influence on all mankind。
Though it be too obvious to escape observation； that
different ideas are connected together； I do not find that
any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the
principles of association； a subject； however； that seems
worthy of curiosity。 To me； there appear to be only three
principles of connexion among ideas； namely； ；
in time or place； and or 。
That these principles serve to connect ideas will not；
I believe； be much doubted。 A picture naturally leads our
thoughts to the original：＇5＇ the mention of one apartment in
a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse
concerning the others：＇6＇ and if we think of a wound； we can
scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it。＇7＇
But that this enumeration is complete； and that there are no
other principles of association except these； may be
difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader； or
even to a man's own satisfaction。 All we can do； in such
cases； is to run over several instances； and examine
carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts
to each other； never stopping till we render the principle
as general as possible。＇8＇ The more instances we examine；
and the more care we employ； the more assurance shall we
acquire； that the enumeration； which we form from the whole；
is complete and entire。＇9＇
Instead of entering into a detail of this kind； which
would lead us into many useless subtilties； we shall
consider some of the effects of this connection upon the