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enlarged treatment of moral ideas； which was rendered necessary by the
extreme pure moral law of our religion； awakened the interest； and
thereby quickened the perceptions of reason in relation to this
object。 In this way； and without the help either of an extended
acquaintance with nature； or of a reliable transcendental insight （for
these have been wanting in all ages）； a conception of the Divine Being
was arrived at； which we now bold to be the correct one； not because
speculative reason convinces us of its correctness； but because it
accords with the moral principles of reason。 Thus it is to pure
reason； but only in its practical use； that we must ascribe the
merit of having connected with our highest interest a cognition； of
which mere speculation was able only to form a conjecture； but the
validity of which it was unable to establish… and of having thereby
rendered it； not indeed a demonstrated dogma； but a hypothesis
absolutely necessary to the essential ends of reason。
But if practical reason has reached this elevation； and has attained
to the conception of a sole Primal Being as the supreme good； it
must not； therefore； imagine that it has transcended the empirical
conditions of its application； and risen to the immediate cognition of
new objects； it must not presume to start from the conception which it
has gained； and to deduce from it the moral laws themselves。 For it
was these very laws； the internal practical necessity of which led
us to the hypothesis of an independent cause； or of a wise ruler of
the universe； who should give them effect。 Hence we are not entitled
to regard them as accidental and derived from the mere will of the
ruler； especially as we have no conception of such a will； except as
formed in accordance with these laws。 So far； then； as practical
reason has the right to conduct us； we shall not look upon actions
as binding on us； because they are the commands of God； but we shall
regard them as divine commands； because we are internally bound by
them。 We shall study freedom under the teleological unity which
accords with principles of reason； we shall look upon ourselves as
acting in conformity with the divine will only in so far as we hold
sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from the nature of
actions themselves； and we shall believe that we can obey that will
only by promoting the weal of the universe in ourselves and in others。
Moral theology is； therefore； only of immanent use。 It teaches us to
fulfil our destiny here in the world； by placing ourselves in
harmony with the general system of ends； and warns us against the
fanaticism； nay； the crime of depriving reason of its legislative
authority in the moral conduct of life； for the purpose of directly
connecting this authority with the idea of the Supreme Being。 For this
would be； not an immanent； but a transcendent use of moral theology；
and； like the transcendent use of mere speculation； would inevitably
pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason。
SECTION III。 Of Opinion； Knowledge； and Belief。
The holding of a thing to be true is a phenomenon in our
understanding which may rest on objective grounds； but requires； also；
subjective causes in the mind of the person judging。 If a judgement is
valid for every rational being； then its ground is objectively
sufficient； and it is termed a conviction。 If； on the other hand； it
has its ground in the particular character of the subject； it is
termed a persuasion。
Persuasion is a mere illusion； the ground of the judgement； which
lies solely in the subject； being regarded as objective。 Hence a
judgement of this kind has only private validity… is only valid for
the individual who judges； and the holding of a thing to be true in
this way cannot be communicated。 But truth depends upon agreement with
the object； and consequently the judgements of all understandings；
if true； must be in agreement with each other （consentientia uni
tertio consentiunt inter se）。 Conviction may； therefore； be
distinguished； from an external point of view； from persuasion； by the
possibility of communicating it and by showing its validity for the
reason of every man； for in this case the presumption； at least；
arises that the agreement of all judgements with each other； in
spite of the different characters of individuals； rests upon the
common ground of the agreement of each with the object； and thus the
correctness of the judgement is established。
Persuasion； accordingly； cannot be subjectively distinguished from
conviction； that is； so long as the subject views its judgement simply
as a phenomenon of its own mind。 But if we inquire whether the grounds
of our judgement； which are valid for us； produce the same effect on
the reason of others as on our own； we have then the means； though
only subjective means； not； indeed； of producing conviction； but of
detecting the merely private validity of the judgement； in other
words； of discovering that there is in it the element of mere
persuasion。
If we can； in addition to this； develop the subjective causes of the
judgement； which we have taken for its objective grounds； and thus
explain the deceptive judgement as a phenomenon in our mind； apart
altogether from the objective character of the object； we can then
expose the illusion and need be no longer deceived by it； although； if
its subjective cause lies in our nature； we cannot hope altogether
to escape its influence。
I can only maintain； that is； affirm as necessarily valid for
every one； that which produces conviction。 Persuasion I may keep for
myself； if it is agreeable to me； but I cannot； and ought not； to
attempt to impose it as binding upon others。
Holding for true； or the subjective validity of a judgement in
relation to conviction （which is； at the same time； objectively
valid）； has the three following degrees： opinion； belief； and
knowledge。 Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgement；
subjectively as well as objectively。 Belief is subjectively
sufficient； but is recognized as being objectively insufficient。
Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient。
Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction （for myself）； objective
sufficiency is termed certainty （for all）。 I need not dwell longer
on the explanation of such simple conceptions。
I must never venture to be of opinion； without knowing something； at
least； by which my judgement； in itself merely problematical； is
brought into connection with the truth… which connection； although not
perfect； is still something more than an arbitrary fiction。
Moreover； the law of such a connection must be certain。 For if； in
relation to this law； I have nothing more than opinion； my judgement
is but a play of the imagination； without the least relation to truth。
In the judgements of pure reason； opinion has no place。 For； as they
do not rest on empirical grounds and as the sphere of pure reason is
that of necessary truth and a priori cognition； the principle of
connection in it requires universality and necessity； and consequently
perfect certainty… otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at
all。 Hence it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics； we
must know； or abstain from forming a judgement altogether。 The case is
the same with the maxims of morality。 For we must not hazard an action
on the mere opinion that it is allowed； but we must know it to be so。
In the transcendental sphere of reason； on the other hand； the
term opinion is too weak； while the word knowledge is too strong。 From
the merely speculative point of view； therefore； we cannot form a
judgement at all。 For the subjective grounds of a judgement； such as
produce belief； cannot be admitted in speculative inquiries；
inasmuch as they cannot stand without empirical support and are
incapable of being communicated to others in equal measure。
But it is only from the practical point of view that a theoretically
insufficient judgement can be termed belief。 Now the practical
reference is either to skill or to morality； to the former； when the
end proposed is arbitrary and accidental； to the latter； when it is
absolutely necessary。
If we propose to ourselves any end whatever； the conditions of its
attainment are hypothetically necessary。 The necessity is
subjectively； but still only comparatively； sufficient； if I am
acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can be
attained。 On the other hand； it is sufficient； absolutely and for
every one； if I know for certain that no one can be acquainted with
any other conditions under which the attainment of the proposed end
would be possible。 In the former case my supposition… my judgement
with regard to certain conditions… is a merely accidental belief； in
the latter it is a necessary belief。 The physician must pursue some
course in the case of a patient who is in danger； but is ignorant of
the nature o