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must then have a point of time in which it was not。 But how and by
what can we fix and determine this point of time； unless by that which
already exists？ For a void time… preceding… is not an object of
perception； but if we connect this beginning with objects which
existed previously； and which continue to exist till the object in
question in question begins to be； then the latter can only be a
determination of the former as the permanent。 The same holds good of
the notion of extinction； for this presupposes the empirical
representation of a time； in which a phenomenon no longer exists。
Substances （in the world of phenomena） are the substratum of all
determinations of time。 The beginning of some； and the ceasing to be
of other substances； would utterly do away with the only condition
of the empirical unity of time； and in that case phenomena would
relate to two different times； in which； side by side； existence would
pass； which is absurd。 For there is only one time in which all
different times must be placed； not as coexistent； but as successive。
Accordingly； permanence is a necessary condition under which alone
phenomena； as things or objects； are determinable in a possible
experience。 But as regards the empirical criterion of this necessary
permanence； and with it of the substantiality of phenomena； we shall
find sufficient opportunity to speak in the sequel。
B。 SECOND ANALOGY。
Principle of the Succession of Time According
to the Law of Causality。
All changes take place according to the law of the
connection of Cause and Effect。
PROOF。
（That all phenomena in the succession of time are only changes； that
is； a successive being and non…being of the determinations of
substance； which is permanent； consequently that a being of
substance itself which follows on the non…being thereof； or a
non…being of substance which follows on the being thereof； in other
words； that the origin or extinction of substance itself； is
impossible… all this has been fully established in treating of the
foregoing principle。 This principle might have been expressed as
follows： 〃All alteration （succession） of phenomena is merely
change〃； for the changes of substance are not origin or extinction；
because the conception of change presupposes the same subject as
existing with two opposite determinations； and consequently as
permanent。 After this premonition； we shall proceed to the proof。）
I perceive that phenomena succeed one another； that is to say； a
state of things exists at one time； the opposite of which existed in a
former state。 In this case； then； I really connect together two
perceptions in time。 Now connection is not an operation of mere
sense and intuition； but is the product of a synthetical faculty of
imagination； which determines the internal sense in respect of a
relation of time。 But imagination can connect these two states in
two ways； so that either the one or the other may antecede in time；
for time in itself cannot be an object of perception； and what in an
object precedes and what follows cannot be empirically determined in
relation to it。 I am only conscious； then； that my imagination
places one state before and the other after； not that the one state
antecedes the other in the object。 In other words； the objective
relation of the successive phenomena remains quite undetermined by
means of mere perception。 Now in order that this relation may be
cognized as determined； the relation between the two states must be so
cogitated that it is thereby determined as necessary； which of them
must be placed before and which after； and not conversely。 But the
conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical unity； can
be none other than a pure conception of the understanding which does
not lie in mere perception； and in this case it is the conception of
〃the relation of cause and effect；〃 the former of which determines the
latter in time； as its necessary consequence； and not as something
which might possibly antecede （or which might in some cases not be
perceived to follow）。 It follows that it is only because we subject
the sequence of phenomena； and consequently all change； to the law
of causality； that experience itself； that is； empirical cognition
of phenomena； becomes possible； and consequently； that phenomena
themselves； as objects of experience； are possible only by virtue of
this law。
Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is always
successive。 The representations of parts succeed one another。
Whether they succeed one another in the object also； is a second point
for reflection； which was not contained in the former。 Now we may
certainly give the name of object to everything； even to every
representation； so far as we are conscious thereof； but what this word
may mean in the case of phenomena； not merely in so far as they （as
representations） are objects； but only in so far as they indicate an
object； is a question requiring deeper consideration。 In so far as
they； regarded merely as representations； are at the same time objects
of consciousness； they are not to be distinguished from
apprehension； that is； reception into the synthesis of imagination；
and we must therefore say： 〃The manifold of phenomena is always
produced successively in the mind。〃 If phenomena were things in
themselves； no man would be able to conjecture from the succession
of our representations how this manifold is connected in the object；
for we have to do only with our representations。 How things may be
in themselves； without regard to the representations through which
they affect us； is utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition。 Now
although phenomena are not things in themselves； and are
nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized； it is my
duty to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold
in phenomena themselves； while the representation of this manifold
in apprehension is always successive。 For example； the apprehension of
the manifold in the phenomenon of a house which stands before me； is
successive。 Now comes the question whether the manifold of this
house is in itself successive… which no one will be at all willing
to grant。 But； so soon as I raise my conception of an object to the
transcendental signification thereof； I find that the house is not a
thing in itself； but only a phenomenon； that is； a representation； the
transcendental object of which remains utterly unknown。 What then am I
to understand by the question： 〃How can the manifold be connected in
the phenomenon itself… not considered as a thing in itself； but merely
as a phenomenon？〃 Here that which lies in my successive apprehension
is regarded as representation； whilst the phenomenon which is given
me； notwithstanding that it is nothing more than a complex of these
representations； is regarded as the object thereof； with which my
conception； drawn from the representations of apprehension； must
harmonize。 It is very soon seen that； as accordance of the cognition
with its object constitutes truth； the question now before us can only
relate to the formal conditions of empirical truth； and that the
phenomenon； in opposition to the representations of apprehension；
can only be distinguished therefrom as the object of them； if it is
subject to a rule which distinguishes it from every other
apprehension； and which renders necessary a mode of connection of
the manifold。 That in the phenomenon which contains the condition of
this necessary rule of apprehension； is the object。
Let us now proceed to our task。 That something happens； that is to
say； that something or some state exists which before was not；
cannot be empirically perceived； unless a phenomenon precedes； which
does not contain in itself this state。 For a reality which should
follow upon a void time； in other words； a beginning； which no state
of things precedes； can just as little be apprehended as the void time
itself。 Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which
follows upon another perception。 But as this is the case with all
synthesis of apprehension； as I have shown above in the example of a
house； my apprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently
distinguished from other apprehensions。 But I remark also that if in a
phenomenon which contains an occurrence； I call the antecedent state
of my perception； A； and the following state； B； the perception B
can only follow A in apprehension； and the perception A cannot
follow B； but only precede it。 For example； I see a ship float down
the stream of a river。 My perception of its place lower down follows
upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river； and
it is impossible that； in the apprehension of this phenomenon； the
vessel should be perceived first below and afterwards higher up the
stream。 Here； theref