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after an antecedent time； in which it did not exist。 But it can
receive its determined place in time only by the presupposition that
something existed in the foregoing state； upon which it follows
inevitably and always； that is； in conformity with a rule。 From all
this it is evident that； in the first place； I cannot reverse the
order of succession； and make that which happens precede that upon
which it follows； and that； in the second place； if the antecedent
state be posited； a certain determinate event inevitably and
necessarily follows。 Hence it follows that there exists a certain
order in our representations； whereby the present gives a sure
indication of some previously existing state； as a correlate； though
still undetermined； of the existing event which is given… a
correlate which itself relates to the event as its consequence；
conditions it； and connects it necessarily with itself in the series
of time。
If then it be admitted as a necessary law of sensibility； and
consequently a formal condition of all perception； that the
preceding necessarily determines the succeeding time （inasmuch as I
cannot arrive at the succeeding except through the preceding）； it must
likewise be an indispensable law of empirical representation of the
series of time that the phenomena of the past determine all
phenomena in the succeeding time； and that the latter； as events；
cannot take place； except in so far as the former determine their
existence in time； that is to say； establish it according to a rule。
For it is of course only in phenomena that we can empirically
cognize this continuity in the connection of times。
For all experience and for the possibility of experience；
understanding is indispensable； and the first step which it takes in
this sphere is not to render the representation of objects clear；
but to render the representation of an object in general； possible。 It
does this by applying the order of time to phenomena； and their
existence。 In other words； it assigns to each phenomenon； as a
consequence； a place in relation to preceding phenomena； determined
a priori in time； without which it could not harmonize with time
itself； which determines a place a priori to all its parts。 This
determination of place cannot be derived from the relation of
phenomena to absolute time （for it is not an object of perception）；
but； on the contrary； phenomena must reciprocally determine the places
in time of one another； and render these necessary in the order of
time。 In other words； whatever follows or happens； must follow in
conformity with a universal rule upon that which was contained in
the foregoing state。 Hence arises a series of phenomena； which； by
means of the understanding； produces and renders necessary exactly the
same order and continuous connection in the series of our possible
perceptions； as is found a priori in the form of internal intuition
（time）； in which all our perceptions must have place。
That something happens； then； is a perception which belongs to a
possible experience； which becomes real only because I look upon the
phenomenon as determined in regard to its place in time；
consequently as an object； which can always be found by means of a
rule in the connected series of my perceptions。 But this rule of the
determination of a thing according to succession in time is as
follows： 〃In what precedes may be found the condition； under which
an event always （that is； necessarily） follows。〃 From all this it is
obvious that the principle of cause and effect is the principle of
possible experience； that is； of objective cognition of phenomena；
in regard to their relations in the succession of time。
The proof of this fundamental proposition rests entirely on the
following momenta of argument。 To all empirical cognition belongs
the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination； a synthesis which is
always successive； that is； in which the representations therein
always follow one another。 But the order of succession in
imagination is not determined； and the series of successive
representations may be taken retrogressively as well as progressively。
But if this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension （of the
manifold of a given phenomenon）；then the order is determined in the
object； or to speak more accurately； there is therein an order of
successive synthesis which determines an object； and according to
which something necessarily precedes； and when this is posited；
something else necessarily follows。 If； then； my perception is to
contain the cognition of an event； that is； of something which
really happens； it must be an empirical judgement； wherein we think
that the succession is determined； that is； it presupposes another
phenomenon； upon which this event follows necessarily； or in
conformity with a rule。 If； on the contrary； when I posited the
antecedent； the event did not necessarily follow； I should be
obliged to consider it merely as a subjective play of my
imagination； and if in this I represented to myself anything as
objective； I must look upon it as a mere dream。 Thus； the relation
of phenomena （as possible perceptions）； according to which that
which happens is； as to its existence； necessarily determined in
time by something which antecedes； in conformity with a rule… in other
words； the relation of cause and effect… is the condition of the
objective validity of our empirical judgements in regard to the
sequence of perceptions； consequently of their empirical truth； and
therefore of experience。 The principle of the relation of causality in
the succession of phenomena is therefore valid for all objects of
experience； because it is itself the ground of the possibility of
experience。
Here； however； a difficulty arises； which must be resolved。 The
principle of the connection of causality among phenomena is limited in
our formula to the succession thereof； although in practice we find
that the principle applies also when the phenomena exist together in
the same time； and that cause and effect may be simultaneous。 For
example； there is heat in a room； which does not exist in the open
air。 I look about for the cause； and find it to be the fire； Now the
fire as the cause is simultaneous with its effect； the heat of the
room。 In this case； then； there is no succession as regards time；
between cause and effect； but they are simultaneous； and still the law
holds good。 The greater part of operating causes in nature are
simultaneous with their effects； and the succession in time of the
latter is produced only because the cause cannot achieve the total
of its effect in one moment。 But at the moment when the effect first
arises； it is always simultaneous with the causality of its cause；
because； if the cause had but a moment before ceased to be； the effect
could not have arisen。 Here it must be specially remembered that we
must consider the order of time and not the lapse thereof。 The
relation remains； even though no time has elapsed。 The time between
the causality of the cause and its immediate effect may entirely
vanish； and the cause and effect be thus simultaneous； but the
relation of the one to the other remains always determinable according
to time。 If； for example； I consider a leaden ball； which lies upon
a cushion and makes a hollow in it； as a cause； then it is
simultaneous with the effect。 But I distinguish the two through the
relation of time of the dynamical connection of both。 For if I lay the
ball upon the cushion； then the hollow follows upon the before
smooth surface； but supposing the cushion has； from some cause or
another； a hollow； there does not thereupon follow a leaden ball。
Thus； the law of succession of time is in all instances the only
empirical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of the
antecedent cause。 The glass is the cause of the rising of the water
above its horizontal surface； although the two phenomena are
contemporaneous。 For； as soon as I draw some water with the glass from
a larger vessel； an effect follows thereupon； namely； the change of
the horizontal state which the water had in the large vessel into a
concave； which it assumes in the glass。
This conception of causality leads us to the conception of action；
that of action； to the conception of force； and through it； to the
conception of substance。 As I do not wish this critical essay； the
sole purpose of which is to treat of the sources of our synthetical
cognition a priori； to be crowded with analyses which merely
explain； but do not enlarge the sphere of our conceptions； I reserve
the detailed explanation of the above conceptions for a future
system of pure reason。 Such an analysis； indeed； executed with great
particularity； may already be found in well…known works on this
subject。 But I cannot at present refrain from making a few remarks
on the empirical criterion of a substance； in so far as it seems to be
more evident an