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it is； with all to which it serves as condition； a nonentity。 But
the foundation for this kind of idealism we have already destroyed
in the transcendental aesthetic。 Problematical idealism； which makes
no such assertion； but only alleges our incapacity to prove the
existence of anything besides ourselves by means of immediate
experience； is a theory rational and evidencing a thorough and
philosophical mode of thinking； for it observes the rule not to form a
decisive judgement before sufficient proof be shown。 The desired proof
must therefore demonstrate that we have experience of external things；
and not mere fancies。 For this purpose； we must prove； that our
internal and； to Descartes； indubitable experience is itself
possible only under the previous assumption of external experience。
THEOREM。
The simple but empirically determined consciousness of
my own existence proves the existence of external
objects in space。
PROOF
I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time。 All
determination in regard to time presupposes the existence of something
permanent in perception。 But this permanent something cannot be
something in me； for the very reason that my existence in time is
itself determined by this permanent something。 It follows that the
perception of this permanent existence is possible only through a
thing without me and not through the mere representation of a thing
without me。 Consequently； the determination of my existence in time is
possible only through the existence of real things external to me。
Now； consciousness in time is necessarily connected with the
consciousness of the possibility of this determination in time。
Hence it follows that consciousness in time is necessarily connected
also with the existence of things without me； inasmuch as the
existence of these things is the condition of determination in time。
That is to say； the consciousness of my own existence is at the same
time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things
without me。
Remark I。 The reader will observe； that in the foregoing proof the
game which idealism plays is retorted upon itself； and with more
justice。 It assumed that the only immediate experience is internal and
that from this we can only infer the existence of external things。
But； as always happens； when we reason from given effects to
determined causes； idealism bas reasoned with too much haste and
uncertainty； for it is quite possible that the cause of our
representations may lie in ourselves； and that we ascribe it falsely
to external things。 But our proof shows that external experience is
properly immediate；* that only by virtue of it… not； indeed； the
consciousness of our own existence； but certainly the determination of
our existence in time； that is； internal experience… is possible。 It
is true； that the representation 〃I am；〃 which is the expression of
the consciousness which can accompany all my thoughts； is that which
immediately includes the existence of a subject。 But in this
representation we cannot find any knowledge of the subject； and
therefore also no empirical knowledge； that is； experience。 For
experience contains； in addition to the thought of something existing；
intuition； and in this case it must be internal intuition； that is；
time； in relation to which the subject must be determined。 But the
existence of external things is absolutely requisite for this purpose；
so that it follows that internal experience is itself possible only
mediately and through external experience。
*The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things is；
in the preceding theorem； not presupposed； but proved； by the
possibility of this consciousness understood by us or not。 The
question as to the possibility of it would stand thus： 〃Have we an
internal sense； but no external sense； and is our belief in external
perception a mere delusion？〃 But it is evident that； in order merely
to fancy to ourselves anything as external； that is； to present it
to the sense in intuition we must already possess an external sense；
and must thereby distinguish immediately the mere receptivity of an
external intuition from the spontaneity which characterizes every
act of imagination。 For merely to imagine also an external sense；
would annihilate the faculty of intuition itself which is to be
determined by the imagination。
Remark II。 Now with this view all empirical use of our faculty of
cognition in the determination of time is in perfect accordance。 Its
truth is supported by the fact that it is possible to perceive a
determination of time only by means of a change in external
relations （motion） to the permanent in space （for example； we become
aware of the sun's motion by observing the changes of his relation
to the objects of this earth）。 But this is not all。 We find that we
possess nothing permanent that can correspond and be submitted to
the conception of a substance as intuition； except matter。 This idea
of permanence is not itself derived from external experience； but is
an a priori necessary condition of all determination of time；
consequently also of the internal sense in reference to our own
existence； and that through the existence of external things。 In the
representation 〃I；〃 the consciousness of myself is not an intuition；
but a merely intellectual representation produced by the spontaneous
activity of a thinking subject。 It follows； that this 〃I〃 has not
any predicate of intuition； which； in its character of permanence；
could serve as correlate to the determination of time in the
internal sense… in the same way as impenetrability is the correlate of
matter as an empirical intuition。
Remark III。 From the fact that the existence of external things is a
necessary condition of the possibility of a determined consciousness
of ourselves； it does not follow that every intuitive representation
of external things involves the existence of these things； for their
representations may very well be the mere products of the
imagination （in dreams as well as in madness）； though； indeed； these
are themselves created by the reproduction of previous external
perceptions； which； as has been shown； are possible only through the
reality of external objects。 The sole aim of our remarks has； however；
been to prove that internal experience in general is possible only
through external experience in general。 Whether this or that
supposed experience be purely imaginary must be discovered from its
particular determinations and by comparing these with the criteria
of all real experience。
Finally； as regards the third postulate； it applies to material
necessity in existence； and not to merely formal and logical necessity
in the connection of conceptions。 Now as we cannot cognize
completely a priori the existence of any object of sense； though we
can do so comparatively a priori； that is； relatively to some other
previously given existence… a cognition； however； which can only be of
such an existence as must be contained in the complex of experience；
of which the previously given perception is a part… the necessity of
existence can never be cognized from conceptions； but always； on the
contrary； from its connection with that which is an object of
perception。 But the only existence cognized； under the condition of
other given phenomena； as necessary； is the existence of effects
from given causes in conformity with the laws of causality。 It is
consequently not the necessity of the existence of things （as
substances）； but the necessity of the state of things that we cognize；
and that not immediately； but by means of the existence of other
states given in perception； according to empirical laws of
causality。 Hence it follows that the criterion of necessity is to be
found only in the law of possible experience… that everything which
happens is determined a priori in the phenomenon by its cause。 Thus we
cognize only the necessity of effects in nature； the causes of which
are given us。 Moreover； the criterion of necessity in existence
possesses no application beyond the field of possible experience；
and even in this it is not valid of the existence of things as
substances； because these can never be considered as empirical
effects； or as something that happens and has a beginning。
Necessity； therefore； regards only the relations of phenomena
according to the dynamical law of causality； and the possibility
grounded thereon； of reasoning from some given existence （of a
cause） a priori to another existence （of an effect）。 〃Everything
that happens is hypothetically necessary；〃 is a principle which
subjects the changes that take place in the world to a law； that is；
to a rule of necessary existence； without which nature herself could
not possibly exist。 Hence the proposition； 〃Nothing happens by blind
chanc