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now in writing that you are seated…a false statement； though it was
true at the time when it was written： therefore the statement that was
written is at the same time false and true。' But this is fallacious；
for the falsity or truth of a statement or opinion indicates not a
substance but a quality： for the same account applies to the case of
an opinion as well。 Again； 'Is what a learner learns what he
learns？' 'Yes。' 'But suppose some one learns 〃slow〃 quick'。 Then his
（the sophist's） words denote not what the learner learns but how he
learns it。 Also； 'Does a man tread upon what he walks through？
'Yes。' 'But X walks through a whole day。' No； rather the words
denote not what he walks through； but when he walks； just as when
any one uses the words 'to drink the cup' he denotes not what he
drinks； but the vessel out of which he drinks。 Also； 'Is it either
by learning or by discovery that a man knows what he knows？' 'Yes。'
'But suppose that of a pair of things he has discovered one and
learned the other； the pair is not known to him by either method。' No：
'what' he knows； means' every single thing' he knows； individually；
but this does not mean 'all the things' he knows； collectively。 Again；
there is the proof that there is a 'third man' distinct from Man and
from individual men。 But that is a fallacy； for 'Man'； and indeed
every general predicate； denotes not an individual substance； but a
particular quality； or the being related to something in a
particular manner； or something of that sort。 Likewise also in the
case of 'Coriscus' and 'Coriscus the musician' there is the problem；
Are they the same or different？' For the one denotes an individual
substance and the other a quality； so that it cannot be isolated；
though it is not the isolation which creates the 'third man'； but
the admission that it is an individual substance。 For 'Man' cannot
be an individual substance； as Callias is。 Nor is the case improved
one whit even if one were to call the clement he has isolated not an
individual substance but a quality： for there will still be the one
beside the many； just as 'Man' was。 It is evident then that one must
not grant that what is a common predicate applying to a class
universally is an individual substance； but must say that denotes
either a quality； or a relation； or a quantity； or something of that
kind。
23
It is a general rule in dealing with arguments that depend on
language that the solution always follows the opposite of the point on
which the argument turns： e。g。 if the argument depends upon
combination； then the solution consists in division； if upon division；
then in combination。 Again； if it depends on an acute accent； the
solution is a grave accent； if on a grave accent； it is an acute。 If
it depends on ambiguity； one can solve it by using the opposite
term； e。g。 if you find yourself calling something inanimate； despite
your previous denial that it was so； show in what sense it is alive：
if； on the other hand； one has declared it to be inanimate and the
sophist has proved it to be animate； say how it is inanimate。 Likewise
also in a case of amphiboly。 If the argument depends on likeness of
expression； the opposite will be the solution。 'Could a man give
what he has not got？ 'No； not what he has not got； but he could give
it in a way in which he has not got it； e。g。 one die by itself。'
Does a man know either by learning or by discovery each thing that
he knows； singly？ but not the things that he knows； collectively。'
Also a man treads； perhaps； on any thing he walks through； but not
on the time he walks through。 Likewise also in the case of the other
examples。
24
In dealing with arguments that depend on Accident； one and the
same solution meets all cases。 For since it is indeterminate when an
attribute should be ascribed to a thing； in cases where it belongs
to the accident of the thing； and since in some cases it is
generally agreed and people admit that it belongs； while in others
they deny that it need belong； we should therefore； as soon as the
conclusion has been drawn； say in answer to them all alike； that there
is no need for such an attribute to belong。 One must； however； be
prepared to adduce an example of the kind of attribute meant。 All
arguments such as the following depend upon Accident。 'Do you know
what I am going to ask you？ you know the man who is approaching'； or
'the man in the mask'？ 'Is the statue your work of art？' or 'Is the
dog your father？' 'Is the product of a small number with a small
number a small number？' For it is evident in all these cases that
there is no necessity for the attribute which is true of the thing's
accident to be true of the thing as well。 For only to things that
are indistinguishable and one in essence is it generally agreed that
all the same attributes belong； whereas in the case of a good thing；
to be good is not the same as to be going to be the subject of a
question； nor in the case of a man approaching； or wearing a mask；
is 'to be approaching' the same thing as 'to be Coriscus'； so that
suppose I know Coriscus； but do not know the man who is approaching；
it still isn't the case that I both know and do not know the same man；
nor； again； if this is mine and is also a work of art； is it therefore
my work of art； but my property or thing or something else。 （The
solution is after the same manner in the other cases as well。）
Some solve these refutations by demolishing the original proposition
asked： for they say that it is possible to know and not to know the
same thing； only not in the same respect： accordingly； when they don't
know the man who is coming towards them； but do know Corsicus； they
assert that they do know and don't know the same object； but not in
the same respect。 Yet； as we have already remarked； the correction
of arguments that depend upon the same point ought to be the same；
whereas this one will not stand if one adopts the same principle in
regard not to knowing something； but to being； or to being is a in a
certain state； e。g。 suppose that X is father； and is also yours： for
if in some cases this is true and it is possible to know and not to
know the same thing； yet with that case the solution stated has
nothing to do。 Certainly there is nothing to prevent the same argument
from having a number of flaws； but it is not the exposition of any and
every fault that constitutes a solution： for it is possible for a
man to show that a false conclusion has been proved； but not to show
on what it depends； e。g。 in the case of Zeno's argument to prove
that motion is impossible。 So that even if any one were to try to
establish that this doctrine is an impossible one； he still is
mistaken； and even if he proved his case ten thousand times over；
still this is no solution of Zeno's argument： for the solution was all
along an exposition of false reasoning； showing on what its falsity
depends。 If then he has not proved his case； or is trying to establish
even a true proposition； or a false one； in a false manner； to point
this out is a true solution。 Possibly； indeed； the present
suggestion may very well apply in some cases： but in these cases； at
any rate； not even this would be generally agreed： for he knows both
that Coriscus is Coriscus and that the approaching figure is
approaching。 To know and not to know the same thing is generally
thought to be possible； when e。g。 one knows that X is white； but
does not realize that he is musical： for in that way he does know
and not know the same thing； though not in the same respect。 But as to
the approaching figure and Coriscus he knows both that it is
approaching and that he is Coriscus。
A like mistake to that of those whom we have mentioned is that of
those who solve the proof that every number is a small number： for if；
when the conclusion is not proved； they pass this over and say that
a conclusion has been proved and is true； on the ground that every
number is both great and small； they make a mistake。
Some people also use the principle of ambiguity to solve the
aforesaid reasonings； e。g。 the proof that 'X is your father'； or
'son'； or 'slave'。 Yet it is evident that if the appearance a proof
depends upon a plurality of meanings； the term； or the expression in
question； ought to bear a number of literal senses； whereas no one
speaks of A as being 'B's child' in the literal sense； if B is the
child's master； but the combination depends upon Accident。 'Is A
yours？' 'Yes。' 'And is A a child？' 'Yes。' 'Then the child A is yours；'
because he happens to be both yours and a child； but he is no