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because he happens to be both yours and a child； but he is not 'your
child'。
There is also the proof that 'something 〃of evils〃 is good'； for
wisdom is a 'knowledge 〃of evils〃'。 But the expression that this is
'of so and…so' （='so…and…so's'） has not a number of meanings： it means
that it is 'so…and…so's property'。 We may suppose of course； on the
other hand； that it has a number of meanings…for we also say that
man is 'of the animals'； though not their property； and also that
any term related to 'evils' in a way expressed by a genitive case is
on that account a so…and…so 'of evils'； though it is not one of the
evils…but in that case the apparently different meanings seem to
depend on whether the term is used relatively or absolutely。 'Yet it
is conceivably possible to find a real ambiguity in the phrase
〃Something of evils is good〃。' Perhaps； but not with regard to the
phrase in question。 It would occur more nearly； suppose that 'A
servant is good of the wicked'； though perhaps it is not quite found
even there： for a thing may be 'good' and be 'X's' without being at
the same time 'X's good'。 Nor is the saying that 'Man is of the
animals' a phrase with a number of meanings： for a phrase does not
become possessed of a number of meanings merely suppose we express
it elliptically： for we express 'Give me the Iliad' by quoting half
a line of it； e。g。 'Give me 〃Sing； goddess； of the wrath。。。〃'
25
Those arguments which depend upon an expression that is valid of a
particular thing； or in a particular respect； or place； or manner；
or relation； and not valid absolutely； should be solved by considering
the conclusion in relation to its contradictory； to see if any of
these things can possibly have happened to it。 For it is impossible
for contraries and opposites and an affirmative and a negative to
belong to the same thing absolutely； there is； however； nothing to
prevent each from belonging in a particular respect or relation or
manner； or to prevent one of them from belonging in a particular
respect and the other absolutely。 So that if this one belongs
absolutely and that one in a particular respect； there is as yet no
refutation。 This is a feature one has to find in the conclusion by
examining it in comparison with its contradictory。
All arguments of the following kind have this feature： 'Is it
possible for what is…not to be？ 〃No。〃 But； you see； it is something；
despite its not being。' Likewise also； Being will not be； for it
will not he some particular form of being。 Is it possible for the same
man at the same time to be a keeper and a breaker of his oath？' 'Can
the same man at the same time both obey and disobey the same man？'
Or isn't it the case that being something in particular and Being
are not the same？ On the other hand； Not…being； even if it be
something； need not also have absolute 'being' as well。 Nor if a man
keeps his oath in this particular instance or in this particular
respect； is he bound also to be a keeper of oaths absolutely； but he
who swears that he will break his oath； and then breaks it； keeps this
particular oath only； he is not a keeper of his oath： nor is the
disobedient man 'obedient'； though he obeys one particular command。
The argument is similar； also； as regards the problem whether the same
man can at the same time say what is both false and true： but it
appears to be a troublesome question because it is not easy to see
in which of the two connexions the word 'absolutely' is to be
rendered…with 'true' or with 'false'。 There is； however； nothing to
prevent it from being false absolutely； though true in some particular
respect or relation； i。e。 being true in some things； though not 'true'
absolutely。 Likewise also in cases of some particular relation and
place and time。 For all arguments of the following kind depend upon
this。' Is health； or wealth； a good thing？' 'Yes。' 'But to the fool
who does not use it aright it is not a good thing： therefore it is
both good and not good。' 'Is health； or political power； a good
thing？' 'Yes。 〃But sometimes it is not particularly good： therefore
the same thing is both good and not good to the same man。' Or rather
there is nothing to prevent a thing； though good absolutely； being not
good to a particular man； or being good to a particular man； and yet
not good or here。 'Is that which the prudent man would not wish； an
evil？' 'Yes。' 'But to get rid of； he would not wish the good：
therefore the good is an evil。' But that is a mistake； for it is not
the same thing to say 'The good is an evil' and 'to get rid of the
good is an evil'。 Likewise also the argument of the thief is mistaken。
For it is not the case that if the thief is an evil thing； acquiring
things is also evil： what he wishes； therefore； is not what is evil
but what is good； for to acquire something good is good。 Also； disease
is an evil thing； but not to get rid of disease。 'Is the just
preferable to the unjust； and what takes place justly to what takes
place unjustly？ 'Yes。' 'But to to be put to death unjustly is
preferable。' 'Is it just that each should have his own？' 'Yes。' 'But
whatever decisions a man comes to on the strength of his personal
opinion； even if it be a false opinion； are valid in law： therefore
the same result is both just and unjust。' Also； should one decide in
favour of him who says what is unjust？' 'The former。' 'But you see； it
is just for the injured party to say fully the things he has suffered；
and these are fallacies。 For because to suffer a thing unjustly is
preferable； unjust ways are not therefore preferable； though in this
particular case the unjust may very well be better than the just。
Also； to have one's own is just； while to have what is another's is
not just： all the same； the decision in question may very well be a
just decision； whatever it be that the opinion of the man who gave the
decision supports： for because it is just in this particular case or
in this particular manner； it is not also just absolutely。 Likewise
also； though things are unjust； there is nothing to prevent the
speaking of them being just： for because to speak of things is just；
there is no necessity that the things should be just； any more than
because to speak of things be of use； the things need be of use。
Likewise also in the case of what is just。 So that it is not the
case that because the things spoken of are unjust； the victory goes to
him who speaks unjust things： for he speaks of things that are just to
speak of； though absolutely； i。e。 to suffer； they are unjust。
26
Refutations that depend on the definition of a refutation must；
according to the plan sketched above； be met by comparing together the
conclusion with its contradictory； and seeing that it shall involve
the same attribute in the same respect and relation and manner and
time。 If this additional question be put at the start； you should
not admit that it is impossible for the same thing to be both double
and not double； but grant that it is possible； only not in such a
way as was agreed to constitute a refutation of your case。 All the
following arguments depend upon a point of that kind。 'Does a man
who knows A to be A； know the thing called A？' and in the same way；
'is one who is ignorant that A is A ignorant of the thing called A？'
'Yes。' 'But one who knows that Coriscus is Coriscus might be
ignorant of the fact that he is musical； so that he both knows and
is ignorant of the same thing。' Is a thing four cubits long greater
than a thing three cubits long？' 'Yes。' 'But a thing might grow from
three to four cubits in length； 'now what is 'greater' is greater than
a 'less'： accordingly the thing in question will be both greater and
less than itself in the same respect。
27
As to refutations that depend on begging and assuming the original
point to be proved； suppose the nature of the question to be
obvious； one should not grant it； even though it be a view generally
held； but should tell him the truth。 Suppose； however； that it escapes
one； then； thanks to the badness of arguments of that kind； one should
make one's error recoil upon the questioner； and say that he has
brought no argument： for a refutation must be proved independently
of the original point。 Secondly； one should say that the point was
granted under the impression that he intended not to use it as a
premiss； but to reason against it； in the opposite way from that
adopted in refutations on side issues。
28
Also； those refutations that bring one to their