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should come about without taking into account the original point；
and this is not the case with those arguments which depend upon
begging the original point。
Those that depend upon the consequent are a branch of Accident：
for the consequent is an accident； only it differs from the accident
in this； that you may secure an admission of the accident in the
case of one thing only （e。g。 the identity of a yellow thing and
honey and of a white thing and swan）； whereas the consequent always
involves more than one thing： for we claim that things that are the
same as one and the same thing are also the same as one another； and
this is the ground of a refutation dependent on the consequent。 It is；
however； not always true； e。g。 suppose that and B are the same as C
per accidens； for both 'snow' and the 'swan' are the same as something
white'。 Or again； as in Melissus' argument； a man assumes that to
'have been generated' and to 'have a beginning' are the same thing； or
to 'become equal' and to 'assume the same magnitude'。 For because what
has been generated has a beginning； he claims also that what has a
beginning has been generated； and argues as though both what has
been generated and what is finite were the same because each has a
beginning。 Likewise also in the case of things that are made equal
he assumes that if things that assume one and the same magnitude
become equal； then also things that become equal assume one magnitude：
i。e。 he assumes the consequent。 Inasmuch； then； as a refutation
depending on accident consists in ignorance of what a refutation is；
clearly so also does a refutation depending on the consequent。 We
shall have further to examine this in another way as well。
Those fallacies that depend upon the making of several questions
into one consist in our failure to dissect the definition of
'proposition'。 For a proposition is a single statement about a
single thing。 For the same definition applies to 'one single thing
only' and to the 'thing'； simply； e。g。 to 'man' and to 'one single man
only' and likewise also in other cases。 If； then； a 'single
proposition' be one which claims a single thing of a single thing； a
'proposition'； simply； will also be the putting of a question of
that kind。 Now since a proof starts from propositions and refutation
is a proof； refutation； too； will start from propositions。 If； then； a
proposition is a single statement about a single thing； it is
obvious that this fallacy too consists in ignorance of what a
refutation is： for in it what is not a proposition appears to be
one。 If； then； the answerer has returned an answer as though to a
single question； there will be a refutation； while if he has
returned one not really but apparently； there will be an apparent
refutation of his thesis。 All the types of fallacy； then； fall under
ignorance of what a refutation is； some of them because the
contradiction； which is the distinctive mark of a refutation； is
merely apparent； and the rest failing to conform to the definition
of a proof。
7
The deception comes about in the case of arguments that depend on
ambiguity of words and of phrases because we are unable to divide
the ambiguous term （for some terms it is not easy to divide； e。g。
'unity'； 'being'； and 'sameness'）； while in those that depend on
combination and division； it is because we suppose that it makes no
difference whether the phrase be combined or divided； as is indeed the
case with most phrases。 Likewise also with those that depend on
accent： for the lowering or raising of the voice upon a phrase is
thought not to alter its meaning…with any phrase； or not with many。
With those that depend on the of expression it is because of the
likeness of expression。 For it is hard to distinguish what kind of
things are signified by the same and what by different kinds of
expression： for a man who can do this is practically next door to
the understanding of the truth。 A special reason why a man is liable
to be hurried into assent to the fallacy is that we suppose every
predicate of everything to be an individual thing； and we understand
it as being one with the thing： and we therefore treat it as a
substance： for it is to that which is one with a thing or substance；
as also to substance itself； that 'individually' and 'being' are
deemed to belong in the fullest sense。 For this reason； too； this type
of fallacy is to be ranked among those that depend on language； in the
first place； because the deception is effected the more readily when
we are inquiring into a problem in company with others than when we do
so by ourselves （for an inquiry with another person is carried on by
means of speech； whereas an inquiry by oneself is carried on quite
as much by means of the object itself）； secondly a man is liable to be
deceived； even when inquiring by himself； when he takes speech as
the basis of his inquiry： moreover the deception arises out of the
likeness （of two different things）； and the likeness arises out of the
language。 With those fallacies that depend upon Accident； deception
comes about because we cannot distinguish the sameness and otherness
of terms； i。e。 their unity and multiplicity； or what kinds of
predicate have all the same accidents as their subject。 Likewise
also with those that depend on the Consequent： for the consequent is a
branch of Accident。 Moreover； in many cases appearances point to
this…and the claim is made that if is inseparable from B； so also is B
from With those that depend upon an imperfection in the definition
of a refutation； and with those that depend upon the difference
between a qualified and an absolute statement； the deception
consists in the smallness of the difference involved； for we treat the
limitation to the particular thing or respect or manner or time as
adding nothing to the meaning； and so grant the statement universally。
Likewise also in the case of those that assume the original point； and
those of false cause； and all that treat a number of questions as one：
for in all of them the deception lies in the smallness of the
difference： for our failure to be quite exact in our definition of
'premiss' and of 'proof' is due to the aforesaid reason。
8
Since we know on how many points apparent syllogisms depend； we know
also on how many sophistical syllogisms and refutations may depend。 By
a sophistical refutation and syllogism I mean not only a syllogism
or refutation which appears to be valid but is not； but also one
which； though it is valid； only appears to be appropriate to the thing
in question。 These are those which fail to refute and prove people
to be ignorant according to the nature of the thing in question； which
was the function of the art of examination。 Now the art of examining
is a branch of dialectic： and this may prove a false conclusion
because of the ignorance of the answerer。 Sophistic refutations on the
other hand； even though they prove the contradictory of his thesis； do
not make clear whether he is ignorant： for sophists entangle the
scientist as well with these arguments。
That we know them by the same line of inquiry is clear： for the same
considerations which make it appear to an audience that the points
required for the proof were asked in the questions and that the
conclusion was proved； would make the answerer think so as well； so
that false proof will occur through all or some of these means： for
what a man has not been asked but thinks he has granted； he would also
grant if he were asked。 Of course； in some cases the moment we add the
missing question； we also show up its falsity； e。g。 in fallacies
that depend on language and on solecism。 If then； fallacious proofs of
the contradictory of a thesis depend on their appearing to refute；
it is clear that the considerations on which both proofs of false
conclusions and an apparent refutation depend must be the same in
number。 Now an apparent refutation depends upon the elements
involved in a genuine one： for the failure of one or other of these
must make the refutation merely apparent； e。g。 that which depends on
the failure of the conclusion to follow from the argument （the
argument ad impossible） and that which treats two questions as one and
so depends upon a flaw in the premiss； and that which depends on the
substitution of an accident for an essential attribute； and…a branch
of the last…that which depends upon the consequent： more over； the
conclusion may follow not in fact but only verbally： then； instead
of proving the contradictory universally and in the same respect and
relation and manner； the falla