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scientist； even if in what they say they seem to the latter to go
wildly astray from them。 All； then； are engaged in refutation； for
they take a hand as amateurs in the same task with which dialectic
is concerned professionally； and he is a dialectician who examines
by the help of a theory of reasoning。 Now there are many identical
principles which are true of everything； though they are not such as
to constitute a particular nature； i。e。 a particular kind of being；
but are like negative terms； while other principles are not of this
kind but are special to particular subjects； accordingly it is
possible from these general principles to hold an examination on
everything； and that there should be a definite art of so doing；
and； moreover； an art which is not of the same kind as those which
demonstrate。 This is why the contentious reasoner does not stand in
the same condition in all respects as the drawer of a false diagram：
for the contentious reasoner will not be given to misreasoning from
any definite class of principles； but will deal with every class。
These； then； are the types of sophistical refutations： and that it
belongs to the dialectician to study these； and to be able to effect
them； is not difficult to see： for the investigation of premisses
comprises the whole of this study。
12
So much； then； for apparent refutations。 As for showing that the
answerer is committing some fallacy； and drawing his argument into
paradox…for this was the second item of the sophist's programme…in the
first place； then； this is best brought about by a certain manner of
questioning and through the question。 For to put the question
without framing it with reference to any definite subject is a good
bait for these purposes： for people are more inclined to make mistakes
when they talk at large； and they talk at large when they have no
definite subject before them。 Also the putting of several questions；
even though the position against which one is arguing be quite
definite； and the claim that he shall say only what he thinks；
create abundant opportunity for drawing him into paradox or fallacy；
and also； whether to any of these questions he replies 'Yes' or
replies 'No'； of leading him on to statements against which one is
well off for a line of attack。 Nowadays； however； men are less able to
play foul by these means than they were formerly： for people rejoin
with the question； 'What has that to do with the original subject？' It
is； too； an elementary rule for eliciting some fallacy or paradox that
one should never put a controversial question straight away； but say
that one puts it from the wish for information： for the process of
inquiry thus invited gives room for an attack。
A rule specially appropriate for showing up a fallacy is the
sophistic rule； that one should draw the answerer on to the kind of
statements against which one is well supplied with arguments： this can
be done both properly and improperly； as was said before。' Again； to
draw a paradoxical statement； look and see to what school of
philosophers the person arguing with you belongs； and then question
him as to some point wherein their doctrine is paradoxical to most
people： for with every school there is some point of that kind。 It
is an elementary rule in these matters to have a collection of the
special 'theses' of the various schools among your propositions。 The
solution recommended as appropriate here； too； is to point out that
the paradox does not come about because of the argument： whereas
this is what his opponent always really wants。
Moreover； argue from men's wishes and their professed opinions。
For people do not wish the same things as they say they wish： they say
what will look best； whereas they wish what appears to be to their
interest： e。g。 they say that a man ought to die nobly rather than to
live in pleasure； and to live in honest poverty rather than in
dishonourable riches； but they wish the opposite。 Accordingly； a man
who speaks according to his wishes must be led into stating the
professed opinions of people； while he who speaks according to these
must be led into admitting those that people keep hidden away： for
in either case they are bound to introduce a paradox； for they will
speak contrary either to men's professed or to their hidden opinions。
The widest range of common…place argument for leading men into
paradoxical statement is that which depends on the standards of Nature
and of the Law： it is so that both Callicles is drawn as arguing in
the Gorgias； and that all the men of old supposed the result to come
about： for nature （they said） and law are opposites； and justice is
a fine thing by a legal standard； but not by that of nature。
Accordingly； they said； the man whose statement agrees with the
standard of nature you should meet by the standard of the law； but the
man who agrees with the law by leading him to the facts of nature： for
in both ways paradoxical statements may be committed。 In their view
the standard of nature was the truth； while that of the law was the
opinion held by the majority。 So that it is clear that they； too； used
to try either to refute the answerer or to make him make paradoxical
statements； just as the men of to…day do as well。
Some questions are such that in both forms the answer is
paradoxical； e。g。 'Ought one to obey the wise or one's father？' and
'Ought one to do what is expedient or what is just？' and 'Is it
preferable to suffer injustice or to do an injury？' You should lead
people； then； into views opposite to the majority and to the
philosophers； if any one speaks as do the expert reasoners； lead him
into opposition to the majority； while if he speaks as do the
majority； then into opposition to the reasoners。 For some say that
of necessity the happy man is just； whereas it is paradoxical to the
many that a king should be happy。 To lead a man into paradoxes of this
sort is the same as to lead him into the opposition of the standards
of nature and law： for the law represents the opinion of the majority；
whereas philosophers speak according to the standard of nature and the
truth。
13
Paradoxes； then； you should seek to elicit by means of these
common…place rules。 Now as for making any one babble； we have
already said what we mean by 'to babble'。 This is the object in view
in all arguments of the following kind： If it is all the same to state
a term and to state its definition； the 'double' and 'double of
half' are the same： if then 'double' be the 'double of half'； it
will be the 'double of half of half'。 And if； instead of 'double'；
'double of half' be again put； then the same expression will be
repeated three times； 'double of half of half of half'。 Also 'desire
is of the pleasant； isn't it？' desire is conation for the pleasant：
accordingly； 'desire' is 'conation for the pleasant for the pleasant'。
All arguments of this kind occur in dealing （1） with any relative
terms which not only have relative genera； but are also themselves
relative； and are rendered in relation to one and the same thing； as
e。g。 conation is conation for something； and desire is desire of
something； and double is double of something； i。e。 double of half：
also in dealing （2） with any terms which； though they be not
relative terms at all； yet have their substance； viz。 the things of
which they are the states or affections or what not； indicated as well
in their definition； they being predicated of these things。 Thus
e。g。 'odd' is a 'number containing a middle'： but there is an 'odd
number'： therefore there is a 'number…containing…a…middle number'。
Also； if snubness be a concavity of the nose； and there be a snub
nose； there is therefore a 'concave…nose nose'。
People sometimes appear to produce this result； without really
producing it； because they do not add the question whether the
expression 'double'； just by itself； has any meaning or no； and if so；
whether it has the same meaning； or a different one； but they draw
their conclusion straight away。 Still it seems； inasmuch as the word
is the same； to have the same meaning as well。
14
We have said before what kind of thing 'solecism' is。' It is
possible both to commit it； and to seem to do so without doing so； and
to do so without seeming to do so。 Suppose； as Protagoras used to
say that menis （'wrath'） and pelex （'helmet'） are masculine：
according to him a man who calls wrath a 'destructress' （oulomenen）
commits a solecism； though he does not seem to do so to other
people； where he who calls it a 'destructor'