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We have now therefore dealt with the sources of questions； and the
methods of questioning in contentious disputations： next we have to
speak of answering； and of how solutions should be made； and of what
requires them； and of what use is served by arguments of this kind。
The use of them； then； is； for philosophy； twofold。 For in the first
place； since for the most part they depend upon the expression； they
put us in a better condition for seeing in how many senses any term is
used； and what kind of resemblances and what kind of differences occur
between things and between their names。 In the second place they are
useful for one's own personal researches； for the man who is easily
committed to a fallacy by some one else； and does not perceive it；
is likely to incur this fate of himself also on many occasions。
Thirdly and lastly； they further contribute to one's reputation；
viz。 the reputation of being well trained in everything； and not
inexperienced in anything： for that a party to arguments should find
fault with them； if he cannot definitely point out their weakness；
creates a suspicion； making it seem as though it were not the truth of
the matter but merely inexperience that put him out of temper。
Answerers may clearly see how to meet arguments of this kind； if our
previous account was right of the sources whence fallacies came； and
also our distinctions adequate of the forms of dishonesty in putting
questions。 But it is not the same thing take an argument in one's hand
and then to see and solve its faults； as it is to be able to meet it
quickly while being subjected to questions： for what we know； we often
do not know in a different context。 Moreover； just as in other
things speed is enhanced by training； so it is with arguments too；
so that supposing we are unpractised； even though a point be clear
to us； we are often too late for the right moment。 Sometimes too it
happens as with diagrams； for there we can sometimes analyse the
figure； but not construct it again： so too in refutations； though we
know the thing on which the connexion of the argument depends； we
still are at a loss to split the argument apart。
17
First then； just as we say that we ought sometimes to choose to
prove something in the general estimation rather than in truth； so
also we have sometimes to solve arguments rather in the general
estimation than according to the truth。 For it is a general rule in
fighting contentious persons； to treat them not as refuting； but as
merely appearing to refute： for we say that they don't really prove
their case； so that our object in correcting them must be to dispel
the appearance of it。 For if refutation be an unambiguous
contradiction arrived at from certain views； there could be no need to
draw distinctions against amphiboly and ambiguity： they do not
effect a proof。 The only motive for drawing further distinctions is
that the conclusion reached looks like a refutation。 What； then； we
have to beware of； is not being refuted； but seeming to be； because of
course the asking of amphibolies and of questions that turn upon
ambiguity； and all the other tricks of that kind； conceal even a
genuine refutation； and make it uncertain who is refuted and who is
not。 For since one has the right at the end； when the conclusion is
drawn； to say that the only denial made of One's statement is
ambiguous； no matter how precisely he may have addressed his
argument to the very same point as oneself； it is not clear whether
one has been refuted： for it is not clear whether at the moment one is
speaking the truth。 If； on the other hand； one had drawn a
distinction； and questioned him on the ambiguous term or the
amphiboly； the refutation would not have been a matter of uncertainty。
Also what is incidentally the object of contentious arguers； though
less so nowadays than formerly； would have been fulfilled； namely that
the person questioned should answer either 'Yes' or 'No'： whereas
nowadays the improper forms in which questioners put their questions
compel the party questioned to add something to his answer in
correction of the faultiness of the proposition as put： for certainly；
if the questioner distinguishes his meaning adequately； the answerer
is bound to reply either 'Yes' or 'No'。
If any one is going to suppose that an argument which turns upon
ambiguity is a refutation； it will be impossible for an answerer to
escape being refuted in a sense： for in the case of visible objects
one is bound of necessity to deny the term one has asserted； and to
assert what one has denied。 For the remedy which some people have
for this is quite unavailing。 They say； not that Coriscus is both
musical and unmusical； but that this Coriscus is musical and this
Coriscus unmusical。 But this will not do； for to say 'this Coriscus is
unmusical'； or 'musical'； and to say 'this Coriscus' is so； is to
use the same expression： and this he is both affirming and denying
at once。 'But perhaps they do not mean the same。' Well； nor did the
simple name in the former case： so where is the difference？ If；
however； he is to ascribe to the one person the simple title
'Coriscus'； while to the other he is to add the prefix 'one' or
'this'； he commits an absurdity： for the latter is no more
applicable to the one than to the other： for to whichever he adds
it； it makes no difference。
All the same； since if a man does not distinguish the senses of an
amphiboly； it is not clear whether he has been confuted or has not
been confuted； and since in arguments the right to distinguish them is
granted； it is evident that to grant the question simply without
drawing any distinction is a mistake； so that； even if not the man
himself； at any rate his argument looks as though it had been refuted。
It often happens； however； that； though they see the amphiboly； people
hesitate to draw such distinctions； because of the dense crowd of
persons who propose questions of the kind； in order that they may
not be thought to be obstructionists at every turn： then； though
they would never have supposed that that was the point on which the
argument turned； they often find themselves faced by a paradox。
Accordingly； since the right of drawing the distinction is granted；
one should not hesitate； as has been said before。
If people never made two questions into one question； the fallacy
that turns upon ambiguity and amphiboly would not have existed either；
but either genuine refutation or none。 For what is the difference
between asking 'Are Callias and Themistocles musical？' and what one
might have asked if they； being different； had had one name？ For if
the term applied means more than one thing； he has asked more than one
question。 If then it be not right to demand simply to be given a
single answer to two questions； it is evident that it is not proper to
give a simple answer to any ambiguous question； not even if the
predicate be true of all the subjects； as some claim that one
should。 For this is exactly as though he had asked 'Are Coriscus and
Callias at home or not at home？'； supposing them to be both in or both
out： for in both cases there is a number of propositions： for though
the simple answer be true； that does not make the question one。 For it
is possible for it to be true to answer even countless different
questions when put to one； all together with either a 'Yes' or a 'No'：
but still one should not answer them with a single answer： for that is
the death of discussion。 Rather； the case is like as though
different things has actually had the same name applied to them。 If
then； one should not give a single answer to two questions； it is
evident that we should not say simply 'Yes' or 'No' in the case of
ambiguous terms either： for the remark is simply a remark； not an
answer at all； although among disputants such remarks are loosely
deemed to be answers； because they do not see what the consequence is。
As we said； then； inasmuch as certain refutations are generally
taken for such； though not such really； in the same way also certain
solutions will be generally taken for solutions； though not really
such。 Now these； we say； must sometimes be advanced rather than the
true solutions in contentious reasonings and in the encounter with
ambiguity。 The proper answer in saying what one thinks is to say
'Granted'； for in that way the likelihood of being refuted on a side
issue is minimized。 If； on the other hand； one is compelled to say
something paradoxical； one should then be most careful to add that 'it
seems' so： for in that way one avoids the impression of being either
refuted or paradoxical。 Since it is