按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
But if this be true； liability to an action does not necessarily import wrong… doing。 And this may be admitted without at all impairing the force of the argument in the foregoing Lecture； which only requires that people should not be made to pay for accidents which they could not have avoided。
It is doubtful； however； whether the ruling of Chief Justice Rolle would now be followed。 The squib case； Scott v。 Shepherd； and the language of some text… books； are more or less opposed to it。 /2/ If the latter view is law； then an act must in general not only be dangerous； but one which would be blameworthy on the part of the average man； in order to make the actor liable。 But； aside from such exceptional cases as Gilbert v。 Stone； the two tests agree； and the difference need not be considered in what follows。
I therefore repeat； that experience is the test by which it is decided whether the degree of danger attending given conduct under certain known circumstances is sufficient to throw the risk upon the party pursuing it。
For instance； experience shows that a good many guns supposed to be unloaded go off and hurt people。 The ordinarily intelligent and prudent member of the community ＇150＇ would foresee the possibility of danger from pointing a gun which he had not inspected into a crowd； and pulling the trigger； although it was said to be unloaded。 Hence； it may very properly be held that a man who does such a thing does it at his peril； and that； if damage ensues； he is answerable for it。 The co…ordinated acts necessary to point a gun and pull a trigger； and the intent and knowledge shown by the co…ordination of those acts； are all consistent with entire blamelessness。 They threaten harm to no one without further facts。 But the one additional circumstance of a man in the line and within range of the piece makes the conduct manifestly dangerous to any one who knows the fact。 There is no longer any need to refer to the prudent man； or general experience。 The facts have taught their lesson； and have generated a concrete and external rule of liability。 He who snaps a cap upon a gun pointed in the direction of another person； known by him to be present； is answerable for the consequences。
The question what a prudent man would do under given circumstances is then equivalent to the question what are the teachings of experience as to the dangerous character of this or that conduct under these or those circumstances； and as the teachings of experience are matters of fact； it is easy to see why the jury should be consulted with regard to them。 They are； however； facts of a special and peculiar function。 Their only bearing is on the question； what ought to have been done or omitted under the circumstances of the case； not on what was done。 Their function is to suggest a rule of conduct。
Sometimes courts are induced to lay down rules by facts of a more specific nature； as that the legislature passed a certain statute； and that the case at bar is within ＇151＇ the fair meaning of its words； or that the practice of a specially interested class； or of the public at large； has generated a rule of conduct outside the law which it is desirable that the courts should recognize and enforce。 These are matters of fact； and have sometimes been pleaded as such。 But as their only importance is； that； if believed； they will induce the judges to lay down a rule of conduct； or in other words a rule of law； suggested by them； their tendency in most instances is to disappear as fast as the rules suggested by them become settled。 /1/ While the facts are uncertain； as they are still only motives for decision upon the law；grounds for legislation； so to speak；the judges may ascertain them in any way which satisfies their conscience。 Thus； courts recognize the statutes of the jurisdiction judicially； although the laws of other jurisdictions； with doubtful wisdom； are left to the jury。 /2/ They may take judicial cognizance of a custom of merchants。 /3/ In former days； at least； they might inquire about it in pais after a demurrer。 /4/ They may act on the statement of a special jury； as in the time of Lord Mansfield and his successors； or upon the finding of a common jury based on the testimony of witnesses； as is the practice to…day in this country。 But many instances will be found the text…books which show that； when the facts are ascertained； they soon cease to be referred to； and give place to a rule of law。
＇152＇ The same transition is noticeable with regard to the teachings of experience。 There are many cases； no doubt； in which the court would lean for aid upon a jury； but there are also many in which the teaching has been formulated in specific rules。 These rules will be found to vary considerably with regard to the number of concomitant circumstances necessary to throw the peril of conduct otherwise indifferent on the actor。 As the circumstances become more numerous and complex； the tendency to cut the knot with the jury becomes greater。 It will be useful to follow a line of cases up from the simple to the more complicated； by way of illustration。 The difficulty of distinguishing rules based on other grounds of policy from those which have been worked out in the field of negligence； will be particularly noticed。
In all these cases it will be found that there has been a voluntary act on the part of the person to be charged。 The reason for this requirement was shown in the foregoing Lecture。 Unnecessary though it is for the defendant to have intended or foreseen the evil which he has caused； it is necessary that he should have chosen the conduct which led to it。 But it has also been shown that a voluntary act is not enough； and that even a co…ordinated series of acts or conduct is often not enough by itself。 But the co…ordination of a series of acts shows a further intent than is necessarily manifested by any single act； and sometimes proves with almost equal certainty the knowledge of one or more concomitant circumstances。 And there are cases where conduct with only the intent and knowledge thus necessarily implied is sufficient to throw the risk of it on the actor。
For instance； when a man does the series of acts called ＇153＇ walking； it is assumed for all purposes of responsibility that he knows the earth is under his feet。 The conduct per se is indifferent； to be sure。 A man may go through the motions of walking without legal peril； if he chooses to practise on a private treadmill； but if he goes through the same motions on the surface of the earth； it cannot be doubted that he knows that the earth is there。 With that knowledge； he acts at his peril in certain respects。 If he crosses his neighbor's boundary； he is a trespasser。 The reasons for this strict rule have been partially discussed in the last Lecture。 Possibly there is more of history or of past or present notions of policy its explanation than is there suggested； and at any rate I do not care to justify the rule。 But it is intelligible。 A man who walks knows that he is moving over the surface of the earth； he knows that he is surrounded by private estates which he has no right to enter； and he knows that his motion； unless properly guided； will carry him into those estates。 He is thus warned； and the burden of his conduct is thrown upon himself。
But the act of walking does not throw the peril of all possible consequences upon him。 He may run a man down in the street； but he is not liable for that unless he does it negligently。 Confused as the law is with cross…lights of tradition； and hard as we may find it to arrive at perfectly satisfactory general theory； it does distinguish in a pretty sensible way； according to the nature and degree of the different perils incident to a given situation。
》From the simple case of walking we may proceed to the more complex cases of dealings with tangible objects of property。 It may be said that； generally speaking； a man meddles with such things at his own risk。 It does not ＇154＇ matter how honestly he may believe that they belong to himself； or are free to the public； or that he has a license from the owner； or that the case is one in which the law has limited the rights of ownership； he takes the chance of how the fact may turn out； and if the fact is otherwise than as he supposes； he must answer for his conduct。 As has been already suggested； he knows that he is exercising more or less dominion over property； or that he is injuring it； he must make good his right if it is challenged。
Whether this strict rule is based on the common grounds of liability； or upon some special consideration of past or present policy； policy has set some limits to it； as was mentioned in the foregoing Lecture。
Another case of conduct which is at the risk of the party without further knowledge than it necessarily imports； is the keeping of a tiger or bear； or other animal of a species commonly known to be ferocious。 If such an animal escapes and does damage； the owner is liable simply on proof that he kept it。 In this instance the comparative remoteness of the moment of choice in the line of causation from the effect complained of； will be particularly noticed。 Ordinary cases of liability arise out of a choice which was the proximate cause of the harm upon