representative government-第48章

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　might；　though　appointed　by　Parliament；　hold　his　office　for　a　fixed　period；　independent　of　a　parliamentary　vote：　which　would　be　the　American　system；　minus　the　popular　election　and　its　evils。　There　is　another　mode　of　giving　the　head　of　the　administration　as　much　independence　of　the　legislature　as　is　at　all　compatible　with　the　essentials　of　free　government。　He　never　could　be　unduly　dependent　on　a　vote　of　Parliament；　if　he　had；　as　the　British　Prime　Minister　practically　has；　the　power　to　dissolve　the　House　and　appeal　to　the　people：　if　instead　of　being　turned　out　of　office　by　a　hostile　vote；　he　could　only　be　reduced　by　it　to　the　alternative　of　resignation　or　dissolution。　The　power　of　dissolving　Parliament　is　one　which　I　think　it　desirable　he　should　possess；　even　under　the　system　by　which　his　own　tenure　of　office　is　secured　to　him　for　a　fixed　period。　There　ought　not　to　be　any　possibility　of　that　deadlock　in　politics　which　would　ensue　on　a　quarrel　breaking　out　between　a　President　and　an　Assembly；　neither　of　whom；　during　an　interval　which　might　amount　to　years；　would　have　any　legal　means　of　ridding　itself　of　the　other。　To　get　through　such　a　period　without　a　coup　d'etat　being　attempted；　on　either　side　or　on　both；　requires　such　a　combination　of　the　love　of　liberty　and　the　habit　of　self…restraint　as　very　few　nations　have　yet　shown　themselves　capable　of：　and　though　this　extremity　were　avoided；　to　expect　that　the　two　authorities　would　not　paralyse　each　other's　operations　is　to　suppose　that　the　political　life　of　the　country　will　always　be　pervaded　by　a　spirit　of　mutual　forbearance　and　compromise；　imperturbable　by　the　passions　and　excitements　of　the　keenest　party　struggles。　Such　a　spirit　may　exist；　but　even　where　it　does　there　is　imprudence　in　trying　it　too　far。　　　Other　reasons　make　it　desirable　that　some　power　in　the　state　（which　can　only　be　the　executive）　should　have　the　liberty　of　at　any　time；　and　at　discretion；　calling　a　new　Parliament。　When　there　is　a　real　doubt　which　of　two　contending　parties　has　the　strongest　following；　it　is　important　that　there　should　exist　a　constitutional　means　of　immediately　testing　the　point；　and　setting　it　at　rest。　No　other　political　topic　has　a　chance　of　being　properly　attended　to　while　this　is　undecided：　and　such　an　interval　is　mostly　an　interregnum　for　purposes　of　legislative　or　administrative　improvement；　neither　party　having　sufficient　confidence　in　its　strength　to　attempt　things　likely　to　promote　opposition　in　any　quarter　that　has　either　direct　or　indirect　influence　in　the　pending　struggle。　　　I　have　not　taken　account　of　the　case　in　which　the　vast　power　centralised　in　the　chief　magistrate；　and　the　insufficient　attachment　of　the　mass　of　the　people　to　free　institutions；　give　him　a　chance　of　success　in　an　attempt　to　subvert　the　Constitution；　and　usurp　sovereign　power。　Where　such　peril　exists；　no　first　magistrate　is　admissible　whom　the　Parliament　cannot；　by　a　single　vote；　reduce　to　a　private　station。　In　a　state　of　things　holding　out　any　encouragement　to　that　most　audacious　and　profligate　of　all　breaches　of　trust；　even　this　entireness　of　constitutional　dependence　is　but　a　weak　protection。　　　Of　all　officers　of　government；　those　in　whose　appointment　any　participation　of　popular　suffrage　is　the　most　objectionable　are　judicial　officers。　While　there　are　no　functionaries　whose　special　and　professional　qualifications　the　popular　judgment　is　less　fitted　to　estimate；　there　are　none　in　whose　case　absolute　impartiality；　and　freedom　from　connection　with　politicians　or　sections　of　politicians；　are　of　anything　like　equal　importance。　Some　thinkers；　among　others　Mr。　Bentham；　have　been　of　opinion　that；　although　it　is　better　that　judges　should　not　be　appointed　by　popular　election；　the　people　of　their　district　ought　to　have　the　power；　after　sufficient　experience；　of　removing　them　from　their　trust。　It　cannot　be　denied　that　the　irremovability　of　any　public　officer；　to　whom　great　interests　are　entrusted；　is　in　itself　an　evil。　It　is　far　from　desirable　that　there　should　be　no　means　of　getting　rid　of　a　bad　or　incompetent　judge；　unless　for　such　misconduct　as　he　can　be　made　to　answer　for　in　a　criminal　court；　and　that　a　functionary　on　whom　so　much　depends　should　have　the　feeling　of　being　free　from　responsibility　except　to　opinion　and　his　own　conscience。　The　question　however　is；　whether　in　the　peculiar　position　of　a　judge；　and　supposing　that　all　practicable　securities　have　been　taken　for　an　honest　appointment；　irresponsibility；　except　to　his　own　and　the　public　conscience；　has　not　on　the　whole　less　tendency　to　pervert　his　conduct　than　responsibility　to　the　government；　or　to　a　popular　vote。　Experience　has　long　decided　this　point　in　the　affirmative　as　regards　responsibility　to　the　executive；　and　the　case　is　quite　equally　strong　when　the　responsibility　sought　to　be　enforced　is　to　the　suffrages　of　electors。　Among　the　good　qualities　of　a　popular　constituency；　those　peculiarly　incumbent　upon　a　judge；　calmness　and　impartiality；　are　not　numbered。　Happily；　in　that　intervention　of　popular　suffrage　which　is　essential　to　freedom　they　are　not　the　qualities　required。　Even　the　quality　of　justice；　though　necessary　to　all　human　beings；　and　therefore　to　all　electors；　is　not　the　inducement　which　decides　any　popular　election。　Justice　and　impartiality　are　as　little　wanted　for　electing　a　member　of　Parliament　as　they　can　be　in　any　transaction　of　men。　The　electors　have　not　to　award　something　which　either　candidate　has　a　right　to；　nor　to　pass　judgment　on　the　general　merits　of　the　competitors；　but　to　declare　which　of　them　has　most　of　their　personal　confidence；　or　best　represents　their　political　convictions。　A　judge　is　bound　to　treat　his　political　friend；　or　the　person　best　known　to　him；　exactly　as　he　treats　other　people；　but　it　would　be　a　breach　of　duty　as　well　as　an　absurdity　if　an　elector　did　so。　No　argument　can　be　grounded　on　the　beneficial　effect　produced　on　judges；　as　on　all　other　functionaries；　by　the　moral　jurisdiction　of　opinion；　for　even　in　this　respect；　that　which　really　exercises　a　useful　control　over　the　proceedings　of　a　judge；　when　fit　for　the　judicial　office；　is　not　（except　sometimes　in　political　cases）　the　opinion　of　the　community　generally；　but　that　of　the　only　public　by　whom　his　conduct　or　qualifications　can　be　duly　estimated；　the　bar　of　his　own　court。　　　I　must　not　be　understood　to　say　that　the　participation　of　the　general　public　in　the　administration　of　justice　is　of　no　importance；　it　is　of　the　greatest：　but　in　what　manner？　By　the　actual　discharge　of　a　part　of　the　judicial　office；　in　the　capacity　of　jurymen。　This　is　one　of　the　few　cases　in　politics　in　which　it　is　better　that　the　people　should　act　directly　and　personally　than　through　their　representatives；　being　almost　the　only　case　in　which　the　errors　that　a　person　exercising　authority　may　commit　can　be　better　borne　than　the　consequences　of　making　him　responsible　for　them。　If　a　judge　could　be　removed　from　office　by　a　popular　vote；　whoever　was　desirous　of　supplanting　him　would　make　capital　for　that　purpose　out　of　all　his　judicial　decisions；　would　carry　all　of　them；　as　far　as　he　found　practicable；　by　irregular　appeal　before　a　public　opinion　wholly　incompetent；　for　want　of　having　heard　the　case；　or　from　having　heard　it　without　either　the　precautions　or　the　impartiality　belonging　to　a　judicial　hearing；　would　play　upon　popular　passion　and　prejudice　where　they　existed；　and　take　pains　to　arouse　them　where　they　did　not。　And　in　this；　if　the　case　were　interesting；　and　he　took　sufficient　trouble；　he　would　infallibly　be　successful；　unless　the　judge　or　his　friends　descended　into　the　arena；　and　made　equally　powerful　appeals　on　the　other　side。　Judges　would　end　by　feeling　that　they　risked　their　office　upon　every　decision　they　gave　in　a　case　susceptible　of　general　interest；　and　that　it　was　less　essential　for　them　to　consider　what　decision　was　just　than　what　would　be　most　applauded　by　the　public；　or　would　least　admit　of　insidious　misrepresentation。　The　practice　introduced　by　some　of　the　new　or　revised　State　Constitutions　in　America；　of　submitting　judicial　officers　to　periodical　popular　re…election；　will　be　found；　I　apprehend；　to　be　one　of　the　most　dangerous　errors　ever　yet　committed　by　democracy：　and；　were　it　not　that　the　practical　good　sense　which　never　totally　deserts　the　people　of　the　United　States　is　said　to　be　producing　a　reaction；　likely　in　no　long　time　to　lead　to　the　retraction　of　the　error；　it　might　with　reason　be　regarded　as　the　first　great　downward　step　in　the　degeneration　of　modern　democratic　government。*

　　*　I　have　been　informed；　however；　that　in　the　States　which　have　made　their　judges　elective；　the　choice　is　not　really　made　by　the　people；　but　by　the　leaders　of　parties；　no　elector　ever　thinking　of　voting　for　any　one　but　the　party　candidate：　and　that；　in　consequence；　the　person　elected　is　usually　in　effect　the　same　who　would　have　been　appointed　to　the　office　by　the　President　or　by　the　Governor　of　the　State。　Thus　one　bad　practice　limits　and　corrects　another；　and　the　habit　of　voting　en　masse　under　a　party　banner；　which　is　so　full　of　evil　in　all　cases　in　which　the　function　of　electing　is　rightly　vested　in　the　people；　tends　to　alleviate　a　still　greater　mischief　in　a　case　where　the　officer　to　be　elected　is　one　who　ough