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Phaedo； I suppose that these fair locks of yours will be severed。
Yes； Socrates； I suppose that they will； I replied。
Not so if you will take my advice。
What shall I do with them？ I said。
To…day； he replied； and not to…morrow； if this argument dies and
cannot be brought to life again by us； you and I will both shave our
locks； and if I were you； and could not maintain my ground against
Simmias and Cebes； I would myself take an oath； like the Argives；
not to wear hair any more until I had renewed the conflict and
defeated them。
Yes； I said； but Heracles himself is said not to be a match for two。
Summon me then； he said； and I will be your Iolaus until the sun
goes down。
I summon you rather； I said； not as Heracles summoning Iolaus； but
as Iolaus might summon Heracles。
That will be all the same； he said。 But first let us take care
that we avoid a danger。
And what is that？ I said。
The danger of becoming misologists； he replied； which is one of
the very worst things that can happen to us。 For as there are
misanthropists or haters of men； there are also misologists or
haters of ideas； and both spring from the same cause； which is
ignorance of the world。 Misanthropy arises from the too great
confidence of inexperience； you trust a man and think him altogether
true and good and faithful； and then in a little while he turns out to
be false and knavish； and then another and another； and when this
has happened several times to a man； especially within the circle of
his most trusted friends； as he deems them； and he has often quarreled
with them； he at last hates all men； and believes that no one has
any good in him at all。 I dare say that you must have observed this。
Yes； I said。
And is not this discreditable？ The reason is that a man； having to
deal with other men； has no knowledge of them； for if he had knowledge
he would have known the true state of the case； that few are the
good and few the evil； and that the great majority are in the interval
between them。
How do you mean？ I said。
I mean； he replied； as you might say of the very large and very
small； that nothing is more uncommon than a very large or a very small
man； and this applies generally to all extremes； whether of great
and small； or swift and slow； or fair and foul； or black and white：
and whether the instances you select be men or dogs or anything
else； few are the extremes； but many are in the mean between them。 Did
you never observe this？
Yes； I said； I have。
And do you not imagine； he said； that if there were a competition of
evil； the first in evil would be found to be very few？
Yes； that is very likely； I said。
Yes； that is very likely； he replied； not that in this respect
arguments are like men…there I was led on by you to say more than I
had intended； but the point of comparison was that when a simple man
who has no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which
he afterwards imagines to be false； whether really false or not； and
then another and another； he has no longer any faith left； and great
disputers； as you know； come to think； at last that they have grown to
be the wisest of mankind； for they alone perceive the utter
unsoundness and instability of all arguments； or； indeed； of all
things； which； like the currents in the Euripus； are going up and down
in never…ceasing ebb and flow。
That is quite true； I said。
Yes； Phaedo； he replied； and very melancholy too； if there be such a
thing as truth or certainty or power of knowing at all； that a man
should have lighted upon some argument or other which at first
seemed true and then turned out to be false； and instead of blaming
himself and his own want of wit； because he is annoyed； should at last
be too glad to transfer the blame from himself to arguments in
general； and forever afterwards should hate and revile them； and
lose the truth and knowledge of existence。
Yes； indeed； I said； that is very melancholy。
Let us； then； in the first place； he said； be careful of admitting
into our souls the notion that there is no truth or health or
soundness in any arguments at all； but let us rather say that there is
as yet no health in us； and that we must quit ourselves like men and
do our best to gain health…you and all other men with a view to the
whole of your future life； and I myself with a view to death。 For at
this moment I am sensible that I have not the temper of a philosopher；
like the vulgar； I am only a partisan。 For the partisan； when he is
engaged in a dispute； cares nothing about the rights of the
question； but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own
assertions。 And the difference between him and me at the present
moment is only this…that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that
what he says is true； I am rather seeking to convince myself； to
convince my hearers is a secondary matter with me。 And do but see
how much I gain by this。 For if what I say is true； then I do well
to be persuaded of the truth； but if there be nothing after death；
still； during the short time that remains； I shall save my friends
from lamentations； and my ignorance will not last； and therefore no
harm will be done。 This is the state of mind； Simmias and Cebes； in
which I approach the argument。 And I would ask you to be thinking of
the truth and not of Socrates： agree with me； if I seem to you to be
speaking the truth； or if not； withstand me might and main； that I may
not deceive you as well as myself in my enthusiasm； and； like the bee；
leave my sting in you before I die。
And now let us proceed； he said。 And first of all let me be sure
that I have in my mind what you were saying。 Simmias； if I remember
rightly； has fears and misgivings whether the soul； being in the
form of harmony； although a fairer and diviner thing than the body；
may not perish first。 On the other hand； Cebes appeared to grant
that the soul was more lasting than the body； but he said that no
one could know whether the soul； after having worn out many bodies；
might not perish herself and leave her last body behind her； and
that this is death； which is the destruction not of the body but of
the soul； for in the body the work of destruction is ever going on。
Are not these； Simmias and Cebes； the points which we have to
consider？
They both agreed to this statement of them。
He proceeded： And did you deny the force of the whole preceding
argument； or of a part only？
Of a part only； they replied。
And what did you think； he said； of that part of the argument in
which we said that knowledge was recollection only； and inferred
from this that the soul must have previously existed somewhere else
before she was enclosed in the body？ Cebes said that he had been
wonderfully impressed by that part of the argument； and that his
conviction remained unshaken。 Simmias agreed； and added that he
himself could hardly imagine the possibility of his ever thinking
differently about that。
But； rejoined Socrates； you will have to think differently； my
Theban friend； if you still maintain that harmony is a compound； and
that the soul is a harmony which is made out of strings set in the
frame of the body； for you will surely never allow yourself to say
that a harmony is prior to the elements which compose the harmony。
No； Socrates； that is impossible。
But do you not see that you are saying this when you say that the
soul existed before she took the form and body of man； and was made up
of elements which as yet had no existence？ For harmony is not a sort
of thing like the soul； as you suppose； but first the lyre； and the
strings； and the sounds exist in a state of discord； and then
harmony is made last of all； and perishes first。 And how can such a
notion of the soul as this agree with the other？
Not at all； replied Simmias。
And yet； he said； there surely ought to be harmony when harmony is
the theme of discourse。
There ought； replied Simmias。
But there is no harmony； he said； in the two propositions that
knowledge is recollection； and that the soul is a harmony。 Which of
them； then； will you retain？
I think； he replied； that I have a much stronger faith； Socrates； in
the first of the two； which has been fully demonstrated to me； than in
the latter； which has not been demonstrated at all； but rests only
on probable and plausible grounds； and I know too well that these
arguments from probabilities are impostors； and unless great caution
is observed in the use of them they are apt to be deceptive…in
geometry； and in other things too。 But the doctrine of knowledge and
recollection has been proven to me