按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
of existence。 I dare say that the simile is not perfect…for I am
very far from admitting that he who contemplates existence through the
medium of ideas； sees them only 〃through a glass darkly；〃 any more
than he who sees them in their working and effects。 However； this
was the method which I adopted： I first assumed some principle which I
judged to be the strongest； and then I affirmed as true whatever
seemed to agree with this； whether relating to the cause or to
anything else； and that which disagreed I regarded as untrue。 But I
should like to explain my meaning clearly； as I do not think that
you understand me。
No； indeed； replied Cebes； not very well。
There is nothing new； he said； in what I am about to tell you； but
only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the
previous discussion and on other occasions： I want to show you the
nature of that cause which has occupied my thoughts； and I shall
have to go back to those familiar words which are in the mouth of
everyone； and first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and
goodness and greatness； and the like； grant me this； and I hope to
be able to show you the nature of the cause； and to prove the
immortality of the soul。
Cebes said： You may proceed at once with the proof； as I readily
grant you this。
Well； he said； then I should like to know whether you agree with
me in the next step； for I cannot help thinking that if there be
anything beautiful other than absolute beauty； that can only be
beautiful in as far as it partakes of absolute beauty…and this I
should say of everything。 Do you agree in this notion of the cause？
Yes； he said； I agree。
He proceeded： I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other
of those wise causes which are alleged； and if a person says to me
that the bloom of color； or form； or anything else of that sort is a
source of beauty； I leave all that； which is only confusing to me； and
simply and singly； and perhaps foolishly； hold and am assured in my
own mind that nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and
participation of beauty in whatever way or manner obtained； for as
to the manner I am uncertain； but I stoutly contend that by beauty all
beautiful things become beautiful。 That appears to me to be the only
safe answer that I can give； either to myself or to any other； and
to that I cling； in the persuasion that I shall never be overthrown；
and that I may safely answer to myself or any other that by beauty
beautiful things become beautiful。 Do you not agree to that？
Yes； I agree。
And that by greatness only great things become great and greater
greater； and by smallness the less becomes less。
True。
Then if a person remarks that A is taller by a head than B； and B
less by a head than A； you would refuse to admit this； and would
stoutly contend that what you mean is only that the greater is greater
by； and by reason of； greatness； and the less is less only by； or by
reason of； smallness； and thus you would avoid the danger of saying
that the greater is greater and the less by the measure of the head；
which is the same in both； and would also avoid the monstrous
absurdity of supposing that the greater man is greater by reason of
the head； which is small。 Would you not be afraid of that？
Indeed； I should； said Cebes； laughing。
In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight
by； and by reason of； two； but would say by； and by reason of； number；
or that two cubits exceed one cubit not by a half； but by
magnitude？…that is what you would say； for there is the same danger in
both cases。
Very true； he said。
Again； would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of
one to one； or the division of one； is the cause of two？ And you would
loudly asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes into
existence except by participation in its own proper essence； and
consequently； as far as you know； the only cause of two is the
participation in duality； that is the way to make two； and the
participation in one is the way to make one。 You would say： I will let
alone puzzles of division and addition…wiser heads than mine may
answer them； inexperienced as I am； and ready to start； as the proverb
says； at my own shadow； I cannot afford to give up the sure ground
of a principle。 And if anyone assails you there； you would not mind
him； or answer him until you had seen whether the consequences which
follow agree with one another or not； and when you are further
required to give an explanation of this principle； you would go on
to assume a higher principle； and the best of the higher ones； until
you found a resting…place； but you would not refuse the principle
and the consequences in your reasoning like the Eristics…at least if
you wanted to discover real existence。 Not that this confusion
signifies to them who never care or think about the matter at all； for
they have the wit to be well pleased with themselves； however great
may be the turmoil of their ideas。 But you； if you are a
philosopher； will； I believe； do as I say。
What you say is most true； said Simmias and Cebes； both speaking
at once。
Ech。 Yes； Phaedo； and I don't wonder at their assenting。 Anyone
who has the least sense will acknowledge the wonderful clear。 of
Socrates' reasoning。
Phaed。 Certainly； Echecrates； and that was the feeling of the
whole company at the time。
Ech。 Yes； and equally of ourselves； who were not of the company； and
are now listening to your recital。 But what followed？
Phaedo。 After all this was admitted； and they had agreed about the
existence of ideas and the participation in them of the other things
which derive their names from them； Socrates； if I remember rightly；
said：…
This is your way of speaking； and yet when you say that Simmias is
greater than Socrates and less than Phaedo； do you not predicate of
Simmias both greatness and smallness？
Yes； I do。
But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates； as
the words may seem to imply； because he is Simmias； but by reason of
the size which he has； just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates
because he is Simmias； any more than because Socrates is Socrates； but
because he has smallness when compared with the greatness of Simmias？
True。
And if Phaedo exceeds him in size； that is not because Phaedo is
Phaedo； but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias； who is
comparatively smaller？
That is true。
And therefore Simmias is said to be great； and is also said to be
small； because he is in a mean between them； exceeding the smallness
of the one by his greatness； and allowing the greatness of the other
to exceed his smallness。 He added； laughing； I am speaking like a
book； but I believe that what I am now saying is true。
Simmias assented to this。
The reason why I say this is that I want you to agree with me in
thinking； not only that absolute greatness will never be great and
also small； but that greatness in us or in the concrete will never
admit the small or admit of being exceeded： instead of this； one of
two things will happen…either the greater will fly or retire before
the opposite； which is the less； or at the advance of the less will
cease to exist； but will not； if allowing or admitting smallness； be
changed by that； even as I； having received and admitted smallness
when compared with Simmias； remain just as I was； and am the same
small person。 And as the idea of greatness cannot condescend ever to
be or become small； in like manner the smallness in us cannot be or
become great； nor can any other opposite which remains the same ever
be or become its own opposite； but either passes away or perishes in
the change。
That； replied Cebes； is quite my notion。
One of the company； though I do not exactly remember which of
them； on hearing this； said： By Heaven； is not this the direct
contrary of what was admitted before…that out of the greater came
the less and out of the less the greater； and that opposites are
simply generated from opposites； whereas now this seems to be
utterly denied。
Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened。 I like
your courage； he said； in reminding us of this。 But you do not observe
that there is a difference in the two cases。 For then we were speaking
of opposites in the concrete； and now of the essential opposite which；
as is affirmed； neither in us nor in nature can ever be at variance
with itself： then； my friend； we were speaking of things in which
opposites are inherent and which are called after them； but now
about the opposites which are inherent in