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from the dead？
That is clear； he replied。
Then the inference is； that our souls are in the world below？
That is true。
And one of the two processes or generations is visible…for surely
the act of dying is visible？
Surely； he said。
And may not the other be inferred as the complement of nature； who
is not to be supposed to go on one leg only？ And if not； a
corresponding process of generation in death must also be assigned
to her？
Certainly； he replied。
And what is that process？
Revival。
And revival； if there be such a thing； is the birth of the dead into
the world of the living？
Quite true。
Then there is a new way in which we arrive at the inference that the
living come from the dead； just as the dead come from the living；
and if this is true； then the souls of the dead must be in some
place out of which they come again。 And this； as I think； has been
satisfactorily proved。
Yes； Socrates； he said； all this seems to flow necessarily out of
our previous admissions。
And that these admissions are not unfair； Cebes； he said； may be
shown； as I think； in this way： If generation were in a straight
line only； and there were no compensation or circle in nature； no turn
or return into one another； then you know that all things would at
last have the same form and pass into the same state； and there
would be no more generation of them。
What do you mean？ he said。
A simple thing enough； which I will illustrate by the case of sleep；
he replied。 You know that if there were no compensation of sleeping
and waking； the story of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have
no meaning； because all other things would be asleep； too； and he
would not be thought of。 Or if there were composition only； and no
division of substances； then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again。
And in like manner； my dear Cebes； if all things which partook of life
were to die； and after they were dead remained in the form of death；
and did not come to life again； all would at last die； and nothing
would be alive…how could this be otherwise？ For if the living spring
from any others who are not the dead； and they die； must not all
things at last be swallowed up in death？
There is no escape from that； Socrates； said Cebes； and I think that
what you say is entirely true。
Yes； he said； Cebes； I entirely think so； too； and we are not
walking in a vain imagination； but I am confident in the belief that
there truly is such a thing as living again； and that the living
spring from the dead； and that the souls of the dead are in existence；
and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil。
Cebes added： Your favorite doctrine； Socrates； that knowledge is
simply recollection； if true； also necessarily implies a previous time
in which we learned that which we now recollect。 But this would be
impossible unless our soul was in some place before existing in the
human form； here； then； is another argument of the soul's immortality。
But tell me； Cebes； said Simmias； interposing； what proofs are given
of this doctrine of recollection？ I am not very sure at this moment
that I remember them。
One excellent proof； said Cebes； is afforded by questions。 If you
put a question to a person in a right way； he will give a true
answer of himself； but how could he do this unless there were
knowledge and right reason already in him？ And this is most clearly
shown when he is taken to a diagram or to anything of that sort。
But if； said Socrates； you are still incredulous； Simmias； I would
ask you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the
matter in another way； I mean； if you are still incredulous as to
whether knowledge is recollection。
Incredulous； I am not； said Simmias； but I want to have this
doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection； and； from
what Cebes has said； I am beginning to recollect and be convinced； but
I should still like to hear what more you have to say。
This is what I would say； he replied： We should agree； if I am not
mistaken； that what a man recollects he must have known at some
previous time。
Very true。
And what is the nature of this recollection？ And； in asking this；
I mean to ask whether； when a person has already seen or heard or in
any way perceived anything； and he knows not only that； but
something else of which he has not the same； but another knowledge； we
may not fairly say that he recollects that which comes into his
mind。 Are we agreed about that？
What do you mean？
I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance： The
knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man？
True。
And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre； or
a garment； or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of
using？ Do not they； from knowing the lyre； form in the mind's eye an
image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs？ And this is recollection：
and in the same way anyone who sees Simmias may remember Cebes； and
there are endless other things of the same nature。
Yes； indeed； there are…endless； replied Simmias。
And this sort of thing； he said； is recollection； and is most
commonly a process of recovering that which has been forgotten through
time and inattention。
Very true； he said。
Well； and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a
lyre remember a man？ and from the picture of Simmias； you may be led
to remember Cebes？
True。
Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself？
True； he said。
And in all these cases； the recollection may be derived from
things either like or unlike？
That is true。
And when the recollection is derived from like things； then there is
sure to be another question； which is； whether the likeness of that
which is recollected is in any way defective or not。
Very true； he said。
And shall we proceed a step further； and affirm that there is such a
thing as equality； not of wood with wood； or of stone with stone；
but that； over and above this； there is equality in the abstract？
Shall we affirm this？
Affirm； yes； and swear to it； replied Simmias； with all the
confidence in life。
And do we know the nature of this abstract essence？
To be sure； he said。
And whence did we obtain this knowledge？ Did we not see equalities
of material things； such as pieces of wood and stones； and gather from
them the idea of an equality which is different from them？…you will
admit that？ Or look at the matter again in this way： Do not the same
pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal； and at another
time unequal？
That is certain。
But are real equals ever unequal？ or is the idea of equality ever
inequality？
That surely was never yet known； Socrates。
Then these （so…called） equals are not the same with the idea of
equality？
I should say； clearly not； Socrates。
And yet from these equals； although differing from the idea of
equality； you conceived and attained that idea？
Very true； he said。
Which might be like； or might be unlike them？
Yes。
But that makes no difference； whenever from seeing one thing you
conceived another； whether like or unlike； there must surely have been
an act of recollection？
Very true。
But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone； or other
material equals？ and what is the impression produced by them？ Are they
equals in the same sense as absolute equality？ or do they fall short
of this in a measure？
Yes； he said； in a very great measure； too。
And must we not allow that when I or anyone look at any object；
and perceive that the object aims at being some other thing； but falls
short of； and cannot attain to it…he who makes this observation must
have had previous knowledge of that to which； as he says； the other；
although similar； was inferior？
Certainly。
And has not this been our case in the matter of equals and of
absolute equality？
Precisely。
Then we must have known absolute equality previously to the time
when we first saw the material equals； and reflected that all these
apparent equals aim at this absolute equality； but fall short of it？
That is true。
And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been
known； and can only be known； through the medium of sight or touch； or
of some other sense。 And this I would affirm of all such conceptions。
Yes； Socrates； as far as the argument is concerned； one of them is
the same as the other。
And from the senses； then； is derived the knowledge that all
sensible things aim at an idea