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the same as the other。
And from the senses； then； is derived the knowledge that all
sensible things aim at an idea of equality of which they fall short…is
not that true？
Yes。
Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way； we
must have had a knowledge of absolute equality； or we could not have
referred to that the equals which are derived from the senses…for to
that they all aspire； and of that they fall short？
That； Socrates； is certainly to be inferred from the previous
statements。
And did we not see and hear and acquire our other senses as soon
as we were born？
Certainly。
Then we must have acquired the knowledge of the ideal equal at
some time previous to this？
Yes。
That is to say； before we were born； I suppose？
True。
And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born； and were born
having it； then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of
birth not only equal or the greater or the less； but all other
ideas； for we are not speaking only of equality absolute； but of
beauty； goodness； justice； holiness； and all which we stamp with the
name of essence in the dialectical process； when we ask and answer
questions。 Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the
knowledge before birth？
That is true。
But if； after having acquired； we have not forgotten that which we
acquired； then we must always have been born with knowledge； and shall
always continue to know as long as life lasts…for knowing is the
acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting。 Is not
forgetting； Simmias； just the losing of knowledge？
Quite true； Socrates。
But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us
at birth； and afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered that
which we previously knew； will not that which we call learning be a
process of recovering our knowledge； and may not this be rightly
termed recollection by us？
Very true。
For this is clear； that when we perceived something； either by the
help of sight or hearing； or some other sense； there was no difficulty
in receiving from this a conception of some other thing like or unlike
which had been forgotten and which was associated with this； and
therefore； as I was saying； one of two alternatives follows： either we
had this knowledge at birth； and continued to know through life； or；
after birth； those who are said to learn only remember； and learning
is recollection only。
Yes； that is quite true； Socrates。
And which alternative； Simmias； do you prefer？ Had we the
knowledge at our birth； or did we remember afterwards the things which
we knew previously to our birth？
I cannot decide at the moment。
At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge ought or
ought not to be able to give a reason for what he knows。
Certainly； he ought。
But do you think that every man is able to give a reason about these
very matters of which we are speaking？
I wish that they could； Socrates； but I greatly fear that
to…morrow at this time there will be no one able to give a reason
worth having。
Then you are not of opinion； Simmias； that all men know these
things？
Certainly not。
Then they are in process of recollecting that which they learned
before。
Certainly。
But when did our souls acquire this knowledge？…not since we were
born as men？
Certainly not。
And therefore previously？
Yes。
Then； Simmias； our souls must have existed before they were in the
form of man…without bodies； and must have had intelligence。
Unless indeed you suppose； Socrates； that these notions were given
us at the moment of birth； for this is the only time that remains。
Yes； my friend； but when did we lose them？ for they are not in us
when we are born…that is admitted。 Did we lose them at the moment of
receiving them； or at some other time？
No； Socrates； I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense。
Then may we not say； Simmias； that if； as we are always repeating；
there is an absolute beauty； and goodness； and essence in general； and
to this； which is now discovered to be a previous condition of our
being； we refer all our sensations； and with this compare
them…assuming this to have a prior existence； then our souls must have
had a prior existence； but if not； there would be no force in the
argument？ There can be no doubt that if these absolute ideas existed
before we were born； then our souls must have existed before we were
born； and if not the ideas； then not the souls。
Yes； Socrates； I am convinced that there is precisely the same
necessity for the existence of the soul before birth； and of the
essence of which you are speaking： and the argument arrives at a
result which happily agrees with my own notion。 For there is nothing
which to my mind is so evident as that beauty； goodness； and other
notions of which you were just now speaking have a most real and
absolute existence； and I am satisfied with the proof。
Well； but is Cebes equally satisfied？ for I must convince him too。
I think； said Simmias； that Cebes is satisfied： although he is the
most incredulous of mortals； yet I believe that he is convinced of the
existence of the soul before birth。 But that after death the soul will
continue to exist is not yet proven even to my own satisfaction。 I
cannot get rid of the feeling of the many to which Cebes was
referring…the feeling that when the man dies the soul may be
scattered； and that this may be the end of her。 For admitting that she
may be generated and created in some other place； and may have existed
before entering the human body； why after having entered in and gone
out again may she not herself be destroyed and come to an end？
Very true； Simmias； said Cebes； that our soul existed before we were
born was the first half of the argument； and this appears to have been
proven； that the soul will exist after death as well as before birth
is the other half of which the proof is still wanting； and has to be
supplied。
But that proof； Simmias and Cebes； has been already given； said
Socrates； if you put the two arguments together…I mean this and the
former one； in which we admitted that everything living is born of the
dead。 For if the soul existed before birth； and in coming to life
and being born can be born only from death and dying； must she not
after death continue to exist； since she has to be born again？
surely the proof which you desire has been already furnished。 Still
I suspect that you and Simmias would be glad to probe the argument
further； like children； you are haunted with a fear that when the soul
leaves the body； the wind may really blow her away and scatter her；
especially if a man should happen to die in stormy weather and not
when the sky is calm。
Cebes answered with a smile： Then； Socrates； you must argue us out
of our fears…and yet； strictly speaking； they are not our fears； but
there is a child within us to whom death is a sort of hobgoblin； him
too we must persuade not to be afraid when he is alone with him in the
dark。
Socrates said： Let the voice of the charmer be applied daily until
you have charmed him away。
And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears； Socrates；
when you are gone？
Hellas； he replied； is a large place； Cebes； and has many good
men； and there are barbarous races not a few： seek for him among
them all； far and wide； sparing neither pains nor money； for there
is no better way of using your money。 And you must not forget to
seek for him among yourselves too； for he is nowhere more likely to be
found。
The search； replied Cebes； shall certainly be made。 And now； if
you please； let us return to the point of the argument at which we
digressed。
By all means； replied Socrates； what else should I please？
Very good； he said。
Must we not； said Socrates； ask ourselves some question of this
sort？…What is that which； as we imagine； is liable to be scattered
away； and about which we fear？ and what again is that about which we
have no fear？ And then we may proceed to inquire whether that which
suffers dispersion is or is not of the nature of soul…our hopes and
fears as to our own souls will turn upon that。
That is true； he said。
Now the compound or composite may be supposed to be naturally
capable of being dissolved in like manner as of being compounded；
but that which is uncompounded； and that only； must be； if anything
is； indissoluble。
Yes； that is what I should imagine； said Cebes。
And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and unchanging；
where the compound is always