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stivers； in order to discourage the multiplicity of small
transactions。 The person who neglects to balance his account
twice in the year forfeits twenty…five guilders。 The person who
orders a transfer for more than is upon his account； is obliged
to pay three per cent for the sum overdrawn； and his order is set
aside into the bargain。 The bank is supposed； too； to make a
considerable profit by the sale of the foreign coin or bullion
which sometimes falls to it by the expiring of receipts； and
which is always kept till it can be sold with advantage。 It makes
a profit likewise by selling bank money at five per cent agio；
and buying it in at four。 These different emoluments amount to a
good deal more than what is necessary for paying the salaries of
officers； and defraying the expense of management。 What is paid
for the keeping of bullion upon receipts is alone supposed to
amount to a neat annual revenue of between one hundred and fifty
thousand and two hundred thousand guilders。 Public utility；
however； and not revenue； was the original object of this
institution。 Its object was to relieve the merchants from the
inconvenience of a disadvantageous exchange。 The revenue which
has arisen from it was unforeseen； and may be considered as
accidental。 But it is now time to return from this long
digression； into which I have been insensibly led in endeavouring
to explain the reasons why the exchange between the countries
which pay in what is called bank money； and those which pay in
common currency； should generally appear to be in favour of the
former and against the latter。 The former pay in a species of
money of which the intrinsic value is always the same； and
exactly agreeable to the standard of their respective mints； the
latter is a species of money of which the intrinsic value is
continually varying； and is almost always more or less below that
standard。
PART 2
Of the Unreasonableness of those extraordinary Restraints
upon other Principles
IN the foregoing part of this chapter I have endeavoured to
show； even upon the principles of the commercial system； how
unnecessary it is to lay extraordinary restraints upon the
importation of goods from those countries with which the balance
of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous。
Nothing； however； can be more absurd than this whole
doctrine of the balance of trade； upon which； not only these
restraints； but almost all the other regulations of commerce are
founded。 When two places trade with one another； this doctrine
supposes that； if the balance be even； neither of them either
loses or gains； but if it leans in any degree to one side； that
one of them loses and the other gains in proportion to its
declension from the exact equilibrium。 Both suppositions are
false。 A trade which is forced by means of bounties and
monopolies may be and commonly is disadvantageous to the country
in whose favour it is meant to be established； as I shall
endeavour to show hereafter。 But that trade which； without force
or constraint； is naturally and regularly carried on between any
two places is always advantageous； though not always equally so；
to both。
By advantage or gain； I understand not the increase of the
quantity of gold and silver； but that of the exchangeable value
of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country； or
the increase of the annual revenue of its inhabitants。
If the balance be even； and if the trade between the two
places consist altogether in the exchange of their native
commodities； they will； upon most occasions； not only both gain；
but they will gain equally； or very near equally； each will in
this case afford a market for a part of the surplus produce of
the other； each will replace a capital which had been employed in
raising and preparing for the market this part of the surplus
produce of the other； and which had been distributed among； and
given revenue and maintenance to a certain number of its
inhabitants。 Some part of the inhabitants of each； therefore；
will indirectly derive their revenue and maintenance from the
other。 As the commodities exchanged； too； are supposed to be of
equal value； so the two capitals employed in the trade will； upon
most occasions； be equal； or very nearly equal； and both being
employed in raising the native commodities of the two countries；
the revenue and maintenance which their distribution will afford
to the inhabitants of each will be equal； or very nearly equal。
This revenue and maintenance； thus mutually afforded； will be
greater or smaller in proportion to the extent of their dealings。
If these should annually amount to an hundred thousand pounds；
for example； or to a million on each side； each of them would
afford an annual revenue in the one case of an hundred thousand
pounds； in the other of a million； to the inhabitants of the
other。
If their trade should be of such a nature that one of them
exported to the other nothing but native commodities； while the
returns of that other consisted altogether in foreign goods； the
balance； in this case； would still be supposed even； commodities
being paid for with commodities。 They would； in this case too；
both gain； but they would not gain equally； and the inhabitants
of the country which exported nothing but native commodities
would derive the greatest revenue from the trade。 If England； for
example； should import from France nothing but the native
commodities of that country； and； not having such commodities of
its own as were in demand there； should annually repay them by
sending thither a large quantity of foreign goods； tobacco； we
shall suppose； and East India goods； this trade； though it would
give some revenue to the inhabitants of both countries； would
give more to those of France than to those of England。 The whole
French capital annually employed in it would annually be
distributed among the people of France。 But that part of the
English capital only which was employed in producing the English
commodities with which those foreign goods were purchased would
be annually distributed among the people of England。 The greater
part of it would replace the capitals which had been employed in
Virginia； Indostan； and China； and which had given revenue and
maintenance to the of those distant countries。 If the capitals
were equal； or nearly equal； therefore this employment of the
French capital would augment much more the revenue of the people
of France than that of the English capital would the revenue of
the people of England。 France would in this case carry on a
direct foreign trade of consumption with England； whereas England
would carry on a round…about trade of the same kind with France。
The different effects of a capital employed in the direct and of
one employed in the round…about foreign trade of consumption have
already been fully explained。
There is not； probably； between any two countries a trade
which consists altogether in the exchange either of native
commodities on both sides； or of native commodities on one side
and of foreign goods on the other。 Almost all countries exchange
with one another partly native and partly foreign goods。 That
country； however； in whose cargoes there is the greatest
proportion of native； and the least of foreign goods； will always
be the principal gainer。
If it was not with tobacco and East India goods； but with
gold and silver； that England paid for the commodities annually
imported from France； the balance； in this case； would be
supposed uneven； commodities not being paid for with commodities；
but with gold and silver。 The trade； however； would； in this
case； as in the foregoing； give some revenue to the inhabitants
of both countries； but more to those of France than to those of
England。 It would give some revenue to those of England。 The
capital which had been employed in producing the English goods
that purchased this gold and silver； the capital which had been
distributed among； and given revenue to； certain inhabitants of
England； would thereby be replaced and enabled to continue that
employment。 The whole capital of England would no more be
diminished by this exportation of gold and silver than by the
exportation of an equal value of any other goods。 On the
contrary； it would in most cases be augmented。 No goods are sent
abroad but those for which the demand is supposed to be greater
abroad than at home； and of which the returns consequently； it is
expected； will be of more value at home than the commodities
exported。 If the tobacco which； in England； is worth only a
hundred thousand pounds； when sent to France will purchase wine
which is； in England； worth a hundred and ten thousand； this
exchange will equally augment the capital of England by ten
thousand pounds。 If a hundred thousand pounds of English gold； in
the same manner； purchase French wine which； in England； is worth
a hundred and ten thousand； this exchange will equally augment
the capital of England