按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
company was erected； with a capital of five hundred thousand
pounds； to which the subscribers （over and above all other
encouragements； the tonnage bounty just now mentioned； the
exportation bounty of two shillings and eightpence the barrel；
the delivery of both British and foreign salt duty free） were；
during the space of fourteen years； for every hundred pounds
which they subscribed and paid in to the stock of the society；
entitled to three pounds a year； to be paid by the
receiver…general of the customs in equal half…yearly payments。
Besides this great company； the residence of whose governor and
directors was to be in London； it was declared lawful to erect
different fishing…chambers in all the different outports of the
kingdom； provided a sum not less than ten thousand pounds was
subscribed into the capital of each； to be managed at its own
risk； and for its own profit and loss。 The same annuity； and the
same encouragements of all kinds； were given to the trade of
those inferior chambers as to that of the great company。 The
subscription of the great company was soon filled up； and several
different fishing…chambers were erected in the different outports
of the kingdom。 In spite of all these encouragements； almost all
those different companies； both great and small； lost either the
whole； or the greater part of their capitals； scarce a vestige
now remains of any of them； and the white…herring fishery is now
entirely； or almost entirely； carried on by private adventurers。
If any particular manufacture was necessary； indeed； for the
defence of the society； it might not always be prudent to depend
upon our neighbours for the supply； and if such manufacture could
not otherwise be supported at home； it might not be unreasonable
that all the other branches of industry should be taxed in order
to support it。 The bounties upon the exportation of British…made
sailcloth and British…made gunpowder may； perhaps； both be
vindicated upon this principle。
But though it can very seldom be reasonable to tax the
industry of the great body of the people in order to support that
of some particular class of manufacturers； yet in the wantonness
of great prosperity； when the public enjoys a greater revenue
than it knows well what to do with； to give such bounties to
favourite manufactures may； perhaps； be as natural as to incur
any other idle expense。 In public as well as in private expenses；
great wealth may； perhaps； frequently be admitted as an apology
for great folly。 But there must surely be something more than
ordinary absurdity in continuing such profusion in times of
general difficulty and distress。
What is called a bounty is sometimes no more than a
drawback； and consequently is not liable to the same objections
as what is properly a bounty。 The bounty； for example； upon
refined sugar exported may be considered as a drawback of the
duties upon the brown and muscovado sugars from which it is made。
The bounty upon wrought silk exported； a drawback of the duties
upon raw and thrown silk imported。 The bounty upon gunpowder
exported； a drawback of the duties upon brimstone and saltpetre
imported。 In the language of the customs those allowances only
are called drawbacks which are given upon goods exported in the
same form in which they are imported。 When that form has been so
altered by manufacture of any kind as to come under a new
denomination； they are called bounties。
Premiums given by the public to artists and manufacturers
who excel in their particular occupations are not liable to the
same objections as bounties。 By encouraging extraordinary
dexterity and ingenuity； they serve to keep up the emulation of
the workmen actually employed in those respective occupations；
and are not considerable enough to turn towards any one of them a
greater share of the capital of the country than what would go to
it of its own accord。 Their tendency is not to overturn the
natural balance of employments； but to render the work which is
done in each as perfect and complete as possible。 The expense of
premiums； besides； is very trifling； that of bounties very great。
The bounty upon corn alone has sometimes cost the public in one
year more than three hundred thousand pounds。
DIGRESSION CONCERNING THE CORN TRADE AND CORN LAWS
I cannot conclude this chapter concerning bounties without
observing that the praises which have been bestowed upon the law
which establishes the bounty upon the exportation of corn； and
upon that system of regulations which is connected with it； are
altogether unmerited。 A particular examination of the nature of
the corn trade； and of the principal British laws which relate to
it。 will sufficiently demonstrate the truth of this assertion。
The great importance of this subject must justify the length of
the digression。
The trade of the corn merchant is composed of four different
branches； which； though they may sometimes be all carried on by
the same person； are in their own nature four separate and
distinct trades。 These are； first； the trade of the inland
dealer； secondly； that of the merchant importer for home
consumption； thirdly； that of the merchant exporter of home
produce for foreign consumption； and； fourthly； that of the
merchant carrier； or of the importer of corn in order to export
it again。
I。 The interest of the inland dealer； and that of the great
body of the people； how opposite soever they may at first sight
appear； are； even in years of the greatest scarcity； exactly the
same。 It is his interest to raise the price of his corn as high
as the real scarcity of the season requires； and it can never be
his interest to raise it higher。 By raising the price he
discourages the consumption； and puts everybody more or less； but
particularly the inferior ranks of people； upon thrift and good
management。 If； by raising it too high； he discourages the
consumption so much that the supply of the season is likely to go
beyond the consumption of the season； and to last for some time
after the next crop begins to come in； he runs the hazard； not
only of losing a considerable part of his corn by natural causes；
but of being obliged to sell what remains of it for much less
than what he might have had for it several months before。 If by
not raising the price high enough he discourages the consumption
so little that the supply of the season is likely to fall short
of the consumption of the season； he not only loses a part of the
profit which he might otherwise have made； but he exposes the
people to suffer before the end of the season； instead of the
hardships of a dearth； the dreadful horrors of a famine。 It is
the interest of the people that their daily； weekly； and monthly
consumption should be proportioned as exactly as possible to the
supply of the season。 The interest of the inland corn dealer is
the same。 By supplying them； as nearly as he can judge； in this
proportion； he is likely to sell all his corn for the highest
price； and with the greatest profit； and his knowledge of the
state of the crop； and of his daily； weekly； and monthly sales；
enable him to judge； with more or less accuracy； how far they
really are supplied in this manner。 Without intending the
interest of the people； he is necessarily led； by a regard to his
own interest； to treat them； even in years of scarcity； pretty
much in the same manner as the prudent master of a vessel is
sometimes obliged to treat his crew。 When he foresees that
provisions are likely to run short； he puts them upon short
allowance。 Though from excess of caution he should sometimes do
this without any real necessity； yet all the inconveniences which
his crew can thereby suffer are inconsiderable in comparison of
the danger； misery； and ruin to which they might sometimes be
exposed by a less provident conduct。 Though from excess of
avarice； in the same manner； the inland corn merchant should
sometimes raise the price of his corn somewhat higher than the
scarcity of the season requires； yet all the inconveniences which
the people can suffer from this conduct； which effectually
secures them from a famine in the end of the season； are
inconsiderable in comparison of what they might have been exposed
to by a more liberal way of dealing in the beginning of it。 The
corn merchant himself is likely to suffer the most by this excess
of avarice； not only from the indignation which it generally
excites against him； but； though he should escape the effects of
this indignation； from the quantity of corn which it necessarily
leaves upon his hands in the end of the season； and which； if the
next season happens to prove favourable； he must always sell for
a much lower price than he might otherwise have had。
Were it possible； indeed； for one great company of merchants
to possess themselves of the whole crop of an extensive country；
it might； perhaps； be their interest to deal with it as the Dutch
are said to do with the spiceries of the Moluccas； to destroy or
throw away a considerable par