按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
the whole empire。 The care of that defence and support is not
entrusted to them。 It is not their business； and they have no
regular means of information concerning it。 The assembly of a
province； like the vestry of a parish； may judge very properly
concerning the affairs of its own particular district； but can
have no proper means of judging concerning those of the whole
empire。 It cannot even judge properly concerning the proportion
which its own province bears to the whole empire； or concerning
the relative degree of its wealth and importance compared with
the other provinces； because those other provinces are not under
the inspection and superintendency of the assembly of a
particular province。 What is necessary for the defence and
support of the whole empire； and in what proportion each part
ought to contribute； can be judged of only by that assembly which
inspects and superintends the affairs of the whole empire。
It has been proposed； accordingly； that the colonies should
be taxed by requisition； the Parliament of Great Britain
determining the sum which each colony ought to pay； and the
provincial assembly assessing and levying it in the way that
suited best the circumstances of the province。 What concerned the
whole empire would in this way be determined by the assembly
which inspects and superintends the affairs of the whole empire；
and the provincial affairs of each colony might still be
regulated by its own assembly。 Though the colonies should in this
case have no representatives in the British Parliament； yet； if
we may judge by experience； there is no probability that the
Parliamentary requisition would be unreasonable。 The Parliament
of England has not upon any occasion shown the smallest
disposition to overburden those parts of the empire which are not
represented in Parliament。 The islands of Guernsey and Jersey；
without any means of resisting the authority of Parliament； are
more lightly taxed than any part of Great Britain。 Parliament in
attempting to exercise its supposed right； whether well or ill
grounded； of taxing the colonies； has never hitherto demanded of
them anything which even approached to a just proportion to what
was paid by their fellow subjects at home。 If the contribution of
the colonies； besides； was to rise or fall in proportion to the
rise or fall of the land tax； Parliament could not tax them
without taxing at the same time its own constituents； and the
colonies might in this case be considered as virtually
represented in Parliament。
Examples are not wanting of empires in which all the
different provinces are not taxed； if I may be allowed the
expression； in one mass； but in which the sovereign regulates the
sum which each province ought to pay； and in some provinces
assesses and levies it as he thinks proper； while in others； he
leaves it to be assessed and levied as the respective states of
each province shall determine。 In some provinces of France； the
king not only imposes what taxes he thinks proper； but assesses
and levies them in the way he thinks proper。 From others he
demands a certain sum； but leaves it to the states of each
province to assess and levy that sum as they think proper。
According to the scheme of taxing by requisition； the Parliament
of Great Britain would stand nearly in the same situation towards
the colony assemblies as the King of France does towards the
states of those provinces which still enjoy the privilege of
having states of their own； the provinces of France which are
supposed to be the best governed。
But though； according to this scheme； the colonies could
have no just reason to fear that their share of the public
burdens should ever exceed the proper proportion to that of their
fellow…citizens at home； Great Britain might have just reason to
fear that it never would amount to that proper proportion。 The
Parliament of Great Britain has not for some time past had the
same established authority in the colonies； which the French king
has in those provinces of France which still enjoy the privilege
of having states of their own。 The colony assemblies； if they
were not very favourably disposed （and unless more skilfully
managed than they ever have been hitherto； they are not very
likely to be so） might still find many pretences for evading or
rejecting the most reasonable requisitions of Parliament。 A
French war breaks out； we shall suppose； ten millions must
immediately be raised in order to defend the seat of the empire。
This sum must be borrowed upon the credit of some Parliamentary
fund mortgaged for paying the interest。 Part of this fund
Parliament proposes to raise by a tax to be levied in Great
Britain； and part of it by a requisition to all the different
colony assemblies of America and the West Indies。 Would people
readily advance their money upon the credit of a fund； which
partly depended upon the good humour of all those assemblies； far
distant from the seat of the war； and sometimes； perhaps；
thinking themselves not much concerned in the event of it？ Upon
such a fund no more money would probably be advanced than what
the tax to be levied in Great Britain might be supposed to answer
for。 The whole burden of the debt contracted on account of the
war would in this manner fall； as it always has done hitherto；
upon Great Britain； upon a part of the empire； and not upon the
whole empire。 Great Britain is； perhaps； since the world began；
the only state which； as it has extended its empire； has only
increased its expense without once augmenting its resources。
Other states have generally disburdened themselves upon their
subject and subordinate provinces of the most considerable part
of the expense of defending the empire。 Great Britain has
hitherto suffered her subject and subordinate provinces to
disburden themselves upon her of almost this whole expense。 In
order to put Great Britain upon a footing of equality with her
own colonies； which the law has hitherto supposed to be subject
and subordinate； it seems necessary； upon the scheme of taxing
them by Parliamentary requisition； that Parliament should have
some means of rendering its requisitions immediately effectual；
in case the colony assemblies should attempt to evade or reject
them； and what those means are； it is not very easy to conceive；
and it has not yet been explained。
Should the Parliament of Great Britain； at the same time； be
ever fully established in the right of taxing the colonies； even
independent of the consent of their own assemblies； the
importance of those assemblies would from that moment be at an
end； and with it； that of all the leading men of British America。
Men desire to have some share in the management of public affairs
chiefly on account of the importance which it gives them。 Upon
the power which the greater part of the leading men； the natural
aristocracy of every country； have of preserving or defending
their respective importance； depends the stability and duration
of every system of free government。 In the attacks which those
leading men are continually making upon the importance of one
another； and in the defence of their own； consists the whole play
of domestic faction and ambition。 The leading men of America；
like those of all other countries； desire to preserve their own
importance。 They feel； or imagine； that if their assemblies；
which they are fond of calling parliaments； and of considering as
equal in authority to the Parliament of Great Britain； should be
so far degraded as to become the humble ministers and executive
officers of that Parliament； the greater part of their own
importance would be at end。 They have rejected； therefore； the
proposal of being taxed by Parliamentary requisition； and like
other ambitious and high…spirited men； have rather chosen to draw
the sword in defence of their own importance。
Towards the declension of the Roman republic； the allies of
Rome； who had borne the principal burden of defending the state
and extending the empire； demanded to be admitted to all the
privileges of Roman citizens。 Upon being refused； the social war
broke out。 During the course of that war； Rome granted those
privileges to the greater part of them one by one； and in
proportion as they detached themselves from the general
confederacy。 The Parliament of Great Britain insists upon taxing
the colonies； and they refuse to be taxed by a Parliament in
which they are not represented。 If to each colony； which should
detach itself from the general confederacy； Great Britain should
allow such a number of representatives as suited the proportion
of what is contributed to the public revenue of the empire； in
consequence of its being subjected to the same taxes； and in
compensation admitted to the same freedom of trade with its
fellow…subjects at home； the number of its representatives to be
augmented as the proportion of its contribution might afterwards
augment； a new method of acquiring importance； a new and more
dazzling object of ambition would be presented to the leadi