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employment may be as necessary for the welfare of the society as
a near one； the goods which the distant employment deals in being
necessary； perhaps； for carrying on many of the nearer
employments。 But if the profits of those who deal in such goods
are above their proper level； those goods will be sold dearer
than they ought to be； or somewhat above their natural price； and
all those engaged in the nearer employments will be more or less
oppressed by this high price。 Their interest； therefore； in this
case requires that some stock should be withdrawn from those
nearer employments； and turned towards that distant one； in order
to reduce its profits to their proper level； and the price of the
goods which it deals in to their natural price。 In this
extraordinary case； the public interest requires that some stock
should be withdrawn from those employments which in ordinary
cases are more advantageous； and turned towards one which in
ordinary cases is less advantageous to the public； and in this
extraordinary case the natural interests and inclinations of men
coincide as exactly with the public interest as in all other
ordinary cases； and lead them to withdraw stock from the near；
and to turn it towards the distant employment。
It is thus that the private interests and passions of
individuals naturally dispose them to turn their stocks towards
the employments which in ordinary cases are most advantageous to
the society。 But if from this natural preference they should turn
too much of it towards those employments； the fall of profit in
them and the rise of it in all others immediately dispose them to
alter this faulty distribution。 Without any intervention of law；
therefore； the private interests and passions of men naturally
lead them to divide and distribute the stock of every society
among all the different employments carried on in it as nearly as
possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the
interest of the whole society。
All the different regulations of the mercantile system
necessarily derange more or less this natural and most
advantageous distribution of stock。 But those which concern the
trade to America and the East Indies derange it perhaps more than
any other； because the trade to those two great continents
absorbs a greater quantity of stock than any two other branches
of trade。 The regulations； however； by which this derangement is
effected in those two different branches of trade are not
altogether the same。 Monopoly is the great engine of both； but it
is a different sort of monopoly。 Monopoly of one kind or another；
indeed； seems to be the sole engine of the mercantile system。
In the trade to America every nation endeavours to engross
as much as possible the whole market of its own colonies by
fairly excluding all other nations from any direct trade to them。
During the greater part of the sixteenth century； the Portuguese
endeavoured to manage the trade to the East Indies in the same
manner； by claiming the sole right of sailing in the Indian seas；
on account of the merit of having first found out the road to
them。 The Dutch still continue to exclude all other European
nations from any direct trade to their spice islands。 Monopolies
of this kind are evidently established against all other European
nations； who are thereby not only excluded from a trade to which
it might be convenient for them to turn some part of their stock；
but are obliged to buy the goods which that trade deals in
somewhat dearer than if they could import them themselves
directly from the countries which produce them。
But since the fall of the power of Portugal； no European
nation has claimed the exclusive right of sailing in the Indian
seas； of which the principal ports are now open to the ships of
all European nations。 Except in Portugal； however； and within
these few years in France； the trade to the East Indies has in
every European country been subjected to an exclusive company。
Monopolies of this kind are properly established against the very
nation which erects them。 The greater part of that nation are
thereby not only excluded from a trade to which it might be
convenient for them to turn some part of their stock； but are
obliged to buy the goods which that trade deals somewhat dearer
than if it was open and free to all their countrymen。 Since the
establishment of the English East India Company； for example； the
other inhabitants of England； over and above being excluded from
the trade； must have paid in the price of the East India goods
which they have consumed； not only for all the extraordinary
profits which the company may have made upon those goods in
consequence of their monopoly； but for all the extraordinary
waste which the fraud and abuse； inseparable from the management
of the affairs of so great a company； must necessarily have
occasioned。 The absurdity of this second kind of monopoly；
therefore； is much more manifest than that of the first。
Both these kinds of monopolies derange more or less the
natural distribution of the stock of the society； but they do not
always derange it in the same way。
Monopolies of the first kind always attract to the
particular trade in which they are established a greater
proportion of the stock of the society than what would go to that
trade of its own accord。
Monopolies of the second kind may sometimes attract stock
towards the particular trade in which they are established； and
sometimes repel it from that trade according to different
circumstances。 In poor countries they naturally attract towards
that trade more stock than would otherwise go to it。 In rich
countries they naturally repel from it a good deal of stock which
would otherwise go to it。
Such poor countries as Sweden and Denmark； for example；
would probably have never sent a single ship to the East Indies
had not the trade been subjected to an exclusive company。 The
establishment of such a company necessarily encourages
adventurers。 Their monopoly secures them against all competitors
in the home market； and they have the same chance for foreign
markets with the traders of other nations。 Their monopoly shows
them the certainty of a great profit upon a considerable quantity
of goods； and the chance of a considerable profit upon a great
quantity。 Without such extraordinary encouragement； the poor
traders of such poor countries would probably never have thought
of hazarding their small capitals in so very distant and
uncertain an adventure as the trade to the East Indies must
naturally have appeared to them。
Such a rich country as Holland； on the contrary； would
probably； in the case of a free trade； send many more ships to
the East Indies than it actually does。 The limited stock of the
Dutch East India Company probably repels from that trade many
great mercantile capitals which would otherwise go to it。 The
mercantile capital of Holland is so great that it is； as it were；
continually overflowing； sometimes into the public funds of
foreign countries； sometimes into loans to private traders and
adventurers of foreign countries； sometimes into the most
round…about foreign trades of consumption； and sometimes into the
carrying trade。 All near employments being completely filled up；
all the capital which can be placed in them with any tolerable
profit being already placed in them； the capital of Holland
necessarily flows towards the most distant employments。 The trade
to the East Indies； if it were altogether free； would probably
absorb the greater part of this redundant capital。 The East
Indies offer a market for the manufactures of Europe and for the
gold and silver as well as for several other productions of
America greater and more extensive than both Europe and America
put together。
Every derangement of the natural distribution of stock is
necessarily hurtful to the society in which it takes place；
whether it be by repelling from a particular trade the stock
which would otherwise go to it； or by attracting towards a
particular trade that which would not otherwise come to it。 If；
without any exclusive company； the trade of Holland to the East
Indies would be greater than it actually is； that country must
suffer a considerable loss by part of its capital being excluded
from the employment most convenient for that part。 And in the
same manner； if； without an exclusive company； the trade of
Sweden and Denmark to the East Indies would be less than it
actually is； or； what perhaps is more probable； would not exist
at all； those two countries must likewise suffer a considerable
loss by part of their capital being drawn into an employment
which must be more or less unsuitable to their present
circumstances。 Better for them； perhaps； in their present
circumstances； to buy East India goods of other nations； even
though they should pay somewhat dearer； than to turn so great a
part of their small capital to so very distant a trade； in which
the returns are so very slow； in which that capital can maintain
so smal