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gg's first disposition of his troops for battle。 On Monday； the 29th； no change of importance was made； the troops remaining in line of battle。 In the evening； when Harker's brigade crossed the river； Bragg thought this was a movement to occupy a hill situated about six hundred yards in front of Hanson's centre。 This commanded the ground sloping to the river south and west； and from it the right of Withers's division across the river could be enfiladed。 Hanson's brigade was sent out； and； on Harker's return； the hill was occupied by the batteries of the enemy。 On Monday Bragg； finding that Rosecrans was extending his line on his right；as Bragg supposed to operate on that flankthrew his reserve division under McCown on Withers's left。 Hardee was ordered to take command of McCown's division； and to move Cleburne from the second line in the rear of Breckinridge； and place him on the left as support to McCown。 Cleburne was brought forward and placed five hundred yards in rear of the latter。 Bragg's main line of battle was in the edge of the woods； with open ground to the front。 His troops were formed in two lines； the first line protected by intrenchments； and his second line formed some six hundred yards to the rear。 He awaited the attack of Rosecrans on the 30th； and not receiving it； on Tuesday made his arrangements for an advance and attack in force on the morning of the 31st。 His troops remained in line of battle； ready to move with the early dawn of the coming day。 The two armies were now arrayed only some five hundred yards apart； facing each other； and eager for the conflict of the morrow。
At nine o'clock on the evening of the 30th； the corps commanders met at Rosecrans's headquarters； in the cedars near the Murfreesboro pike； to receive their final instructions and to learn the details of the plan of battle for the next day。 McCook was directed with his three divisions to occupy the most advantageous position； refusing his right as much as practicable and necessary to secure it； to await the attack of the enemy； and in the event of that not being made； to himself engage and hold the force on his front； Johnson's division held the extreme right of his line； on Johnson's left was Davis's division； and on Davis's left Sheridan's was posted。 Thomas was instructed to open with skirmishing and engage the enemy's centre with Negley's division of his command and Palmer's of Crittenden's corps； Negley's right resting on Sheridan's left； and Palmer's right on the left of Negley； Rousseau being in reserve。 Crittenden was ordered to move Van Cleve's division across the river at the lower ford； covered and supported by the pioneer brigade and at once advance on Breckinridge。 Wood's division was to followcrossing at the upper ford and joining Van Cleve's rightwhen they were to press everything before them into Murfreesboro。 This gave a strong attack from two divisions of Federal troops on the one of Breckinridge's； which was known to be the only one of the enemy's on the east of the river。 As soon as Breckinridge had been dislodged from his position； the artillery of Wood's division was to take position on the heights east of the river and open fire on the enemy's lines on the other side； which could here be seen in reverse； and dislodge them； when Palmer was to drive them southward across the river or through the wood。 Sustained by the advance of the Centre under Thomas crushing their right； Crittenden was to keep advancing； take Murfreesboro； move rapidly westward on the Franklin pike； get on their flank and rear and drive them into the country toward Salem； with the prospect of cutting off their retreat and probably destroying their army。 Rosecrans called the attention of the corps commanders to the fact that this combination； which gave to him such a superiority on the left； depended for its success upon McCook's maintaining his position on the right for at least three hours； and if compelled to fall back that he should do so in the same manner he had advanced the day before； slowly and steadily； refusing his right。 McCook was asked if he could hold his position for three hours； and replied that he thought he could。 The importance of doing so was again impressed upon him； and the officers then separated。
As will be seen； the plan of battle as formed by Rosecrans contemplated a feint attack by his right； which in the event of a repulse was to fall back slowly； contesting the ground stubbornly； while the main attack was to be made by the forces on the left； followed up the advance of the centre； the right to be temporarily sacrificed for the success of the general plan。 Rosecrans knew that Bragg had weakened his right to support his left； looking to offensive movements on his part； and that the vital point in his own plan was the ability of McCook to hold the enemy in check on his front。
During the 30th； Bragg formed his plan of battle； which； singular as it appears； was the exact counterpart of that of the Federal commander。 Hardee on the left； with McCown's and Cleburne's divisions； was to advance against the Federal right； which being forced back； Polk and Withers's and Cheatham's divisions were then to push the centre。 The movement made by a steady wheel to the right on the right of Polk's command as a pivot。 Bragg's plan was to drive our right and centre back against our left on Stone's River； seize our line of communication with Nashville； thus cutting us off from our base of operations and supplies； and ultimately securing the objective of his campaign； Nashville。 Bragg's plan was equally as bold as that of his opponentwhose command was slightly inferior in strength to the rebel forceand the success of either depended very largely on the degree of diligence in opening the engagement。 Rosecrans's orders were for the troops to breakfast before daylight and attack at seven o'clock。 Bragg issued orders to attack at daylight。
Chapter VIII。
The Battle of Stone's River。
With early light； on the morning of the 31st； the movement in each army began。 Rosecrans had established his headquarters in the rear of the left； in order to direct in person the forward movement of that portion of his army which was to cross Stone's River； sweep all resistance before it； and swing into Murfreesboro。 The command was given； and at once Van Cleve advanced two brigades； making the crossing of the river at the lower ford without opposition。 Wood's division had reached the river bank prepared to make the crossing and support Van Cleve。 Everything on the left appeared to be working satisfactorily； when the opening sounds of the enemy's attack on the right reached the left。 This was as intended； and went to show that if Bragg's left was fully occupied he then could give the less attention to his right； engaged by our army。 with high hopes the troops then pressing forward continued to cross the river。 Within an hour after the opening of the battle； one of McCook's staff officers reported to Rosecrans that the Right Wing was heavily pressed and needed assistance。 Rosecrans was not told of the rout of Johnson's division； nor of the rapid withdrawal of Davis； made necessary thereby。 Rosecrans； sending word to McCook to make a stubborn fight； continued his own offensive movement。 Everything was working well as far as he knew。 His strong force on the left was not yet engaged。 This he could hurl at the enemy's line of communications and strike on the flank of Bragg's army that was flanking him。 Soon after another staff officer from McCook arrived and reported that the entire Right Wing was being driven； a fact that manifested itself by the troops from the broken divisions pouring forth from the cedars in alarming numbers； and by the rapid movement of the noise of the battle to the north。 Then Rosecrans saw the necessity of abandoning his own movement； of recalling the left； and of proceeding at once to the right to save what was left of that corps as speedily as possible。 He ordered back his left from across the river； and calling on his staff to mount； rode full gallop over to the right to reform that command on a new line and save his army。 Now that he was on the defensive； after McCook's disaster； it was impossible to carry out his original plan of battle。
On the 30th； McCown in posting his division placed Ector's and Rains's brigades in the first line； and McNair's brigade in the second。 Hardee ordered McCown at once to change this so as to bring McNair on the front line。 This order was not obeyed until the morning of the 31st； when the movement was made； causing； however； some delay in the advance of Hardee's command on our right。 At half past six o'clock； McCown's division in the front line with Cleburne's division in the second swinging around by a continuous change of direction to the right； advanced on to the right of McCook。 McCown did not properly execute the movement as intended； and was carried so far west as to leave a gap in the rebel front between Withers's left and McCown's right。 Into this gap Cleburne immediately threw his division； and advanced； filling the interval in the front line between McCown and Polk。 This gave Hardee double the length of front originally contemplated