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s where breakfast was being prepared。 He was right as to this fact； but wrong about his deduction。 Willich's brigade was the only one that was not through the morning meal； and this was by reason of his troops being under arms for nearly two hours prior to this time； after which Willich gave them orders to prepare their meal。 Kirk's brigade had been under arms since five o'clock in the morning； ready for action an hour before the battle commenced； and in Post's brigade the men were in order of battle for an hour before the first dawn of light。 The front of all these brigades was covered with heavy picket lines well thrown out。 General Sill reported to General Sheridan at two o'clock in the morning； 〃great activity on the part of the enemy immediately in his front； with movements of troops to their left；〃 and from four o'clock in the morning until seven； Sheridan's troops were standing under arms； and the cannoneeers were at their places。
It is difficult to determine which to admire more； the heavy； quick； decided onset of the rebels； as with ranks well closed up； without music； and almost noiselessly； they moved in the gray light of the early December morning； out of the cedars； across the open fields； hurling the full weight of their advancing columns upon our right； with all the dash of Southern troops； sweeping on with rapid stride； and wild yells of triumph； to what appeared to them an easy final victory； or； later in the afternoon； when our troops that had been driven from the field early in the morning； were reformed under the eye of the commanding general； met and threw back from the point of the bayonet； and from the cannon mouth； the charge after charge of the same victorious troops of the earlier portion of the day。 One was like the resistless sweep of a whirlwind in its onward course of destruction； the other the grand sturdy resistance of the rocky coast； which the waves only rush upon to be dashed to pieces。 In each of these； the two armies displayed their distinctive feature to the best。 Under Thomas； the Centre of the army evinced； in a marked degree； the staying qualities of that commander； which afterward were shown so conspicuously at Chickamauga。
Chapter IX。
In Murfreesboro。
During the first six months of 1863； the military operations of the Army of the Cumberland were of a minor character。 The exhaustion attending the severe fighting of the last week of the previous year； kept that army in camp for some time to restore the losses of arms and material； to reclothe the army； to recruit the strength of the troops； to forward the needed supplies； and to build the necessary works to fortify Murfreesboro as a new base。 The rebuilding of the Muldraughs Hills' trestleworks； and the heavy repairs elsewhere needed on the railroad north of Nashville； together with having the road from Nashville to Murfreesboro placed in proper order； all required time and were necessary to be done； to supply the wants of the army in the immediate present。 But the future was what demanded the greatest thought and most careful planning。 The problem that gave Buell the greatest trouble to solvethe protection of his lines of communication and supplieswas now forced upon Rosecrans。 The enemy with more than one…half of his cavalry force absent during the battle of Stone's River； under Morgan in Kentucky and Forrest in West Tennessee； outnumbered that arm of the service of the Army of the Cumberland during the battle almost two to one。 These troopers were nearly all old veterans； accustomed to the severest hardships of service； and it was wonderful the rapidity with which they got over ground and the amount of fatigue they could undergo。 To afford perfect protection to his line supplying the army from its base at Louisville； as against these raiding bands； if infantry was to be employed； Rosecrans's entire force was needed； posted by brigades at the vulnerable points。 To make an advance and thus lengthen his lines； simply increased the present difficulties。 Without making the necessary preparation to protect his line of supplies； Rosecrans would hamper his forward movement and retard and cripple his advance when commenced。 The only proper force to meet the enemy's troopers was cavalry。 In the early days of the Army of the Ohio； under Buell； a number of unsuccessful attempts were made to chase and fight cavalry with infantry； and in every instance the effort was crowned with failure； the only result being the discomfort and complete exhaustion of the marching troops。
The repair of the most complete wrecking the Louisville road ever suffered； demanded Rosecrans's attention the first thing after the Battle of Stone's River。 When the army left Nashville； on the advance to meet Bragg； the supplies in that city were very limited。 With the disabling of the road it was impossible at that time to forward sufficient supplies to meet the wants of the command； and for the first few weeks while the army remained at Murfreesboro the troops were on half rations； and many of the articles constituting the 〃ration〃 entirely dispensed with； leaving but three or four on the list。 The surrounding country for miles was scoured for forage and provisions。 Everything of that kind was gathered in by raiding parties； not leaving sufficient for the actual necessities of the inhabitants。 To such an extent did this go； that to the officers with means to purchase such provisions as were to be had； potatoes and onions became luxuries。 The whole army was threatened with scurvy。
The number and extent of these raids； and the damage sustained by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad during the year from July 1； 1862； is concisely set forth in the report of the superintendent of that road。 His report shows that during this time 〃the road has been operated for its entire length only seven months and twelve days；〃 〃all the bridges and trestleworks on the main stem and branches； with the exception of the bridge over Barren River and four small bridges； were destroyed and rebuilt during the year。 Some of the structures were destroyed twice and some three times。 In addition to this； most of the water stations； several depots； and a large number of cars were burnt； a number of engines badly damaged； and a tunnel in Tennessee nearly filled up for a distance of eight hundred feet。〃
By reason of this condition of things； Rosecrans determined to increase the cavalry arm of his army； so that he could meet the ten or twelve thousand cavalry of the enemy in their detached raids on more of an equal footing。 From the commencement of operations in Tennessee under Buell； the enemy's cavalry had been steadily increasing in numbers and in efficiency； until at this time it was a greater problem how to meet this arm of the enemy's force than his infantry。 Rosecrans made repeated urgent applications to the department at Washington for additional cavalry； for horses and improved arms for those already under his command。 He detailed infantry to be mounted and armed as cavalry； organizing a brigade of 〃mounted infantry〃 under Colonel John T。 Wilder。
On Bragg's retreating from Murfreesboro； he took position with a portion of his army and established his headquarters at Shelbyville。 He then ordered part of his command to move to Tullahoma； and there intrench； throwing up extensive earthworks and fortifications。 Later； he placed his troops in winter quarters。 In addition to the cavalry that had formerly been under Bragg； Van Dorn in February reported to him with his command of three brigades of cavalry； about five thousand effective troops。 Bragg placed Van Dorn and Wheeler to protect the front and flanks of his army； assigning the former to the left； with his headquarters at Columbia； and directing the latter to take position on the right； constituted each command a corps。 To Wheeler's command he assigned Morgan's； Wharton's； and Martin's divisions。 Forrest's command was assigned to Van Dorn。 Some important events took place during the first six months of 1863； that had a bearing on the fortunes of the Army of the Cumberland。
On January 9th； in recognition of the services of that army； by General Order No。 9 of the War Department； that command was reorganized； and the Centre； Right； and Left were constituted corps d'armee； with the designation of Fourteenth； Twentieth； and Twenty…first Corps； under the same commanders； who were thus advanced to this higher command。 During this month； Steedman； in command of Fry's old division； was ordered from Gallatin to the front； and posted at Triune and La Vergne。 Reynold's division was ordered from Gallatin to Murfreesboro。 A slight change was also made in the boundaries of the Department。 On the 25th； by order of the War Department； the commands of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson were transferred from the department under Grant； to that under Rosecrans； and later Fort Heiman。 To Rosecrans was then committed the care and control of the Cumberland River； his second and secondary line of communication and supplies connecting his two principal depots。
On January 26th； Bragg ordered Wheeler on an expedition to capture Fort Donelson。 Wheeler directed Forrest to move his brigade with four guns on the river