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he regiment entered the town as the rear of the enemy's column was leaving the place。 The next day the four divisions of the Fourteenth Corps were in supporting distance of each other； with Negley still in front of Dug Gap； the enemy holding the east entrance with a heavy force； and the Gap full of obstructions。 Negley discovered early on the following day that his situation was critical； and that he was in danger of losing his train。 He determined to fall back to a strong position in front of Stevens's Gap； which movement he proceeded to execute； and succeeded in the face of the enemy by his energy and skill； with the prompt co…operation of Baird； in securing his position in front of the gap without the loss of a single wagon。 The next day the location of Bragg's army at La Fayette with Johnston's reinforcements was fully determined； and Thomas's corps now awaited the movements of the other troops with reference to the concentration of the army。
In the meantime Davis's and Johnson's divisions of McCook's corps； crossing the river at Caperton's Ferry； moved over Sand Mountain into Will's Valley； and thenceDavis being in the advancemoved into and seized Winston's Gap； some twenty…five miles from Caperton's Ferry； and about forty…two from Chattanooga。 Sheridan's division crossed the river at the railroad bridge； moved through Trenton； and on the 6th encamped twelve miles from Winston's Gap。 McCook sent several detachments on the 8th and 9th to different points； reconnoitering the enemy。 One went to Alpine and two into Broomtown Valley； but nothing was discovered of Bragg's whereabouts。 On the evening of the 9th Rosecrans sent orders to McCook； stating that the enemy had evacuated Chattanooga and were retreating southward； and directing him to move rapidly upon Alpine and Summerville in pursuit； to intercept his line of retreat； and to attack on his flank。 The day following McCook reached Alpine； where he discovered the situation。 The enemy had not retreated very far from Chattanooga； the exact location as yet unknown。 McCook learned that he could not communicate with Thomas； as his couriers could not pass through the valley； occupied as it was by the enemy in force； and that his corps was entirely isolated at Alpine。 That； had he gone to Summerville； he would have been exposed to an attack from the entire rebel army； which his reconnoissance later determined was concentrated in force near La Fayette。 On the following day McCook remained in camp waiting for Thomas to move up on him。 He； however； sent his wagon…train back to the summit of Lookout Mountain。 On the 12th McCook waited in camp for reports from the cavalry as to the position and movements of the enemy。
Crittenden's corps had during the time moved down the Sequatchie Valley； in readiness for an active campaign。 He then crossed the river at Bridgeport； Shell Mound； and Battle Creek； and on September 4th his entire corps was across the river。 He was ordered to move up the valley of Running Water Creek and Whiteside； leaving one division on the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad； and to push forward as near as possible to Chattanooga； threatening the enemy in that direction。 At 6 A。M。 on the 9th Crittenden was informed by a despatch from Rosecrans that Chattanooga had been abandoned by the enemy； and that he was to push forward at once with five day's rations and make a vigorous pursuit。 During the morning Crittenden with Wood's division occupied the town； and Wood was placed in command。 Palmer's and Van Cleve's were turned off south after they passed the spur of Lookout Mountain； and encamped at Rossville； five miles south of Chattanooga。 In the afternoon of the same day Crittenden was ordered to leave a brigade at Chattanooga； and with the balance of his command to pursue the enemy with the utmost vigor； the line of march to be through Ringgold and on to Dalton。 The next day Crittenden left Wagnerwho had crossed the river from the front of the town during the nightin command； and ordered forward Palmer's； Van Cleve's； and the two brigades of Wood's division in pursuit； marching on the Rossville and Riggold road。 During the afternoon Palmer reported the enemy's cavalry strong on his front； that he had only been able to march six miles； had encamped at Chickamauga Creek； and that his advance had been checked by a charge of the rebel cavalry。 That night Crittenden received several reports from his front that the enemy was in force near La Fayette； and threatening to retake Chattanooga。
During the 11th； Wood； with his two brigades； was on a reconnoissance at Gordon's Mills； and Crittenden was ordered to occupy Ringgold and report。 These movements determined to Rosecrans's satisfaction the position of the enemy in force in the vicinity of La Fayette。 He immediately ordered Crittenden to close his entire command upon Wood； crossing as quickly as possible to the Rossville and La Fayette road； to some point near Lee and Gordon's Mills。 Early on the morning of the 12th； Wilder was ordered back to Ringgold and directed to follow on the line of march of the infantry； covering the left flank。 Crittenden succeeded during the day in effecting a concentration of his command at Lee and Gordon's Mills； which point Wilder's brigade reached after a severe skirmish during the day near Leet's tanyard； where he lost thirty men killed and wounded。 With the knowledge that Bragg was concentrating his forces awaiting reinforcements behind Pigeon Mountain； in the vicinity of La Fayette； and that his own army was scattered a distance of thirty miles from flank to flankfrom Lee and Gordon's Mills to AlpineRosecrans felt that it was a matter of life and death to effect the concentration of his army in the shortest possible space of time。
During these movements of the army under Rosecrans； what was Bragg doing？ On August 20th； the movement of our army over the Cumberland Mountains was reported to Bragg； and he then knew that he might look for an immediate advance。 The movement of our army across the Tennessee was also reported to Bragg by his scouts； but was regarded by him as incredible。 These reports were soon after confirmed by the news that our cavalry had occupied Trenton and had advanced up the Will's Valley Railroad as far as Wauhatchie； within seven miles of Chattanooga； as a covering force under which Rosecrans's columns of infantry were advancing。 Our army was now as near the line of communication of the rebel army； as the latter was to the line to Nashville； and with less risk in its advance movements should Bragg commence operations to the north。 Bringing his cavalry forward at once； Bragg soon ascertained that the general movement of our army was toward his left and rear in the direction of Dalton and Rome； keeping Lookout Mountain between the armies。 He then determined to meet our army as its columns debouched from the defiles of the mountains。 To hold Chattanooga would require at least two strong divisions； and he felt that his force would not permit this and make a successful attack also。 Bragg put his army in motion on September 7th and 8th； and took up position from Lee and Gordon's Mills to La Fayette； on the road running south from Chattanooga； with the front to the east side of Lookout Mountain； and on the east bank of Chickamauga Creek； establishing his headquarters at the former place。
The positions of our detached corps was fully known to Bragg on the 8th。 Learning of Negley's movement of the 9th into McLemore's cove； Bragg rightly interpreted it to mean that a hurried pursuit was being made after his force； under the idea that he was in full retreat。 With his own force concentrated in front of the centre； Bragg at once saw how Rosecrans had exposed the corps of his army to be attacked and defeated in detail； and that evening he gave order to Hindman to prepare his division to move against Negley； and ordered Hill to send or take Cleburne's division； join Hindman； and immediately move upon Negley。 On receipt of these orders； Hill replied that his part of the movement was impracticable； as Cleburne was sick； and that both gapsDug and Catlett'shad been closed by felling timber which would require twenty…four hours to remove。 Hindman having marched during the night of the 9th some ten miles； was now in position； some three miles from Negley in the cove。 Bragg not wishing to lose so favorable an opportunity of striking his opponent's force； ordered Buckner with his command to move from Anderson and join Hindman in the cove； which he did during the afternoon of the 10th。 After these commands had united； the commanders held a consultation and determined that a change in the plan of operations should be made。 Bragg having removed his headquarters to La Fayette； 〃so as to secure more prompt and decided action in the movements ordered against the enemy's centre；〃 now directed Polk to send his remaining division to support Hindman during the operations in the cove。 Despatching an officer to Bragg with a report as to this change of plans； Hindman and Cleburne waited his return。 Bragg refused to make any change； and sent a verbal order to Hindman to proceed at once to carry out his previous instruction。 Bragg at the same time sent