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e Roman republic； all was lost； it was no longer possible to direct a populace that sought its own destruction。 But when the body of the nobles are to vote in an aristocracy＇16＇ or in a democracy the senate＇17＇ as the business is then only to prevent intrigues； the suffrages cannot be too secret。
Intriguing in a senate is dangerous； it is dangerous also in a body of nobles； but not so among the people； whose nature is to act through passion。 In countries where they have no share in the government； we often see them as much inflamed on account of an actor as ever they could be for the welfare of the state。 The misfortune of a republic is when intrigues are at an end； which happens when the people are gained by bribery and corruption： in this case they grow indifferent to public affairs； and avarice becomes their predominant passion。 Unconcerned about the government and everything belonging to it； they quietly wait for their hire。
It is likewise a fundamental law in democracies； that the people should have the sole power to enact laws。 And yet there are a thousand occasions on which it is necessary the senate should have the power of decreeing； nay； it is frequently proper to make some trial of a law before it is established。 The constitutions of Rome and Athens were excellent。 The decrees of the senate＇18＇ had the force of laws for the space of a year； but did not become perpetual till they were ratified by the consent of the people。
3。 Of the Laws in relation to the Nature of Aristocracy。 In an aristocracy the supreme power is lodged in the hands of a certain number of persons。 These are invested both with the legislative and executive authority； and the rest of the people are； in respect to them； the same as the subjects of a monarchy in regard to the sovereign。
They do not vote here by lot； for this would be productive of inconveniences only。 And indeed； in a government where the most mortifying distinctions are already established； though they were to be chosen by lot； still they would not cease to be odious； it is the nobleman they envy； and not the magistrate。
When the nobility are numerous； there must be a senate to regulate the affairs which the body of the nobles are incapable of deciding； and to prepare others for their decision。 In this case it may be said that the aristocracy is in some measure in the senate； the democracy in the body of the nobles； and the people are a cipher。
It would be a very happy thing in an aristocracy if the people； in some measure； could be raised from their state of annihilation。 Thus at Genoa； the bank of St。 George being administered by the people＇19＇ gives them a certain influence in the government； whence their whole prosperity is derived。
The senators ought by no means to have the right of naming their own members； for this would be the only way to perpetuate abuses。 At Rome； which in its early years was a kind of aristocracy； the senate did not fill up the vacant places in their own body； the new members were nominated by the censors。＇20＇
In a republic； the sudden rise of a private citizen to exorbitant power produces monarchy； or something more than monarchy。 In the latter the laws have provided for； or in some measure adapted themselves to； the constitution； and the principle of government checks the monarch： but in a republic； where a private citizen has obtained an exorbitant power；＇21＇ the abuse of this power is much greater； because the laws foresaw it not； and consequently made no provision against it。
There is an exception to this rule； when the constitution is such as to have immediate need of a magistrate invested with extraordinary power。 Such was Rome with her dictators； such is Venice with her state inquisitors； these are formidable magistrates； who restore； as it were by violence； the state to its liberty。 But how comes it that these magistracies are so very different in these two republics？ It is because Rome supported the remains of her aristocracy against the people； whereas Venice employs her state inquisitors to maintain her aristocracy against the nobles。 The consequence was that at Rome the dictatorship could be only of short duration； as the people acted through passion and not with design。 It was necessary that a magistracy of this kind should be exercised with lustre and pomp； the business being to intimidate； and not to punish； the multitude。 It was also proper that the dictator should be created only for some particular affair； and for this only should have an unlimited authority； as he was always created upon some sudden emergency。 On the contrary； at Venice they have occasion for a permanent magistracy； for here it is that schemes may be set on foot； continued； suspended； and resumed； that the ambition of a single person becomes that of a family； and the ambition of one family that of many。 They have occasion for a secret magistracy； the crimes they punish being hatched in secrecy and silence。 This magistracy must have a general inquisition； for their business is not to remedy known disorders； but to prevent the unknown。 In a word； the latter is designed to punish suspected crimes； whereas the former used rather menaces than punishment even for crimes that were openly avowed。
In all magistracies； the greatness of the power must be compensated by the brevity of the duration。 This most legislators have fixed to a year； a longer space would be dangerous； and a shorter would be contrary to the nature of government。 For who is it that in the management even of his domestic affairs would be thus confined？ At Ragusa＇22＇ the chief magistrate of the republic is changed every month； the other officers every week； and the governor of the castle every day。 But this can take place only in a small republic environed＇23＇ by formidable powers； who might easily corrupt such petty and insignificant magistrates。
The best aristocracy is that in which those who have no share in the legislature are so few and inconsiderable that the governing party have no interest in oppressing them。 Thus when＇24＇ Antipater made a law at Athens that whosoever was not worth two thousand drachms should have no power to vote； he formed by this method the best aristocracy possible； because this was so small a sum as to exclude very few； and not one of any rank or consideration in the city。
Aristocratic families ought therefore； as much as possible； to level themselves in appearance with the people。 The more an aristocracy borders on democracy； the nearer it approaches perfection： and； in proportion as it draws towards monarchy； the more is it imperfect。
But the most imperfect of all is that in which the part of the people that obeys is in a state of civil servitude to those who command； as the aristocracy of Poland； where the peasants are slaves to the nobility。
4。 Of the Relation of Laws to the Nature of Monarchical Government。 The intermediate； subordinate； and dependent powers constitute the nature of monarchical government； I mean of that in which a single person governs by fundamental laws。 I said the intermediate； subordinate； and dependent powers。 And indeed； in monarchies the prince is the source of all power； political and civil。 These fundamental laws necessarily suppose the intermediate channels through which the power flows： for if there be only the momentary and capricious will of a single person to govern the state； nothing can be fixed； and of course there is no fundamental law。
The most natural； intermediate； and subordinate power is that of the nobility。 This in some measure seems to be essential to a monarchy； whose fundamental maxim is： no monarch； no nobility； no nobility； no monarch； but there may be a despotic prince。
There are men who have endeavoured in some countries in Europe to suppress the jurisdiction of the nobility； not perceiving that they were driving at the very thing that was done by the parliament of England。 Abolish the privileges of the lords； the clergy and cities in a monarchy； and you will soon have a popular state； or else a despotic government。
The courts of a considerable kingdom in Europe have； for many ages； been striking at the patrimonial jurisdiction of the lords and clergy。 We do not pretend to censure these sage magistrates； but we leave it to the public to judge how far this may alter the constitution。 Far am I from being prejudiced in favour of the privileges of the clergy； however； I should be glad if their jurisdiction were once fixed。 The question is not whether their jurisdiction was justly established； but whether it be really established； whether it constitutes a part of the laws of the country； and is in every respect in relation to those laws： whether between two powers acknowledged independent； the conditions ought not to be reciprocal； and whether it be not equally the duty of a good subject to defend the prerogative of the prince； and to maintain the limits which from time immemorial have been prescribed to his authority。
Though the ecclesiastic power be so dangerous in a republic； yet it is extremely proper in a monarchy； especially of the absolute kind。 What would become of Spain and Portugal； since the subversion of their laws； were it not for this only barrier against the incursions of arb