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since the subversion of their laws； were it not for this only barrier against the incursions of arbitrary power？ A barrier ever useful when there is no other： for since a despotic government is productive of the most dreadful calamities to human nature； the very evil that restrains it is beneficial to the subject。
In the same manner as the ocean； threatening to overflow the whole earth； is stopped by weeds and pebbles that lie scattered along the shore； so monarchs； whose power seems unbounded； are restrained by the smallest obstacles； and suffer their natural pride to be subdued by supplication and prayer。
The English； to favour their liberty； have abolished all the intermediate powers of which their monarchy was composed。 They have a great deal of reason to be jealous of this liberty； were they ever to be so unhappy as to lose it； they would be one of the most servile nations upon earth。
Mr。 Law； through ignorance both of a republican and monarchical constitution； was one of the greatest promoters of absolute power ever known in Europe。 Besides the violent and extraordinary changes owing to his direction； he would fain suppress all the intermediate ranks； and abolish the political communities。 He was dissolving＇25＇ the monarchy by his chimerical reimbursements； and seemed as if he even wanted to redeem the constitution。
It is not enough to have intermediate powers in a monarchy； there must be also a depositary of the laws。 This depositary can only be the judges of the supreme courts of justice； who promulgate the new laws； and revive the obsolete。 The natural ignorance of the nobility； their indolence and contempt of civil government； require that there should be a body invested with the power of reviving and executing the laws； which would be otherwise buried in oblivion。 The prince's council are not a proper depositary。 They are naturally the depositary of the momentary will of the prince； and not of the fundamental laws。 Besides； the prince's council is continually changing； it is neither permanent nor numerous； neither has it a sufficient share of the confidence of the people； consequently it is capable of setting them right in difficult conjunctures； or of reducing them to proper obedience。
Despotic governments； where there are no fundamental laws； have no such kind of depositary。 Hence it is that religion has generally so much influence in those countries； because it forms a kind of permanent depositary； and if this cannot be said of religion； it may of the customs that are respected instead of laws。
5。 Of the Laws in relation to the Nature of a despotic Government。 From the nature of despotic power it follows that the single person； invested with this power； commits the execution of it also to a single person。 A man whom his senses continually inform that he himself is everything and that his subjects are nothing； is naturally lazy； voluptuous； and ignorant。 In consequence of this； he neglects the management of public affairs。 But were he to commit the administration to many； there would be continual disputes among them； each would form intrigues to be his first slave； and he would be obliged to take the reins into his own hands。 It is； therefore； more natural for him to resign it to a vizir；＇26＇ and to invest him with the same power as himself。 The creation of a vizir is a fundamental law of this government。
It is related of a pope that he had started an infinite number of difficulties against his election； from a thorough conviction of his incapacity。 At length he was prevailed on to accept of the pontificate； and resigned the administration entirely to his nephew。 He was soon struck with surprise； and said； 〃I should never have thought that these things were so easy。〃 The same may be said of the princes of the East； who； being educated in a prison where eunuchs corrupt their hearts and debase their understandings； and where they are frequently kept ignorant even of their high rank； when drawn forth in order to be placed on the throne； are at first confounded： but as soon as they have chosen a vizir； and abandoned themselves in their seraglio to the most brutal passions； pursuing； in the midst of a prostituted court； every capricious extravagance； they would never have dreamed that they could find matters so easy。
The more extensive the empire； the larger the seraglio； and consequently the more voluptuous the prince。 Hence the more nations such a sovereign has to rule； the less he attends to the cares of government； the more important his affairs； the less he makes them the subject of his deliberations。
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1。 Compare Aristotle； Politics； vi。 2。
2。 Declamations； 17； 18。
3。 See the Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decline of the Romans； 9。
4。 Pp。 691； 693； ed。 Wechel； 1596。
5。 Bk。 i。
6。 Bk。 iv； art。 15 et seq。
7。 See in the Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decline of the Romans； 9； how this spirit of Servius Tullius was preserved in the republic。
8。 Dionysius Halicarnassus； Eulogium of Isocrates； ii； p。 97； ed。 Wechel。 Pollux； viii。 10； art。 130。
9。 See Aristotle's Politics； ii。 12。
10。 Ibid； iv。 9。
11。 See the oration of Demosthenes； De Falsa legat。； and the oration against Timarchus。
12。 They used even to draw two tickets for each place； one which gave the place； and the other which named the person who was to succeed； in case the first was rejected。
13。 De Leg。； i； iii。
14。 They were called leges tabulares； two tablets were presented to each citizen； the first marked with an A； for Antique； or I forbid it； and the other with an U and an R； for Uti rogas； or Be it as you desire。
15。 At Athens the people used to lift up their hands。
16。 As at Venice。
17。 The thirty tyrants at Athens ordered the suffrages of the Areopagites to be public； in order to manage them as they pleased。 Lysias； Orat。 contra Agorat。 8。
18。 See Dionysius Halicarnassus； iv； ix。
19。 See Mr。 Addison； Travels to Italy； p。 16。
20。 They were named at first by the consuls。
21。 This is what ruined the republic of Rome。 See Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decline of the Romans； 14； 16。
22。 Tournefort； Voyages。
23。 At Lucca the magistrates are chosen only for two months。
24。 Diodorus； xviii； p。 601； ed。 Rhodoman。
25。 Ferdinand； king of Aragon； made himself grand master of the orders； and that alone changed the constitution。
26。 The Eastern kings are never without vizirs； says Sir John Chardin。
Book III。 Of the Principles of the Three Kinds of Government
1。 Difference between the Nature and Principle of Government。 Having examined the laws in relation to the nature of each government； we must investigate those which relate to its principle。
There is this difference between the nature and principle＇1＇ of government； that the former is that by which it is constituted； the latter that by which it is made to act。 One is its particular structure； and the other the human passions which set it in motion。
Now； laws ought no less to relate to the principle than to the nature of each government。 We must； therefore； inquire into this principle； which shall be the subject of this third book。
2。 Of the Principle of different Governments。 I have already observed that it is the nature of a republican government that either the collective body of the people； or particular families； should be possessed of the supreme power； of a monarchy； that the prince should have this power； but in the execution of it should be directed by established laws； of a despotic government； that a single person should rule according to his own will and caprice。 This enables me to discover their three principles； which are thence naturally derived。 I shall begin with a republican government； and in particular with that of democracy。
3。 Of the Principle of Democracy。 There is no great share of probity necessary to support a monarchical or despotic government。 The force of laws in one； and the prince's arm in the other； are sufficient to direct and maintain the whole。 But in a popular state； one spring more is necessary； namely； virtue。
What I have here advanced is confirmed by the unanimous testimony of historians； and is extremely agreeable to the nature of things。 For it is clear that in a monarchy； where he who commands the execution of the laws generally thinks himself above them； there is less need of virtue than in a popular government； where the person entrusted with the execution of the laws is sensible of his being subject to their direction。
Clear is it also that a monarch who； through bad advice or indolence； ceases to enforce the execution of the laws； may easily repair the evil； he has only to follow other advice； or to shake off this indolence。 But when； in a popular government； there is a suspension of the laws； as this can proceed only from the corruption of the republic； the state is certainly undone。
A very droll spectacle it was in the last century to behold the impotent efforts of the English towards the establishment of democracy。 As they who had a share in the direction of public affairs were void of virtue； as their ambition was inffamed by the success of the most daring of their members；＇2＇ as t