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f virtue； as their ambition was inffamed by the success of the most daring of their members；＇2＇ as the prevailing parties were successively animated by the spirit of faction； the government was continually changing： the people； amazed at so many revolutions； in vain attempted to erect a commonwealth。 At length； when the country had undergone the most violent shocks； they were obliged to have recourse to the very government which they had so wantonly proscribed。
When Sylla thought of restoring Rome to her liberty； this unhappy city was incapable of receiving that blessing。 She had only the feeble remains of virtue； which were continually diminishing。 Instead of being roused from her lethargy by C？sar； Tiberius； Caius Claudius； Nero； and Domitian； she riveted every day her chains； if she struck some blows； her aim was at the tyrant； not at the tyranny。
The politic Greeks； who lived under a popular government； knew no other support than virtue。 The modern inhabitants of that country are entirely taken up with manufacture； commerce； finances； opulence； and luxury。
When virtue is banished； ambition invades the minds of those who are disposed to receive it； and avarice possesses the whole community。 The objects of their desires are changed； what they were fond of before has become indifferent； they were free while under the restraint of laws； but they would fain now be free to act against law； and as each citizen is like a slave who has run away from his master； that which was a maxim of equity he calls rigour； that which was a rule of action he styles constraint； and to precaution he gives the name of fear。 Frugality； and not the thirst of gain； now passes for avarice。 Formerly the wealth of individuals constituted the public treasure； but now this has become the patrimony of private persons。 The members of the commonwealth riot on the public spoils； and its strength is only the power of a few； and the licence of many。
Athens was possessed of the same number of forces when she triumphed so gloriously as when with such infamy she was enslaved。 She had twenty thousand citizens＇3＇ when she defended the Greeks against the Persians； when she contended for empire with Sparta； and invaded Sicily。 She had twenty thousand when Demetrius Phalereus numbered them＇4＇ as slaves are told by the head in a market…place。 When Philip attempted to lord it over Greece； and appeared at the gates of Athens＇5＇ she had even then lost nothing but time。 We may see in Demosthenes how difficult it was to awaken her； she dreaded Philip； not as the enemy of her liberty； but of her pleasures。＇6＇ This famous city； which had withstood so many defeats； and having been so often destroyed had as often risen out of her ashes； was overthrown at Ch？ronea； and at one blow deprived of all hopes of resource。 What does it avail her that Philip sends back her prisoners； if he does not return her men？ It was ever after as easy to triumph over the forces of Athens as it had been difficult to subdue her virtue。
How was it possible for Carthage to maintain her ground？ When Hannibal； upon his being made pr？tor； endeavoured to hinder the magistrates from plundering the republic； did not they complain of him to the Romans？ Wretches； who would fain be citizens without a city； and be beholden for their riches to their very destroyers！ Rome soon insisted upon having three hundred of their principal citizens as hostages； she obliged them next to surrender their arms and ships； and then she declared war。＇7＇ From the desperate efforts of this defenceless city； one may judge of what she might have performed in her full vigour； and assisted by virtue。
4。 Of the Principle of Aristocracy。 As virtue is necessary in a popular government； it is requisite also in an aristocracy。 True it is that in the latter it is not so absolutely requisite。
The people； who in respect to the nobility are the same as the subjects with regard to a monarch； are restrained by their laws。 They have； therefore； less occasion for virtue than the people in a democracy。 But how are the nobility to be restrained？ They who are to execute the laws against their colleagues will immediately perceive that they are acting against themselves。 Virtue is therefore necessary in this body； from the very nature of the constitution。
An aristocratic government has an inherent vigour； unknown to democracy。 The nobles form a body； who by their prerogative； and for their own particular interest； restrain the people； it is sufficient that there are laws in being to see them executed。
But easy as it may be for the body of the nobles to restrain the people； it is difficult to restrain themselves。＇8＇ Such is the nature of this constitution； that it seems to subject the very same persons to the power of the laws； and at the same time to exempt them。
Now such a body as this can restrain itself only in two ways； either by a very eminent virtue； which puts the nobility in some measure on a level with the people； and may be the means of forming a great republic； or by an inferior virtue； which puts them at least upon a level with one another； and upon this their preservation depends。
Moderation is therefore the very soul of this government； a moderation； I mean； founded on virtue； not that which proceeds from indolence and pusillanimity。
5。 That Virtue is not the Principle of a Monarchical Government。 In monarchies； policy effects great things with as little virtue as possible。 Thus in the nicest machines； art has reduced the number of movements； springs； and wheels。
The state subsists independently of the love of our country； of the thirst of true glory； of self…denial； of the sacrifice of our dearest interests； and of all those heroic virtues which we admire in the ancients； and to us are known only by tradition。
The laws supply here the place of those virtues； they are by no means wanted； and the state dispenses with them： an action performed here in secret is in some measure of no consequence。
Though all crimes be in their own nature public； yet there is a distinction between crimes really public and those that are private； which are so called because they are more injurious to individuals than to the community。
Now in republics private crimes are more public； that is； they attack the constitution more than they do individuals； and in monarchies； public crimes are more private； that is； they are more prejudicial to private people than to the constitution。
I beg that no one will be offended with what I have been saying； my observations are founded on the unanimous testimony of historians。 I am not ignorant that virtuous princes are so very rare； but I venture to affirm that in a monarchy it is extremely difficult for the people to be virtuous。＇9＇
Let us compare what the historians of all ages have asserted concerning the courts of monarchs； let us recollect the conversations and sentiments of people of all countries； in respect to the wretched character of courtiers； and we shall find that these are not airy speculations； but truths confirmed by a sad and melancholy experience。
Ambition in idleness； meanness mixed with pride； a desire of riches without industry； aversion to truth； flattery； perfidy； violation of engagements； contempt of civil duties； fear of the prince's virtue； hope from his weakness； but； above all； a perpetual ridicule cast upon virtue； are； I think； the characteristics by which most courtiers in all ages and countries have been constantly distinguished。 Now； it is exceedingly difficult for the leading men of the nation to be knaves； and the inferior sort to be honest； for the former to be cheats； and the latter to rest satisfied with being only dupes。
But if there should chance to be some unlucky honest man＇10＇ among the people。 Cardinal Richelieu； in his political testament； seems to hint that a prince should take care not to employ him。＇11＇ So true is it that virtue is not the spring of this government！ It is not indeed excluded； but it is not the spring of government。
6。 In what Manner Virtue is supplied in a Monarchical Government。 But it is high time for me to have done with this subject； lest I should be suspected of writing a satire against monarchical government。 Far be it from me； if monarchy wants one spring； it is provided with another。 Honour； that is； the prejudice of every person and rank； supplies the place of the political virtue of which I have been speaking； and is everywhere her representative： here it is capable of inspiring the most glorious actions； and； joined with the force of laws； may lead us to the end of government as well as virtue itself。
Hence； in well…regulated monarchies； they are almost all good subjects； and very few good men； for to be a good man＇12＇ a good intention is necessary；＇13＇ and we should love our country； not so much on our own account； as out of regard to the community。
7。 Of the Principle of Monarchy。 A monarchical government supposes； as we have already observed； pre…eminences and ranks； as likewise a noble descent。 Now since it is the nature of honour to aspire to preferments and titles； it is properly placed in this government。
Ambition is pernicious in a republic。 But in a monarchy it has some good effects； it