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ed to inspire them with the love of industry and labour。 Solon made idleness a crime； and insisted that each citizen should give an account of his manner of getting a livelihood。 And； indeed； in a well…regulated democracy； where people's expenses should extend only to what is necessary； every one ought to have it； for how should their wants be otherwise supplied？
7。 Other Methods of favouring the Principle of Democracy。 An equal division of lands cannot be established in all democracies。 There are some circumstances in which a regulation of this nature would be impracticable； dangerous； and even subversive of the constitution。 We are not always obliged to proceed to extremes。 If it appears that this division of lands； which was designed to preserve the people's morals； does not suit the democracy； recourse must be had to other methods。
If a permanent body be established to serve as a rule and pattern of manners； a senate； to which years； virtue； gravity； and eminent services procure admittance； the senators； by being exposed to public view like the statues of the gods； must naturally inspire every family with sentiments of virtue。
Above all； this senate must steadily adhere to the ancient institutions； and mind that the people and the magistrates never swerve from them。
The preservation of the ancient customs is a very considerable point in respect to manners。 Since a corrupt people seldom perform any memorable actions； seldom establish societies； build cities； or enact laws； on the contrary； since most institutions are derived from people whose manners are plain and simple； to keep up the ancient customs is the way to preserve the original purity of morals。
Besides； if by some revolution the state has happened to assume a new form； this seldom can be effected without infinite pains and labour； and hardly ever by idle and debauched persons。 Even those who had been the instruments of the revolution were desirous it should be relished； which is difficult to compass without good laws。 Hence it is that ancient institutions generally tend to reform the people's manners； and those of modern date to corrupt them。 In the course of a long administration； the descent to vice is insensible； but there is no reascending to virtue without making the most generous efforts。
It has been questioned whether the members of the senate we are speaking of ought to be for life or only chosen for a time。 Doubtless they ought to be for life； as was the custom at Rome；＇15＇ at Sparta；＇16＇ and even at Athens。 For we must not confound the senate at Athens； which was a body that changed every three months； with the Areopagus； whose members； as standing patterns； were established for life。
Let this be therefore a general maxim； that in a senate designed to be a rule； and the depository； as it were； of manners； the members ought to be chosen for life： in a senate intended for the administration of affairs； the members may be changed。
The spirit； says Aristotle； waxes old as well as the body。 This reflection holds good only in regard to a single magistrate； but cannot be applied to a senatorial assembly。
At Athens； besides the Areopagus； there were guardians of the public morals； as well as of the laws。＇17＇ At Sparta； all the old men were censors。 At Rome； the censorship was committed to two particular magistrates。 As the senate watched over the people； the censors were to have an eye over the people and the senate。 Their office was to reform the corruptions of the republic； to stigmatise indolence； to censure neglects； and to correct mistakes； as to flagrant crimes； these were left to the punishment of the laws。
That Roman law which required the accusations in cases of adultery to be public was admirably well calculated for preserving the purity of morals； it intimidated married women； as well as those who were to watch over their conduct。
Nothing contributes more to the preservation of morals than an extreme subordination of the young to the old。 Thus they are both restrained； the former by their respect for those of advanced age； and the latter by their regard for themselves。
Nothing gives a greater force to the law than a perfect subordination between the citizens and the magistrate。 〃The great difference which Lycurgus established between Sparta and the other cities；〃 says Xenophon；＇18＇ 〃consists chiefly in the obedience the citizens show to their laws； they run when the magistrate calls them。 But at Athens a rich man would be highly displeased to be thought dependent on the magistrate。〃
Paternal authority is likewise of great use towards the preservation of morals。 We have already observed that in a republic there is not so coercive a force as in other governments。 The laws must therefore endeavour to supply this defect by some means or other； and this is done by paternal authority。
Fathers at Rome had the power of life and death over their children。＇19＇ At Sparta； every father had a right to correct another man's child。
Paternal authority ended at Rome together with the republic。 In monarchies； where such a purity of morals is not required； they are controlled by no other authority than that of the magistrates。
The Roman laws； which accustomed young people to dependence； established a long minority。 Perhaps we are mistaken in conforming to this custom； there is no necessity for so much constraint in monarchies。
This very subordination in a republic might make it necessary for the father to continue in the possession of his children's fortune during life； as was the custom at Rome。 But this is not agreeable to the spirit of monarchy。
8。 In what Manner the Laws should relate to the Principle of Government in an Aristocracy。 If the people are virtuous in an aristocracy； they enjoy very nearly the same happiness as in a popular government； and the state grows powerful。 But as a great share of virtue is very rare where men's fortunes are so unequal； the laws must tend as much as possible to infuse a spirit of moderation； and endeavour to re…establish that equality which was necessarily removed by the constitution。
The spirit of moderation is what we call virtue in an aristocracy； it supplies the place of the spirit of equality in a popular state。
As the pomp and splendour with which kings are surrounded form a part of their power； so modesty and simplicity of manners constitute the strength of an aristocratic nobility。＇20＇ When they affect no distinction； when they mix with the people； dress like them； and with them share all their pleasures； the people are apt to forget their subjection and weakness。
Every government has its nature and principle。 An aristocracy must not therefore assume the nature and principle of monarchy； which would be the case were the nobles to be invested with personal privileges distinct from those of their body； privileges ought to be for the senate； and simple respect for the senators。
In aristocratic governments there are two principal sources of disorder： excessive inequality between the governors and the governed； and the same inequality between the different members of the body that governs。 From these two inequalities； hatreds and jealousies arise； which the laws ought ever to prevent or repress。
The first inequality is chiefly when the privileges of the nobility are honourable only as they are ignominious to the people。 Such was the law at Rome by which the patricians were forbidden to marry plebeians；＇21＇ a law that had no other effect than to render the patricians on the one side more haughty； and on the other more odious。 The reader may see what advantages the tribunes derived thence in their harangues。
This inequality occurs likewise when the condition of the citizens differs with regard to taxes； which may happen in four different ways： when the nobles assume the privilege of paying none； when they commit frauds to exempt themselves；＇22＇ when they engross the public money； under pretence of rewards or appointments for their respective employments； in fine； when they render the common people tributary； and divide among their own body the profits arising from the several subsidies。 This last case is very rare； an aristocracy so instituted would be the most intolerable of all governments。
While Rome inclined towards aristocracy； she avoided all these inconveniences。 The magistrates never received any emoluments from their office。 The chief men of the republic were taxed like the rest； nay； more heavily； and sometimes the taxes fell upon them alone。 In fine； far from sharing among themselves the revenues of the state； all they could draw from the public treasure； and all the wealth that fortune flung into their laps； they bestowed freely on the people； to be excused from accepting public honours。＇23＇
It is a fundamental maxim that largesses are pernicious to the people in a democracy； but salutary in an aristocratic government。 The former make them forget they are citizens； the latter bring them to a sense of it。 If the revenues of the state are not distributed among the people； they must be convinced at least of their being well administered： to feast their eyes with the public treasure is with them the same thing almost as enjoying it。 The golden chain displ