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s with the public treasure is with them the same thing almost as enjoying it。 The golden chain displayed at Venice； the riches exhibited at Rome in public triumphs； the treasures preserved in the temple of Saturn； were in reality the wealth of the people。
It is a very essential point in an aristocracy that the nobles themselves should not levy the taxes。 The first order of the state in Rome never concerned themselves with it； the levying of the taxes was committed to the second； and even this in process of time was attended with great inconveniences。 In an aristocracy of this kind； where the nobles levied the taxes； the private people would be all at the discretion of persons in public employments； and there would be no such thing as a superior tribunal to check their power。 The members appointed to remove the abuses would rather enjoy them。 The nobles would be like the princes of despotic governments； who confiscate whatever estates they please。
Soon would the profits hence arising be considered as a patrimony； which avarice would enlarge at pleasure。 The farms would be lowered； and the public revenues reduced to nothing。 This is the reason that some governments； without having ever received any remarkable shock； have dwindled away to such a degree as not only their neighbours； but even their own subjects； have been surprised at it。
The laws should likewise forbid the nobles all kinds of commerce： merchants of such unbounded credit would monopolise all to themselves。 Commerce is a profession of people who are upon an equality； hence among despotic states the most miserable are those in which the prince applies himself to trade。
The laws of Venice debar＇24＇ the nobles from commerce； by which they might even innocently acquire exorbitant wealth。
The laws ought to employ the most effectual means for making the nobles do justice to the people。 If they have not established a tribune； they ought to be a tribune themselves。
Every sort of asylum in opposition to the execution of the laws destroys aristocracy； and is soon succeeded by tyranny。 They ought always to mortify the lust of dominion。 There should be either a temporary or perpetual magistrate to keep the nobles in awe； as the Ephori at Sparta and the State Inquisitors at Venice magistrates subject to no formalities。 This sort of government stands in need of the strongest springs： thus a mouth of stone＇25＇ is open to every informer at Venice a mouth to which one would be apt to give the appellation of tyranny。
These arbitrary magistrates in an aristocracy bear some analogy to the censorship in democracies； which of its own nature is equally independent。 And； indeed； the censors ought to be subject to no inquiry in relation to their conduct during their office； they should meet with a thorough confidence； and never be discouraged。 In this respect the practice of the Romans deserved admiration； magistrates of all denominations were accountable for their administration；＇26＇ except the censors。＇27＇
There are two very pernicious things in an aristocracy excess either of poverty； or of wealth in the nobility。 To prevent their poverty； it is necessary； above all things； to oblige them to pay their debts in time。 To moderate the excess of wealth； prudent and gradual regulations should be made； but no confiscations； no agrarian laws； no expunging of debts； these are productive of infinite mischief。
The laws ought to abolish the right of primogeniture among the nobles＇28＇ to the end that by a continual division of the inheritances their fortunes may be always upon a level。
There should be no substitutions； no powers of redemption； no rights of Majorasgo； or adoption。 The contrivances for perpetuating the grandeur of families in monarchical governments ought never to be employed in aristocracies。＇29＇
When the laws have compassed the equality of families； the next thing is to preserve a proper harmony and union among them。 The quarrels of the nobility ought to be quickly decided； otherwise the contests of individuals become those of families。 Arbiters may terminate； or even prevent； the rise ot disputes。
In fine； the laws must not favour the distinctions raised by vanity among families； under pretence that they are more noble or ancient than others。 Pretences of this nature ought to be ranked among the weaknesses of private persons。
We have only to cast an eye upon Sparta； there we may see how the Ephori contrived to check the foibles of the kings； as well as those of the nobility and common people。
9。 In what Manner the Laws are in relation to their Principle in Monarchies。 As honour is the principle of a monarchical government； the laws ought to be in relation to this principle。
They should endeavour to support the nobility； in respect to whom honour may be； in some measure； deemed both child and parent。
They should render the nobility hereditary； not as a boundary between the power of the prince and the weakness of the people； but as the link which connects them both。
In this government； substitutions which preserve the estates of families undivided are extremely useful； though in others not so proper。
Here the power of redemption is of service； as it restores to noble families the lands that had been alienated by the prodigality of a parent。
The land of the nobility ought to have privileges as well as their persons。 The monarch's dignity is inseparable from that of his kingdom； and…the dignity of the nobleman from that of his fief。
All these privileges must be peculiar to the nobility； and incommunicable to the people； unless we intend to act contrary to the principle of government； and to diminish the power of the nobles together with that of the people。
Substitutions are a restraint to commerce； the power of redemption produces an infinite number of processes； every estate in land that is sold throughout the kingdom is in some measure without an owner for the space of a year。 Privileges annexed to fiefs give a power very burdensome to those governments which tolerate them。 These are the inconveniences of nobility inconveniences； however； that vanish when confronted with its general utility： but when these privileges are communicated to the people； every principle of government is wantonly violated。
In monarchies a person may leave the bulk of his estate to one of his children a permission improper in any other government。
The laws ought to favour all kinds of commerce＇30＇ consistent with the constitution； to the end that the subjects may； without ruining themselves； be able to satisfy the continual cravings of the prince and his court。
They should establish some regulation that the manner of collecting the taxes may not be more burdensome than the taxes themselves。
The weight of duties produces labour； labour weariness； and weariness the spirit of indolence。
10。 Of the Expedition peculiar to the Executive Power in Monarchies。 Great is the advantage which a monarchical government has over a republic： as the state is conducted by a single person； the executive power is thereby enabled to act with greater expedition。 But as this expedition may degenerate into rapidity； the laws should use some contrivance to slacken it。 They ought not only to favour the nature of each constitution； but likewise to remedy the abuses that might result from this very nature。
Cardinal Richelieu＇31＇ advises monarchs to permit no such things as societies or communities that raise difficulties upon every trifle。 If this man's heart had not been bewitched with the love of despotic power； still these arbitrary notions would have filled his head。
The bodies entrusted with the deposition of the laws are never more obedient than when they proceed slowly； and use that reflection in the prince's affairs which can scarcely be expected from the ignorance of a court； or from the precipitation of its councils。＇32＇
What would have become of the finest monarchy in the world if the magistrates； by their delays； their complaints； and entreaties； had not checked the rapidity even of their princes' virtues； when these monarchs； consulting only the generous impulse of their minds； would fain have given a boundless reward to services performed with an unlimited courage and fidelity？
11。 Of the Excellence of a Monarchical Government。 Monarchy has a great advantage over a despotic government。 As it naturally requires there should be several orders or ranks of subjects； the state is more permanent； the constitution more steady； and the person of him who governs more secure。
Cicero is of opinion that the establishing of the tribunes preserved the republic。 〃And indeed；〃 says he； 〃the violence of a headless people is more terrible。 A chief or head is sensible that the affair depends upon himself； and therefore he thinks； but the people in their impetuosity are ignorant of the danger into which they hurry themselves。〃 This reflection may be applied to a despotic government； which is a people without tribunes； and to a monarchy； where the people have some sort of tribunes。
Accordingly it is observable that in the commotions of a despotic government； the people； hurried away by their passions； are apt to push things as far as they can go。 The disor