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en in the state who might be said to be great of themselves； a thing directly opposite to the nature of this government。
Were the governor of a town independent of the pasha； expedients would be daily necessary to make them agree； which is highly absurd in a despotic state。 Besides； if a particular governor should refuse to obey； how could the other answer for his province with his head？
In this kind of government； authority must ever be wavering； nor is that of the lowest magistrate more steady than that of the despotic prince。 Under moderate governments； the law is prudent in all its parts； and perfectly well known； so that even the pettiest magistrates are capable of following it。 But in a despotic state； where the prince's will is the law； though the prince were wise； yet how could the magistrate follow a will he does not know？ He must certainly follow his own。
Again； as the law is only the prince's will； and as the prince can only will what he knows； the consequence is that there are an infinite number of people who must will for him； and make their wills keep pace with his。 In fine； as the law is the momentary will of the prince； it is necessary that those who will for him should follow his sudden manner of willing。
17。 Of Presents。 It is a received custom in despotic countries never to address any superior whomsoever； not excepting their kings； without making them a present。 The Mogul＇51＇ never receives the petitions of his subjects if they come with empty hands。 These princes spoil even their own favours。
But thus it must ever be in a government where no man is a citizen； where they have all a notion that a superior is under no obligation to an inferior； where men imagine themselves bound by no other tie than the chastisements inflicted by one party upon another； where； in fine； there is very little to do； and where the people have seldom an occasion of presenting themselves before the great； of offering their petitions； and much less their complaints。
In a republic； presents are odious； because virtue stands in no need of them。 In monarchies； honour is a much stronger incentive than presents。 But in a despotic government； where there is neither honour nor virtue； people cannot be determined to act but through hope of the conveniences of life。
It is in conformity with republican ideas that Plato＇52＇ ordered those who received presents for doing their duty to be punished with death。 〃They must not take presents；〃 says he； 〃neither for good nor for evil actions。〃
A very bad law was that among the Romans＇53＇ which gave the magistrates leave to accept small presents＇＇54＇ provided they did not exceed one hundred crowns in the whole year。 They who receive nothing expect nothing； they who receive a little soon covet more； till at length their desires swell to an exorbitant height。
Besides； it is much easier to convict a man who knows himself obliged to accept no present at all； and yet will accept something； than a person who takes more when he ought to take less； and who always finds pretexts； excuses； and plausible reasons in justification of his conduct。
18。 Of Rewards conferred by the Sovereign。 In despotic governments； where； as we have already observed； the principal motive of action is the hope of the conveniences of life； the prince who confers rewards has nothing to bestow but money。 In monarchies； where honour alone predominates； the prince's rewards would consist only of marks of distinction； if the distinctions established by honour were not attended with luxury； which necessarily brings on its wants： the prince therefore is obliged to confer such honours as lead to wealth。 But in a republic where virtue reigns a motive self…sufficient； and which excludes all others the recompenses of the state consist only of public attestations of this virtue。
It is a general rule that great rewards in monarchies and republics are a sign of their decline； because they are a proof of their principles being corrupted； and that the idea of honour has no longer the same force in a monarchy； nor the title of citizen the same weight in a republic。
The very worst Roman emperors were those who were most profuse in their largesses； for example； Caligula； Claudius； Nero； Otho； Vitellius； Commodus； Heliogabalus； and Caracalla。 The best； as Augustus； Vespasian； Antoninus Pius； Marcus Aurelius； and Pertinax； were economists。 Under good emperors the state resumed its principles； all other treasures were supplied by that of honour。
19。 New Consequences of the Principles of the three Governments。 I cannot conclude this book without making some applications of my three principles。
1st Question。＇ It is a question whether the laws ought to oblige a subject to accept a public employment。 My opinion is that they ought in a republic； but not in a monarchical government。 In the former； public employments are attestations of virtue； depositions with which a citizen is entrusted by his country； for whose sake alone he ought to live； to act； and to think； consequently lie cannot refuse them。＇55＇ In the latter； public offices are testimonials of honour； now such is the capriciousness of honour that it chooses to accept none of these testimonies but when and in what manner it pleases。
The late King of Sardinia＇56＇ inflicted punishments on his subjects who refused the dignities and public offices of the state。 In this he unknowingly followed republican ideas： but his method of governing in other respects sufficiently proves that this was not his intention。
2nd Question。＇ Secondly； it is questioned whether a subject should be obliged to accept a post in the army inferior to that which he held before。 Among the Romans it was usual to see a captain serve the next year under his lieutenant。＇57＇ This is because virtue in republics requires a continual sacrifice of our persons and of our repugnances for the good of the state。 But in monarchies； honour； true or false； will never bear with what it calls degrading itself。
In despotic governments； where honour； posts； and ranks are equally abused； they indiscriminately make a prince a scullion； and a scullion a prince。
3rd Question。＇ Thirdly； it may be inquired； whether civil and military employments should be conferred on the same person。 In republics I think they should be joined； but in monarchies separated。 In the former it would be extremely dangerous to make the profession of arms a particular state； distinct from that of civil functions； and in the latter； no less dangerous would it be to confer these two employments on the same person。
In republics a person takes up arms only with a view to defend his country and its laws； it is because he is a citizen he makes himself for a while a soldier。 Were these two distinct states； the person who under arms thinks himself a citizen would soon be made sensible he is only a soldier。
In monarchies； they whose condition engages them in the profession of arms have nothing but glory； or at least honour or fortune； in view。 To men； therefore； like these； the prince should never give any civil employments； on the contrary； they ought to be checked by the civil magistrate； that the same persons may not have at the same time the confidence of the people and the power to abuse it。＇58＇
We have only to cast an eye on a nation that may be justly called a republic； disguised under the form of monarchy； and we shall see how jealous they are of making a separate order of the profession of arms； and how the military state is constantly allied with that of the citizen； and even sometimes of the magistrate； to the end that these qualities may be a pledge for their country； which should never be forgotten。
The division of civil and military employments； made by the Romans after the extinction of the republic； was not an arbitrary thing。 It was a consequence of the change which happened in the constitution of Rome； it was natural to a monarchical government； and what was only commenced under Augustus＇59＇ succeeding emperors＇60＇ were obliged to finish； in order to temper the military government。
Procopius； therefore； the competitor of Valens the emperor； was very much to blame when； conferring the pro…consular dignity＇61＇ upon Hormisdas； a prince of the blood royal of Persia； he restored to this magistracy the military command of which it had been formerly possessed； unless indeed he had very particular reasons for so doing。 A person that aspires to the sovereignty concerns himself less about what is serviceable to the state than what is likely to promote his own interest。
4th Question。＇ Fourthly； it is a question whether public employments should be sold。 They ought not； I think； in despotic governments； where the subjects must be instantaneously placed or displaced by the prince。
But in monarchies this custom is not at all improper； by reason it is an inducement to engage in that as a family employment which would not be undertaken through a motive of virtue； it fixes likewise every one in his duty； and renders the several orders of the kingdom more permanent。 Suidas very justly observes that Anastasius had changed the empire into a kind of aristocracy； by selling all public employments。
Plato＇62＇ cannot bear with this pr