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12。 The same Subject continued。 In Rome the judges were chosen at first from the order of senators。 This privilege the Gracchi transferred to the knights； Drusus gave it to the senators and knights； Sulla to the senators only： Cotta to the senators； knights； and public treasurers； C？sar excluded the latter； Antony made decuries of senators； knights； and centurions。
When once a republic is corrupted； there is no possibility of remedying any of the growing evils； but by removing the corruption and restoring its lost principles； every other correction is either useless or a new evil。 While Rome preserved her principles entire； the judicial power might without any abuse be lodged in the hands of senators； but as soon as this city became corrupt； to whatsoever body that power was transferred； whether to the senate； to the knights； to the treasurers； to two of those bodies； to all three together； or to any other； matters still went wrong。 The knights had no more virtue than the senate； the treasurers no more than the knights； and these as little as the centurions。
After the people of Rome had obtained the privilege of sharing the magistracy with the patricians； it was natural to think that their flatterers would immediately become arbiters of the government。 But no such thing ever happened。 It was observable that the very people who had rendered the plebeians capable of public offices ever fixed their choice upon the patricians。 Because they were virtuous； they were magnanimous； and because they were free； they had a contempt of power。
But when their morals were corrupted； the more power they were possessed of； the less prudent was their conduct； till at length； upon becoming their own tyrants and slaves； they lost the strength of liberty to fall into the weakness and impotency of licentiousness。
13。 The Effect of an Oath among virtuous People。 There is no nation； says Livy；＇23＇ that has been longer uncorrupted than the Romans； no nation where moderation and poverty have been longer respected。
Such was the influence of an oath among those people that nothing bound them more strongly to the laws。 They often did more for the observance of an oath than they would ever have performed for the thirst of glory or for the love of their country。
When Quintus Cincinnatus； the consul； wanted to raise an army in the city against the ？qui and the Volsci； the tribunes opposed him。 〃Well；〃 said he； 〃let all those who have taken an oath to the consul of the preceding year march under my banner。〃＇24＇ In vain did the tribunes cry out that this oath was no longer binding； and that when they took it Quintus was but a private person： the people were more religious than those who pretended to direct them； they would not listen to the distinctions or equivocations of the tribunes。
When the same people thought of retiring to the Sacred Mount； they felt some remorse from the oath they had taken to the consuls； that they would follow them into the field。＇25＇ They entered then into a design of killing the consuls； but dropped it when they were given to understand that their oath would still be binding。 Now it is easy to judge of the notion they entertained of the violation of an oath from the crime they intended to commit。
After the battle of Cann？； the people were seized with such a panic that they would fain have retired to Sicily。 But Scipio having prevailed upon them to swear they would not stir from Rome； the fear of violating this oath surpassed all other apprehensions。 Rome was a ship held by two anchors； religion and morality； in the midst of a furious tempest。
14。 How the smallest Change of the Constitution is attended with the Ruin of its Principles。 Aristotle mentions the city of Carthage as a well…regulated republic。 Polybius tells us＇26＇ that there was this inconvenience at Carthage in the second Punic war； that the senate had lost almost all its authority。 We are informed by Livy that when Hannibal returned to Carthage he found that the magistrates and the principal citizens had abused their power； and converted the public revenues to their private emolument。 The virtue； therefore； of the magistrates； and the authority of the senate； both fell at the same time； and all was owing to the same cause。
Every one knows the wonderful effects of the censorship among the Romans。 There was a time when it grew burdensome； but still it was supported because there was more luxury than corruption。 Claudius＇27＇ weakened its authority； by which means the corruption became greater than the luxury； and the censorship dwindled away of itself。＇28＇ After various interruptions and resumptions； it was entirely laid aside； till it became altogether useless； that is； till the reigns of Augustus and Claudius。
15。 Sure Methods of preserving the three Principles。 I shall not be able to make myself rightly understood till the reader has perused the four following chapters。
16。 Distinctive Properties of a Republic。 It is natural for a republic to have only a small territory； otherwise it cannot long subsist。 In an extensive republic there are men of large fortunes； and consequently of less moderation； there are trusts too considerable to be placed in any single subject； he has interests of his own； he soon begins to think that he may be happy and glorious； by oppressing his fellow…citizens； and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country。
In an extensive republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand private views； it is subordinate to exceptions； and depends on accidents。 In a small one； the interest of the public is more obvious； better understood； and more within the reach of every citizen； abuses have less extent； and of course are less protected。
The long duration of the republic of Sparta was owing to her having continued in the same extent of territory after all her wars。 The sole aim of Sparta was liberty； and the sole advantage of her liberty； glory。
It was the spirit of the Greek republics to be as contented with their territories as with their laws。 Athens was first fired with ambition and gave it to Laced？mon； but it was an ambition rather of commanding a free people than of governing slaves； rather of directing than of breaking the union。 All was lost upon the starting up of monarchy a government whose spirit is more turned to increase of dominion。
Excepting particular circumstances；＇29＇ it is difficult for any other than a republican government to subsist longer in a single town。 A prince of so petty a state would naturally endeavour to oppress his subjects； because his power would be great； while the means of enjoying it or of causing it to be respected would be inconsiderable。 The consequence is； he would trample upon his people。 On the other hand； such a prince might be easily crushed by a foreign or even a domestic force； the people might any instant unite and rise up against him。 Now as soon as the sovereign of a single town is expelled； the quarrel is over； but if he has many towns； it only begins。
17。 Distinctive Properties of a Monarchy。 A monarchical state ought to be of moderate extent。 Were it small； it would form itself into a republic； were it very large； the nobility； possessed of great estates； far from the eye of the prince； with a private court of their own； and secure； moreover； from sudden executions by the laws and manners of the country such a nobility； I say； might throw off their allegiance； having nothing to fear from too slow and too distant a punishment。
Thus Charlemagne had scarcely founded his empire when he was obliged to divide it； whether the governors of the provinces refused to obey； or whether； in order to keep them more under subjection； there was a necessity of parcelling the empire into several kingdoms。
After the decease of Alexander his empire was divided。 How was it possible for those Greek and Macedonian chiefs； who were each of them free and independent； or commanders at least of the victorious bands dispersed throughout that vast extent of conquered land how was it possible； I say； for them to obey？
Attila's empire was dissolved soon after his death； such a number of kings； who were no longer under restraint； could not resume their fetters。
The sudden establishment of unlimited power is a remedy； which in those cases may prevent a dissolution： but how dreadful the remedy； which after the enlargement of dominion opens a new scene of misery！
The rivers hasten to mingle their waters with the sea； and monarchies lose themselves in despotic power。
18。 Particular Case of the Spanish Monarchy。 Let not the example of Spain be produced against me； it rather proves what I affirm。 To preserve America she did what even despotic power itself does not attempt： she destroyed the inhabitants。 To preserve her colony； she was obliged to keep it dependent even for its subsistence。
In the Netherlands； she essayed to render herself arbitrary； and as soon as she abandoned the attempt； her perplexity increased。 On the one hand the Walloons would not be governed by Spaniards； and on the other； the Spanish soldiers refused to submit to Walloon officers。＇30＇
In Italy she maintained her ground； merely by exhausting herself and by enriching that count