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slative bodies succeed one another； the people who have a bad opinion of that which is actually sitting may reasonably entertain some hopes of the next： but were it to be always the same body； the people upon seeing it once corrupted would no longer expect any good from its laws； and of course they would either become desperate or fall into a state of indolence。
The legislative body should not meet of itself。 For a body is supposed to have no will but when it is met； and besides； were it not to meet unanimously； it would be impossible to determine which was really the legislative body； the part assembled； or the other。 And if it had a right to prorogue itself； it might happen never to be prorogued； which would be extremely dangerous； in case it should ever attempt to encroach on the executive power。 Besides； there are seasons； some more proper than others； for assembling the legislative body： it is fit； therefore； that the executive power should regulate the time of meeting； as well as the duration of those assemblies； according to the circumstances and exigencies of a state known to itself。
Were the executive power not to have a right of restraining the encroachments of the legislative body； the latter would become despotic； for as it might arrogate to itself what authority it pleased； it would soon destroy all the other powers。
But it is not proper； on the other hand； that the legislative power should have a right to stay the executive。 For as the execution has its natural limits； it is useless to confine it； besides； the executive power is generally employed in momentary operations。 The power； therefore； of the Roman tribunes was faulty； as it put a stop not only to the legislation； but likewise to the executive part of government； which was attended with infinite mischief。
But if the legislative power in a free state has no right to stay the executive； it has a right and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have been executed； an advantage which this government has over that of Crete and Sparta； where the Cosmi＇9＇ and the Ephori＇10＇ gave no account of their administration。
But whatever may be the issue of that examination； the legislative body ought not to have a power of arraigning the person； nor； of course； the conduct； of him who is entrusted with the executive power。 His person should be sacred； because as it is necessary for the good of the state to prevent the legislative body from rendering themselves arbitrary； the moment he is accused or tried there is an end of liberty。
In this case the state would be no longer a monarchy； but a kind of republic； though not a free government。 But as the person entrusted with the executive power cannot abuse it without bad counsellors； and such as have the laws as ministers； though the laws protect them as subjects； these men may be examined and punished an advantage which this government has over that of Gnidus； where the law allowed of no such thing as calling the Amymones＇11＇ to an account； even after their administration；＇12＇ and therefore the people could never obtain any satisfaction for the injuries done them。
Though； in general； the judiciary power ought not to be united with any part of the legislative； yet this is liable to three exceptions； founded on the particular interest of the party accused。
The great are always obnoxious to popular envy； and were they to be judged by the people； they might be in danger from their judges； and would； moreover； be deprived of the privilege which the meanest subject is possessed of in a free state； of being tried by his peers。 The nobility； for this reason； ought not to be cited before the ordinary courts of judicature； but before that part of the legislature which is composed of their own body。
It is possible that the law； which is clearsighted in one sense； and blind in another； might； in some cases； be too severe。 But as we have already observed； the national judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law； mere passive beings； incapable of moderating either its force or rigour。 That part； therefore； of the legislative body； which we have just now observed to be a necessary tribunal on another occasion； is also a necessary tribunal in this； it belongs to its supreme authority to moderate the law in favour of the law itself； by mitigating the sentence。
It might also happen that a subject entrusted with the administration of public affairs may infringe the rights of the people； and be guilty of crimes which the ordinary magistrates either could not or would not punish。 But； in general； the legislative power cannot try causes： and much less can it try this particular case； where it represents the party aggrieved； which is the people。 It can only； therefore； impeach。 But before what court shall it bring its impeachment？ Must it go and demean itself before the ordinary tribunals； which are its inferiors； and； being composed； moreover； of men who are chosen from the people as well as itself； will naturally be swayed by the authority of so powerful an accuser？ No： in order to preserve the dignity of the people； and the security of the subject； the legislative part which represents the people must bring in its charge before the legislative part which represents the nobility； who have neither the same interests nor the same passions。
Here is an advantage which this government has over most of the ancient republics； where this abuse prevailed； that the people were at the same time both judge and accuser。
The executive power； pursuant of what has been already said； ought to have a share in the legislature by the power of rejecting； otherwise it would soon be stripped of its prerogative。 But should the legislative power usurp a share of the executive； the latter would be equally undone。
If the prince were to have a part in the legislature by the power of resolving； liberty would be lost。 But as it is necessary he should have a share in the legislature for the support of his own prerogative； this share must consist in the power of rejecting。
The change of government at Rome was owing to this； that neither the senate； who had one part of the executive power； nor the magistrates； who were entrusted with the other； had the right of rejecting； which was entirely lodged in the people。
Here then is the fundamental constitution of the government we are treating of。 The legislative body being composed of two parts； they check one another by the mutual privilege of rejecting。 They are both restrained by the executive power； as the executive is by the legislative。
These three powers should naturally form a state of repose or inaction。 But as there is a necessity for movement in the course of human affairs； they are forced to move； but still in concert。
As the executive power has no other part in the legislative than the privilege of rejecting； it can have no share in the public debates。 It is not even necessary that it should propose； because as it may always disapprove of the resolutions that shall be taken； it may likewise reject the decisions on those proposals which were made against its will。
In some ancient commonwealths； where public debates were carried on by the people in a body； it was natural for the executive power to propose and debate in conjunction with the people； otherwise their resolutions must have been attended with a strange confusion。
Were the executive power to determine the raising of public money； otherwise than by giving its consent； liberty would be at an end； because it would become legislative in the most important point of legislation。
If the legislative power was to settle the subsidies； not from year to year； but for ever； it would run the risk of losing its liberty； because the executive power would be no longer dependent； and when once it was possessed of such a perpetual right； it would be a matter of indifference whether it held it of itself or of another。 The same may be said if it should come to a resolution of entrusting； not an annual； but a perpetual command of the fleets and armies to the executive power。
To prevent the executive power from being able to oppress； it is requisite that the armies with which it is entrusted should consist of the people； and have the same spirit as the people； as was the case at Rome till the time of Marius。 To obtain this end； there are only two ways； either that the persons employed in the army should have sufficient property to answer for their conduct to their fellow…subjects； and be enlisted only for a year； as was customary at Rome： or if there should be a standing army； composed chiefly of the most despicable part of the nation； the legislative power should have a right to disband them as soon as it pleased； the soldiers should live in common with the rest of the people； and no separate camp； barracks； or fortress should be suffered。
When once an army is established； it ought not to depend immediately on the legislative； but on the executive； power； and this from the very nature of the thing； its business consisting more in action than in deliberation。
It is natural for mankind to set a higher value upon courage than timidity； on activity than prudence； on strength than