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In the taxing of lands it is customary to make lists or registers； in which the different classes of estates are ranged。 But it is very difficult to know these differences； and still more so to find people that are not interested in mistaking them。 Here； therefore； are two sorts of injustice； that of the man and that of the thing。 But if in general the tax be not exorbitant； and the people continue to have plenty of necessaries； these particular acts of injustice will do no harm。 On the contrary； if the people are permitted to enjoy only just what is necessary for subsistence； the least disproportion will be of the greatest consequence。
If some subjects do not pay enough； the mischief is not so great； their convenience and ease turn always to the public advantage； if some private people pay too much； their ruin redounds to the public detriment。 If the government proportions its fortune to that of individuals； the ease and convenience of the latter will soon make its fortune rise。 The whole depends upon a critical moment： shall the state begin with impoverishing the subjects to enrich itself？ Or had it better wait to be enriched by its subjects？ Is it more advisable for it to have the former or the latter advantage？ Which shall it choose to begin or to end with opulence？
The duties felt least by the people are those on merchandise； because they are not demanded of them in form。 They may be so prudently managed that the people themselves shall hardly know they pay them。 For this purpose it is of the utmost consequence that the person who sells the merchandise should pay the duty。 He is very sensible that he does not pay it for himself； and the consumer； who pays it in the main； confounds it with the price。 Some authors have observed that Nero had abolished the duty of the five…and…twentieth part arising from the sale of slaves；＇6＇ and yet he had only ordained that it should be paid by the seller instead of the purchaser； this regulation； which left the impost entire； seemed nevertheless to suppress it。
There are two states in Europe where the imposts are very heavy upon liquors： in one the brewer alone pays the duty； in the other it is levied indiscriminately upon all the consumers； in the first nobody feels the rigour of the impost； in the second it is looked upon as a grievance； in the former the subject is sensible only of the liberty he has of not paying； in the latter he feels only the necessity that compels him to pay。
Further； the obliging the consumers to pay requires a perpetual rummaging and searching into their houses。 Now nothing is more contrary than this to liberty； and those who establish these sorts of duties have not surely been so happy as to hit upon the best method of collecting the revenue。
8。 In what Manner the Deception is preserved。 In order to make the purchaser confound the price of the commodity with the impost； there must be some proportion between the impost and the value of the commodity： for which reason there ought not to be an excessive duty upon merchandise of little value。 There are countries in which the duty exceeds seventeen or eighteen times the value of the commodity。 In this case the prince removes the disguise： his subjects plainly see they are dealt with in an unreasonable manner； which renders them most exquisitely sensible of their servile condition。
Besides； the prince； to be able to levy a duty so disproportioned to the value of the commodity； must be himself the vendor； and the people must not have it in their power to purchase it elsewhere： a practice subject to a thousand inconveniences。
Smuggling being in this case extremely lucrative； the natural and most reasonable penalty； namely； the confiscation of the merchandise； becomes incapable of putting a stop to it； especially as this very merchandise is intrinsically of inconsiderable value。 Recourse must therefore be had to extravagant punishments； such as those inflicted for capital crimes。
All proportion then of penalties is at an end。 Persons that cannot really be considered as vicious are punished like the most infamous criminals； which of all things in the world is the most contrary to the spirit of a moderate government。
Again； in proportion as people are tempted to cheat the farmer of the revenues； the more the latter is enriched； and the former impoverished。 To put a stop to smuggling； the farmer must be invested with extraordinary means of oppressing； and then the country is ruined。
9。 Of a bad Kind of Impost。 We shall here； by the way； take notice of an impost laid in particular countries on the different articles of civil contracts。 As these are things subject to very nice disquisitions； a vast deal of knowledge is necessary to make any tolerable defence against the farmer of the revenues； who interprets； in that case； the regulations of the prince； and exercises an arbitrary power over people's fortunes。 Experience has demonstrated that a duty on the paper on which the deeds are drawn would be of far greater service。
10。 That the Greatness of Taxes depends on the Nature of the Government。 Taxes ought to be very light in despotic governments： otherwise who would be at the trouble of tilling the land？ Besides； how is it possible to pay heavy duties in a government that makes no manner of return to the different contributions of the subject？
The exorbitant power of the prince； and the extreme depression of the people； require that there should not be even a possibility of the least mistake between them。 The taxes ought to be so easy to collect； and so clearly settled； as to leave no opportunity for the collectors to increase or diminish them。 A portion of the fruits of the earth； a capitation； a duty of so much per cent on merchandise； are the only taxes suitable to that government。
Merchants in despotic countries ought to have a personal safeguard； to which all due respect should be paid。 Without this they would be too weak to dispute with the custom…house officers。
11。 Of Confiscations。 With respect to confiscations； there is one thing very particular that； contrary to the general custom； they are more severe in Europe than in Asia。 In Europe not only the merchandise； but even sometimes the ships and carriages； are confiscated； which is never practised in Asia。 This is because in Europe the merchant can have recourse to magistrates； who are able to shelter him from oppression； in Asia the magistrates themselves would be the greatest oppressors。 What remedy could a merchant have against a pasha who was determined to confiscate his goods？
The prince； therefore； checks his own power； finding himself under the necessity of acting with some kind of lenity。 In Turkey they raise only a single duty for the importation of goods； and afterwards the whole country is open to the merchant。 Smuggling is not attended with confiscation or increase of duty。 In China＇7＇ they never look into the baggage of those who are not merchants。 Defrauding the customs in the territory of the Mogul is not punished with confiscation； but with doubling the duty。 The princes of Tartary； who reside in towns； impose scarcely any duty at all on the goods that pass through their country。＇8＇ In Japan； it is true； to cheat the customs is a capital crime； but this is because they have particular reasons for prohibiting all communication with foreigners； hence the fraud＇9＇ is rather a contravention of the laws made for the security of the government than of those of commerce。
12。 Relation between the Weight of Taxes and Liberty。 It is a general rule that taxes may be heavier in proportion to the liberty of the subject； and that there is a necessity for reducing them in proportion to the increase of slavery。 This has always been and always will be the case。 It is a rule derived from nature that never varies。 We find it in all parts in England； in Holland； and in every state where liberty gradually declines； till we come to Turkey。 Switzerland seems to be an exception to this rule； because they pay no taxes； but the particular reason for that exemption is well known； and even confirms what I have advanced。 In those barren mountains provisions are so dear； and the country is so populous； that a Swiss pays four times more to nature than a Turk does to the sultan。
A conquering people； such as were formerly the Athenians and the Romans； may rid themselves of all taxes as they reign over vanquished nations。 Then indeed they do not pay in proportion to their liberty； because in this respect they are no longer a people； but a monarch。
But the general rule still holds good。 In moderate governments there is an indemnity for the weight of the taxes； which is liberty。 In despotic countries＇10＇ there is an equivalent for liberty； which is the lightness of the taxes。
In some monarchies in Europe there are particular provinces＇11＇ which from the very nature of their civil government are in a more flourishing condition than the rest。 It is pretended that these provinces are not sufficiently taxed； because through the goodness of their government they are able to be taxed higher； hence the ministers seem constantly to aim at depriving them of this very government； whence a diffusive blessing is derived； which redounds even to the