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rnment； whence a diffusive blessing is derived； which redounds even to the prince's advantage。
13。 In what Government Taxes are capable of Increase。 Taxes may be increased in most republics； because the citizen； who thinks he is paying himself； cheerfully submits to them； and moreover is generally able to bear their weight； from the nature of the government。
In a monarchy taxes may be increased； because the moderation of the government is capable of procuring opulence： it is a recompense； as it were； granted to the prince for the respect he shows to the laws。 In despotic governments they cannot be increased； because there can be no increase of the extremity of slavery。
14。 That the Nature of the Taxes is in Relation to the Government。 A capitation is more natural to slavery； a duty on merchandise is more natural to liberty； by reason it has not so direct a relation to the person。
It is natural in a despotic government for the prince not to give money to his soldiers； or to those belonging to his court； but to distribute lands amongst them； and of course that there should be very few taxes。 But if the prince gives money； the most natural tax he can raise is a capitation； which can never be considerable。 For as it is impossible to make different classes of the contributors； because of the abuses that might arise thence； considering the injustice and violence of the government； they are under an absolute necessity of regulating themselves by the rate of what even the poorest and most wretched are able to contribute。
The natural tax of moderate governments is the duty laid on merchandise。 As this is really paid by the consumer； though advanced by the merchant； it is a loan which the latter has already made to the former。 Hence the merchant must be considered on the one side as the general debtor of the state； and on the other as the creditor of every individual。 He advances to the state the duty which the consumer will sometime or other refund： and he has paid for the consumer the duty which he has advanced for the merchandise。 It is therefore obvious that in proportion to the moderation of the government； to the prevalence of the spirit of liberty； and to the security of private fortunes； a merchant has it in his power to advance money to the state； and to pay considerable duties for individuals。 In England a merchant lends really to the government fifty or sixty pounds sterling for every tun of wine he imports。 Where is the merchant that would dare do any such thing in a country like Turkey？ And were he so presumptuous； how could he do it with a crazy or shattered fortune？
15。 Abuse of Liberty。 To these great advantages of liberty it is owing that liberty itself has been abused。 Because a moderate government has been productive of admirable effects； this moderation has been laid aside； because great taxes have been raised； they wanted to carry them to excess； and ungrateful to the hand of liberty； of whom they received this present； they addressed themselves to slavery； who never grants the least favour。
Liberty produces excessive taxes； the effect of excessive taxes is slavery； and slavery produces a diminution of tribute。
Most of the edicts of the eastern monarchs are to exempt every year some province of their empire from paying tribute。＇12＇ The manifestations of their wills are favours。 But in Europe the edicts of princes are disagreeable even before they are seen； because they always make mention of their own wants； but not a word of ours。
From an unpardonable indolence in the ministers of those countries； owing to the nature of the government； and frequently to the climate； the people derive this advantage； that they are not incessantly plagued with new demands。 The public expense does not increase； because the ministers do not form new projects： and if some by chance are formed； they are such as are soon executed。 The governors of the state do not perpetually torment the people； for they do not perpetually。 torment themselves。 But it is impossible there should be any fixed rule in our finances； since we always know that we shall have something or other to execute； without ever knowing what it is。
It is no longer customary with us to give the appellation of a great minister to a wise dispenser of the public revenues； but to a person of dexterity and cunning； who is clever at finding out what we call the ways and means。
16。 Of the Conquests of the Mahometans。 It was this excess of taxes＇13＇ that occasioned the prodigious facility with which the Mahometans carried on their conquests。 Instead of a continual series of extortions devised by the subtle avarice of the Greek emperors； the people were subjected to a simple tribute which was paid and collected with ease。 Thus they were far happier in obeying a barbarous nation than a corrupt government； in which they suffered every inconvenience of lost liberty； with all the horror of present slavery。
17。 Of the Augmentation of Troops。 A new distemper has spread itself over Europe； infecting our princes； and inducing them to keep up an exorbitant number of troops。 It has its redoublings； and of necessity becomes contagious。 For as soon as one prince augments his forces； the rest of course do the same； so that nothing is gained thereby but the public ruin。 Each monarch keeps as many armies on foot as if his people were in danger of being exterminated： and they give the name of peace＇14＇ to this general effort of all against all。 Thus is Europe ruined to such a degree that were private people to be in the same situation as the three most opulent powers of this part of the globe； they would not have necessary subsistence。 We are poor with the riches and commerce of the whole world； and soon； by thus augmenting our troops； we shall be all soldiers； and be reduced to the very same situation as the Tartars。＇15＇
Great princes； not satisfied with hiring or buying troops of petty states； make it their business on all sides to pay subsidies for alliances； that is； generally to throw away their money。
The consequence of such a situation is the perpetual augmentation of taxes； and the mischief which prevents all future remedy is that they reckon no more upon their revenues； but in waging war against their whole capital。 It is no unusual thing to see governments mortgage their funds even in time of peace； and to employ what they call extraordinary means to ruin themselves means so extraordinary indeed； that such are hardly thought of by the most extravagant young spendthrift。
18。 Of an Exemption from Taxes。 The maxim of the great eastern empires； of exempting such provinces as have very much suffered from taxes； ought to be extended to monarchical states。 There are some； indeed； where this practice is established； yet the country is more oppressed than if no such rule took place； because as the prince levies still neither more nor less； the state becomes bound for the whole。 In order to ease a village that pays badly； they load another that pays better； the former is not relieved； and the latter is ruined。 The people grow desperate； between the necessity of paying for fear of exactions； and the danger of paying for fear of new burdens。
A well…regulated government ought to set aside； for the first article of its expense； a determinate sum to answer contingent cases。 It is with the public as with individuals； who are ruined when they live up exactly to their income。
With regard to an obligation for the whole amongst the inhabitants of the same village； some pretend＇16＇ that it is but reasonable； because there is a possibility of a fraudulent combination on their side： but was it ever heard that； upon mere supposition； we are to establish a thing in itself unjust and ruinous to the state？
19。 Which is more suitable to the Prince and to the People； the farming the Revenues； or managing them by Commission。 The managing of the revenues by commission is like the conduct of a good father of a family； who collects his own rents himself with economy and order。
By this management of the revenues the prince is at liberty to press or to retard the levy of the taxes； either according to his own wants or to those of his people。 By this he saves to the state the immense profits of the farmers； who impoverish it in a thousand ways。 By this he prevents the people from being mortified with the sight of sudden fortunes。 By this the public money passes through few hands； goes directly to the treasury； and consequently makes a quicker return to the people。 By this the prince avoids an infinite number of bad laws extorted from him by the importunate avarice of the farmers； who pretend to offer a present advantage for regulations pernicious to posterity。
As the moneyed man is always the most powerful； the farmer renders himself arbitrary even over the prince himself； he is not the legislator； but he obliges the legislator to give laws。
I acknowledge that it is sometimes of use to farm out a new duty； for there is an art in preventing frauds； which motives of interest suggest to the farmers； but commissioners never think of。 Now the manner of levying it being once established by the farmer； it may afterwards be safely entrusted to a commission。 In England the managemen