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aws will soon appear to flow thence as from their source。 I shall proceed afterwards to other and more particular relations。
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1。 〃Law；〃 says Plutarch； 〃is the king of mortal and immortal beings。〃 See his treatise； A Discourse to an Unlearned Prince。
2。 Witness the savage found in the forests of Hanover； who was carried over to England during the reign of George I。
3。 In pref。； De cive。
4。 Italian poet and jurist； 1664…1718。
Book II。 Of Laws Directly Derived from the Nature of Government
1。 Of the Nature of the three different Governments。 There are three species of government： republican； monarchical； and despotic。 In order to discover their nature； it is sufficient to recollect the common notion； which supposes three definitions； or rather three facts： that a republican government is that in which the body； or only a part of the people； is possessed of the supreme power； monarchy； that in which a single person governs by fixed and established laws； a despotic government； that in which a single person directs everything by his own will and caprice。
This is what I call the nature of each government； we must now inquire into those laws which directly conform to this nature； and consequently are the fundamental institutions。
2。 Of the Republican Government； and the Laws in relation to Democracy。＇1＇ When the body of the people is possessed of the supreme power； it is called a democracy。 When the supreme power is lodged in the hands of a part of the people； it is then an aristocracy。
In a democracy the people are in some respects the sovereign； and in others the subject。
There can be no exercise of sovereignty but by their suffrages； which are their own will； now the sovereign's will is the sovereign himself。 The laws therefore which establish the right of suffrage are fundamental to this government。 And indeed it is as important to regulate in a republic； in what manner； by whom； to whom； and concerning what； suffrages are to be given； as it is in a monarchy to know who is the prince； and after what manner he ought to govern。
Libanius＇2＇ says that at Athens a stranger who intermeddled in the assemblies of the people was punished with death。 This is because such a man usurped the rights of sovereignty。
It is an essential point to fix the number of citizens who are to form the public assemblies； otherwise it would be uncertain whether the whole； or only a part of the people； had given their votes。 At Sparta the number was fixed at ten thousand。 But Rome； designed by Providence to rise from the weakest beginnings to the highest pitch of grandeur； Rome； doomed to experience all the vicissitudes of fortune； Rome； who had sometimes all her inhabitants without her walls； and sometimes all Italy and a considerable part of the world within them； Rome； I say； never fixed the number＇3＇ and this was one of the principal causes of her ruin。
The people； in whom the supreme power resides； ought to have the management of everything within their reach： that which exceeds their abilities must be conducted by their ministers。
But they cannot properly be said to have their ministers； without the power of nominating them： it is； therefore； a fundamental maxim in this government； that the people should choose their ministers that is； their magistrates。
They have occasion； as well as monarchs； and even more so； to be directed by a council or senate。 But to have a proper confidence in these； they should have the choosing of the members； whether the election be made by themselves； as at Athens； or by some magistrate deputed for that purpose； as on certain occasions was customary at Rome。
The people are extremely well qualified for choosing those whom they are to entrust with part of their authority。 They have only to be determined by things to which they cannot be strangers； and by facts that are obvious to sense。 They can tell when a person has fought many battles； and been crowned with success； they are； therefore； capable of electing a general。 They can tell when a judge is assiduous in his office； gives general satisfaction； and has never been charged with bribery： this is sufficient for choosing a pr？tor。 They are struck with the magnificence or riches of a fellow…citizen； no more is requisite for electing an edile。 These are facts of which they can have better information in a public forum than a monarch in his palace。 But are they capable of conducting an intricate affair； of seizing and improving the opportunity and critical moment of action？ No； this surpasses their abilities。
Should we doubt the people's natural capacity； in respect to the discernment of merit； we need only cast an eye on the series of surprising elections made by the Athenians and Romans； which no one surely will attribute to hazard。
We know that though the people of Rome assumed the right of raising plebeians to public offices； yet they never would exert this power； and though at Athens the magistrates were allowed； by the law of Aristides； to be elected from all the different classes of inhabitants； there never was a case； says Xenophon；＇4＇ when the common people petitioned for employments which could endanger either their security or their glory。
As most citizens have sufficient ability to choose； though unqualified to be chosen； so the people； though capable of calling others to an account for their administration； are incapable of conducting the administration themselves。
The public business must be carried on with a certain motion； neither too quick nor too slow。 But the motion of the people is always either too remiss or too violent。 Sometimes with a hundred thousand arms they overturn all before them； and sometimes with a hundred thousand feet they creep like insects。
In a popular state the inhabitants are divided into certain classes。 It is in the manner of making this division that great legislators have signalised themselves； and it is on this the duration and prosperity of democracy have ever depended。
Servius Tullius followed the spirit of aristocracy in the distribution of his classes。 We find in Livy＇5＇ and in Dionysius Halicarnassus；＇6＇ in what manner he lodged the right of suffrage in the hands of the principal citizens。 He had divided the people of Rome into 193 centuries； which formed six classes； and ranking the rich； who were in smaller numbers； in the first centuries； and those in middling circumstances； who were more numerous； in the next； he flung the indigent multitude into the last； and as each century had but one vote＇7＇ it was property rather than numbers that decided the election。
Solon divided the people of Athens into four classes。 In this he was directed by the spirit of democracy； his intention not being to fix those who were to choose； but such as were eligible： therefore； leaving to every citizen the right of election； he made＇8＇ the judges eligible from each of those four classes； but the magistrates he ordered to be chosen only out of the first three； consisting of persons of easy fortunes。＇9＇
As the division of those who have a right of suffrage is a fundamental law in republics； so the manner of giving this suffrage is another fundamental。
The suffrage by lot is natural to democracy； as that by choice is to aristocracy。＇10＇
The suffrage by lot is a method of electing that offends no one； but animates each citizen with the pleasing hope of serving his country。
Yet as this method is in itself defective； it has been the endeavour of the most eminent legislators to regulate and amend it。
Solon made a law at Athens that military employments should be conferred by choice； but that senators and judges should be elected by lot。
The same legislator ordained that civil magistracies； attended with great expense； should be given by choice； and the others by lot。
In order； however； to amend the suffrage by lot； he made a rule that none but those who presented themselves should be elected； that the person elected should be examined by judges＇11＇ and that every one should have a right to accuse him if he were unworthy of the office：＇12＇ this participated at the same time of the suffrage by lot； and of that by choice。 When the time of their magistracy had expired； they were obliged to submit to another judgment in regard to their conduct。 Persons utterly unqualified must have been extremely backward in giving in their names to be drawn by lot。
The law which determines the manner of giving suffrage is likewise fundamental in a democracy。 It is a question of some importance whether the suffrages ought to be public or secret。 Cicero observes＇13＇ that the laws＇14＇ which rendered them secret towards the close of the republic were the cause of its decline。 But as this is differently practised in different republics； I shall offer here my thoughts concerning this subject。
The people's suffrages ought doubtless to be public＇15＇ and this should be considered as a fundamental law of democracy。 The lower class ought to be directed by those of higher rank； and restrained within bounds by the gravity of eminent personages。 Hence； by rendering the suffrages secret in the Roman republic； all was lost； it was no longer possible to direct a populace that sought its own d