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that the leading figures in history are heroes； that is； men gifted
with a special strength of soul and mind called genius。 This power
cannot be based on the predominance of moral strength； for； not to
mention heroes such as Napoleon about whose moral qualities opinions
differ widely； history shows us that neither a Louis XI nor a
Metternich； who ruled over millions of people； had any particular
moral qualities； but on the contrary were generally morally weaker
than any of the millions they ruled over。
If the source of power lies neither in the physical nor in the moral
qualities of him who possesses it； it must evidently be looked for
elsewhere… in the relation to the people of the man who wields the
power。
And that is how power is understood by the science of jurisprudence；
that exchange bank of history which offers to exchange history's
understanding of power for true gold。
Power is the collective will of the people transferred； by expressed
or tacit consent； to their chosen rulers。
In the domain of jurisprudence； which consists of discussions of how
a state and power might be arranged were it possible for all that to
be arranged； it is all very clear； but when applied to history that
definition of power needs explanation。
The science of jurisprudence regards the state and power as the
ancients regarded fire… namely； as something existing absolutely。
But for history； the state and power are merely phenomena； just as for
modern physics fire is not an element but a phenomenon。
From this fundamental difference between the view held by history
and that held by jurisprudence； it follows that jurisprudence can tell
minutely how in its opinion power should be constituted and what
power… existing immutably outside time… is； but to history's questions
about the meaning of the mutations of power in time it can answer
nothing。
If power be the collective will of the people transferred to their
ruler； was Pugachev a representative of the will of the people？ If
not； then why was Napoleon I？ Why was Napoleon III a criminal when
he was taken prisoner at Boulogne； and why； later on； were those
criminals whom he arrested？
Do palace revolutions… in which sometimes only two or three people
take part… transfer the will of the people to a new ruler？ In
international relations； is the will of the people also transferred to
their conqueror？ Was the will of the Confederation of the Rhine
transferred to Napoleon in 1806？ Was the will of the Russian people
transferred to Napoleon in 1809； when our army in alliance with the
French went to fight the Austrians？
To these questions three answers are possible：
Either to assume （1） that the will of the people is always
unconditionally transferred to the ruler or rulers they have chosen；
and that therefore every emergence of a new power； every struggle
against the power once appointed； should be absolutely regarded as
an infringement of the real power； or （2） that the will of the
people is transferred to the rulers conditionally； under definite
and known conditions； and to show that all limitations； conflicts； and
even destructions of power result from a nonobservance by the rulers
of the conditions under which their power was entrusted to them； or
（3） that the will of the people is delegated to the rulers
conditionally； but that the conditions are unknown and indefinite； and
that the appearance of several authorities； their struggles and
their falls； result solely from the greater or lesser fulfillment by
the rulers of these unknown conditions on which the will of the people
is transferred from some people to others。
And these are the three ways in which the historians do explain
the relation of the people to their rulers。
Some historians… those biographical and specialist historians
already referred to… in their simplicity failing to understand the
question of the meaning of power； seem to consider that the collective
will of the people is unconditionally transferred to historical
persons； and therefore when describing some single state they assume
that particular power to be the one absolute and real power； and
that any other force opposing this is not a power but a violation of
power… mere violence。
Their theory； suitable for primitive and peaceful periods of
history； has the inconvenience… in application to complex and stormy
periods in the life of nations during which various powers arise
simultaneously and struggle with one another… that a Legitimist
historian will prove that the National Convention； the Directory；
and Bonaparte were mere infringers of the true power； while a
Republican and a Bonapartist will prove： the one that the Convention
and the other that the Empire was the real power； and that all the
others were violations of power。 Evidently the explanations
furnished by these historians being mutually contradictory can only
satisfy young children。
Recognizing the falsity of this view of history； another set of
historians say that power rests on a conditional delegation of the
will of the people to their rulers； and that historical leaders have
power only conditionally on carrying out the program that the will
of the people has by tacit agreement prescribed to them。 But what this
program consists in these historians do not say； or if they do they
continually contradict one another。
Each historian； according to his view of what constitutes a nation's
progress； looks for these conditions in the greatness； wealth；
freedom； or enlightenment of citizens of France or some other country。
But not to mention the historians' contradictions as to the nature
of this program… or even admitting that some one general program of
these conditions exists… the facts of history almost always contradict
that theory。 If the conditions under which power is entrusted
consist in the wealth； freedom； and enlightenment of the people； how
is it that Louis XIV and Ivan the Terrible end their reigns
tranquilly； while Louis XVI and Charles I are executed by their
people？ To this question historians reply that Louis XIV's activity；
contrary to the program； reacted on Louis XVI。 But why did it not
react on Louis XIV or on Louis XV… why should it react just on Louis
XVI？ And what is the time limit for such reactions？ To these questions
there are and can be no answers。 Equally little does this view explain
why for several centuries the collective will is not withdrawn from
certain rulers and their heirs； and then suddenly during a period of
fifty years is transferred to the Convention； to the Directory； to
Napoleon； to Alexander； to Louis XVIII； to Napoleon again； to
Charles X； to Louis Philippe； to a Republican government； and to
Napoleon III。 When explaining these rapid transfers of the people's
will from from one individual to another； especially in view of
international relations； conquests； and alliances； the historians
are obliged to admit that some of these transfers are not normal
delegations of the people's will but are accidents dependent on
cunning； on mistakes； on craft； or on the weakness of a diplomatist； a
ruler； or a party leader。 So that the greater part of the events of
history… civil wars； revolutions； and conquests… are presented by
these historians not as the results of free transferences of the
people's will； but as results of the ill…directed will of one or
more individuals； that is； once again； as usurpations of power。 And so
these historians also see and admit historical events which are
exceptions to the theory。
These historians resemble a botanist who； having noticed that some
plants grow from seeds producing two cotyledons； should insist that
all that grows does so by sprouting into two leaves； and that the
palm； the mushroom； and even the oak； which blossom into full growth
and no longer resemble two leaves； are deviations from the theory。
Historians of the third class assume that the will of the people
is transferred to historic personages conditionally； but that the
conditions are unknown to us。 They say that historical personages have
power only because they fulfill the will of the people which has
been delegated to them。
But in that case； if the force that moves nations lies not in the
historic leaders but in the nations themselves； what significance have
those leaders？
The leaders； these historians tell us； express the will of the
people： the activity of the leaders represents the activity of the
people。
But in that case the question arises whether all the activity of the
leaders serves as an expression of the people's will or only some part
of it。 If the whole activity of the leaders serves as the expression
of the people's will； as some historians suppose； then all the details
of the court scandals contained in the biographies of a Napoleon or
a Catherine serve to express the life of the nation； which is
evident nonsense； but if it is only some particular side of the
activity of an historical leader which serves to express the
people's life； as other so…called 〃philosophical〃 hist