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In regard to this question； history stands to the other sciences
as experimental science stands to abstract science。
The subject for history is not man's will itself but our
presentation of it。
And so for history； the insoluble mystery presented by the
incompatibility of free will and inevitability does not exist as it
does for theology； ethics； and philosophy。 History surveys a
presentation of man's life in which the union of these two
contradictions has already taken place。
In actual life each historic event； each human action； is very
clearly and definitely understood without any sense of
contradiction； although each event presents itself as partly free
and partly compulsory。
To solve the question of how freedom and necessity are combined
and what constitutes the essence of these two conceptions； the
philosophy of history can and should follow a path contrary to that
taken by other sciences。 Instead of first defining the conceptions
of freedom and inevitability in themselves； and then ranging the
phenomena of life under those definitions； history should deduce a
definition of the conception of freedom and inevitability themselves
from the immense quantity of phenomena of which it is cognizant and
that always appear dependent on these two elements。
Whatever presentation of the activity of many men or of an
individual we may consider； we always regard it as the result partly
of man's free will and partly of the law of inevitability。
Whether we speak of the migration of the peoples and the
incursions of the barbarians； or of the decrees of Napoleon III； or of
someone's action an hour ago in choosing one direction out of
several for his walk； we are unconscious of any contradiction。 The
degree of freedom and inevitability governing the actions of these
people is clearly defined for us。
Our conception of the degree of freedom often varies according to
differences in the point of view from which we regard the event； but
every human action appears to us as a certain combination of freedom
and inevitability。 In every action we examine we see a certain measure
of freedom and a certain measure of inevitability。 And always the more
freedom we see in any action the less inevitability do we perceive；
and the more inevitability the less freedom。
The proportion of freedom to inevitability decreases and increases
according to the point of view from which the action is regarded；
but their relation is always one of inverse proportion。
A sinking man who clutches at another and drowns him； or a hungry
mother exhausted by feeding her baby； who steals some food； or a man
trained to discipline who on duty at the word of command kills a
defenseless man… seem less guilty； that is； less free and more subject
to the law of necessity； to one who knows the circumstances in which
these people were placed； and more free to one who does not know
that the man was himself drowning； that the mother was hungry； that
the soldier was in the ranks； and so on。 Similarly a man who committed
a murder twenty years ago and has since lived peaceably and harmlessly
in society seems less guilty and his action more due to the law of
inevitability； to someone who considers his action after twenty
years have elapsed than to one who examined it the day after it was
committed。 And in the same way every action of an insane； intoxicated；
or highly excited man appears less free and more inevitable to one who
knows the mental condition of him who committed the action； and
seems more free and less inevitable to one who does not know it。 In
all these cases the conception of freedom is increased or diminished
and the conception of compulsion is correspondingly decreased or
increased； according to the point of view from which the action is
regarded。 So that the greater the conception of necessity the
smaller the conception of freedom and vice versa。
Religion； the common sense of mankind； the science of jurisprudence；
and history itself understand alike this relation between necessity
and freedom。
All cases without exception in which our conception of freedom and
necessity is increased and diminished depend on three considerations：
（1） The relation to the external world of the man who commits the
deeds。
（2） His relation to time。
（3） His relation to the causes leading to the action。
The first consideration is the clearness of our perception of the
man's relation to the external world and the greater or lesser
clearness of our understanding of the definite position occupied by
the man in relation to everything coexisting with him。 This is what
makes it evident that a drowning man is less free and more subject
to necessity than one standing on dry ground； and that makes the
actions of a man closely connected with others in a thickly
populated district； or of one bound by family； official； or business
duties； seem certainly less free and more subject to necessity than
those of a man living in solitude and seclusion。
If we consider a man alone； apart from his relation to everything
around him； each action of his seems to us free。 But if we see his
relation to anything around him； if we see his connection with
anything whatever… with a man who speaks to him； a book he reads；
the work on which he is engaged； even with the air he breathes or
the light that falls on the things about him… we see that each of
these circumstances has an influence on him and controls at least some
side of his activity。 And the more we perceive of these influences the
more our conception of his freedom diminishes and the more our
conception of the necessity that weighs on him increases。
The second consideration is the more or less evident time relation
of the man to the world and the clearness of our perception of the
place the man's action occupies in time。 That is the ground which
makes the fall of the first man； resulting in the production of the
human race； appear evidently less free than a man's entry into
marriage today。 It is the reason why the life and activity of people
who lived centuries ago and are connected with me in time cannot
seem to me as free as the life of a contemporary； the consequences
of which are still unknown to me。
The degree of our conception of freedom or inevitability depends
in this respect on the greater or lesser lapse of time between the
performance of the action and our judgment of it。
If I examine an act I performed a moment ago in approximately the
same circumstances as those I am in now； my action appears to me
undoubtedly free。 But if I examine an act performed a month ago；
then being in different circumstances； I cannot help recognizing
that if that act had not been committed much that resulted from it…
good； agreeable； and even essential… would not have taken place。 If
I reflect on an action still more remote； ten years ago or more；
then the consequences of my action are still plainer to me and I
find it hard to imagine what would have happened had that action not
been performed。 The farther I go back in memory； or what is the same
thing the farther I go forward in my judgment； the more doubtful
becomes my belief in the freedom of my action。
In history we find a very similar progress of conviction
concerning the part played by free will in the general affairs of
humanity。 A contemporary event seems to us to be indubitably the doing
of all the known participants； but with a more remote event we already
see its inevitable results which prevent our considering anything else
possible。 And the farther we go back in examining events the less
arbitrary do they appear。
The Austro…Prussian war appears to us undoubtedly the result of
the crafty conduct of Bismarck； and so on。 The Napoleonic wars still
seem to us； though already questionably； to be the outcome of their
heroes' will。 But in the Crusades we already see an event occupying
its definite place in history and without which we cannot imagine
the modern history of Europe； though to the chroniclers of the
Crusades that event appeared as merely due to the will of certain
people。 In regard to the migration of the peoples it does not enter
anyone's head today to suppose that the renovation of the European
world depended on Attila's caprice。 The farther back in history the
object of our observation lies； the more doubtful does the free will
of those concerned in the event become and the more manifest the law
of inevitability。
The third consideration is the degree to which we apprehend that
endless chain of causation inevitably demanded by reason； in which
each phenomenon comprehended； and therefore man's every action； must
have its definite place as a result of what has gone before and as a
cause of what will follow。
The better we are acquainted with the physiological；
psychological； and historical laws deduced by observation and by which
man is controlled； and the more correctly we perceive the
physiological； psychological； and historical causes of the action； and
the simpler the action we are observing and the l