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Soc。 May not 〃the wolf；〃 as the proverb says； claim a hearing〃？
Phaedr。 Do you say what can be said for him。
Soc。 He will argue that is no use in putting a solemn face on
these matters； or in going round and round； until you arrive at
first principles； for； as I said at first； when the question is of
justice and good； or is a question in which men are concerned who
are just and good； either by nature or habit； he who would be a
skilful rhetorician has； no need of truth…for that in courts of law
men literally care nothing about truth； but only about conviction： and
this is based on probability； to which who would be a skilful orator
should therefore give his whole attention。 And they say also that
there are cases in which the actual facts； if they are improbable；
ought to be withheld； and only the probabilities should be told either
in accusation or defence； and that always in speaking； the orator
should keep probability in view； and say good…bye to the truth。 And
the observance； of this principle throughout a speech furnishes the
whole art。
Phaedr。 That is what the professors of rhetoric do actually say；
Socrates。 I have not forgotten that we have quite briefly touched upon
this matter already； with them the point is all…important。
Soc。 I dare say that you are familiar with Tisias。 Does he not
define probability to be that which the many think？
Phaedr。 Certainly； he does。
Soc。 I believe that he has a clever and ingenious case of this
sort：…He supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted a
strong and cowardly one； and to have robbed him of his coat or of
something or other； he is brought into court； and then Tisias says
that both parties should tell lies： the coward should say that he
was assaulted by more men than one； the other should prove that they
were alone； and should argue thus： 〃How could a weak man like me
have assaulted a strong man like him？〃 The complainant will not like
to confess his own cowardice； and will therefore invent some other lie
which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting。 And
there are other devices of the same kind which have a place in the
system。 Am I not right； Phaedrus？
Phaedr。 Certainly。
Soc。 Bless me； what a wonderfully mysterious art is this which
Tisias or some other gentleman； in whatever name or country he
rejoices； has discovered。 Shall we say a word to him or not？
Phaedr。 What shall we say to him？
Soc。 Let us tell him that； before he appeared； you and I were saying
that the probability of which he speaks was engendered in the minds of
the many by the likeness of the truth； and we had just been
affirming that he who knew the truth would always know best how to
discover the resemblances of the truth。 If he has anything else to say
about the art of speaking we should like to hear him； but if not； we
are satisfied with our own view； that unless a man estimates the
various characters of his heaters and is able to divide all things
into classes and to comprehend them under single ideas he will never
be a skilful rhetorician even within the limits of human power。 And
this skill he will not attain without a great deal of trouble； which a
good man ought to undergo； not for the sake of speaking and acting
before men； but in order that he may be able to say what is acceptable
to God and always to act acceptably to Him as far as in him lies；
for there is a saying of wiser men than ourselves； that a man of sense
should not try to please his fellow…servants （at least this should not
be his first object） but his good and noble masters； and therefore
if the way is long and circuitous； marvel not at this； for； where
the end is great； there we may take the longer road； but not for
lesser ends such as yours。 Truly； the argument may say； Tisias； that
if you do not mind going so far； rhetoric has a fair beginning here。
Phaedr。 I think； Socrates； that this is admirable； if only
practicable。
Soc。 But even to fail in an honourable object is honourable。
Phaedr。 True。
Soc。 Enough appears to have been said by us of a true and false
art of speaking。
Phaedr。 Certainly。
Soc。 But there is something yet to be said of propriety and
impropriety of writing。
Phaedr。 Yes。
Soc。 Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner
which will be acceptable to God？
Phaedr。 No； indeed。 Do you？
Soc。 I have heard a tradition of the ancients； whether true or not
they only know； although if we had found the truth ourselves； do you
think that we should care much about the opinions of men？
Phaedr。 Your question needs no answer； but I wish that you would
tell me what you say that you have heard。
Soc。 At the Egyptian city of Naucratis； there was a famous old
god； whose name was Theuth； the bird which is called the Ibis is
sacred to him； and he was the inventor of many arts； such as
arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and
dice； but his great discovery was the use of letters。 Now in those
days the god Thamus was the king of the whole country of Egypt； and he
dwelt in that great city of Upper Egypt which the Hellenes call
Egyptian Thebes； and the god himself is called by them Ammon。 To him
came Theuth and showed his inventions； desiring that the other
Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them； he enumerated
them； and Thamus enquired about their several uses； and praised some
of them and censured others； as he approved or disapproved of them。 It
would take a long time to repeat all that Thamus said to Theuth in
praise or blame of the various arts。 But when they came to letters；
This； said Theuth； will make the Egyptians wiser and give them
better memories； it is a specific both for the memory and for the wit。
Thamus replied： O most ingenious Theuth； the parent or inventor of
an art is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his
own inventions to the users of them。 And in this instance； you who are
the father of letters； from a paternal love of your own children
have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have；
for this discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners'
souls； because they will not use their memories； they will trust to
the external written characters and not remember of themselves。 The
specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory； but to
reminiscence； and you give your disciples not truth； but only the
semblance of truth； they will be hearers of many things and will
have learned nothing； they will appear to be omniscient and will
generally know nothing； they will be tiresome company； having the show
of wisdom without the reality。
Phaedr。 Yes； Socrates； you can easily invent tales of Egypt； or of
any other country。
Soc。 There was a tradition in the temple of Dodona that oaks first
gave prophetic utterances。 The men of old； unlike in their
simplicity to young philosophy； deemed that if they heard the truth
even from 〃oak or rock；〃 it was enough for them； whereas you seem to
consider not whether a thing is or is not true； but who the speaker is
and from what country the tale comes。
Phaedr。 I acknowledge the justice of your rebuke； and I think that
the Theban is right in his view about letters。
Soc。 He would be a very simple person； and quite a stranger to the
oracles of Thamus or Ammon； who should leave in writing or receive
in writing any art under the idea that the written word would be
intelligible or certain； or who deemed that writing was at all
better than knowledge and recollection of the same matters？
Phaedr。 That is most true。
Soc。 I cannot help feeling； Phaedrus； that writing is
unfortunately like painting； for the creations of the painter have the
attitude of life； and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a
solemn silence。 And the same may be said of speeches。 You would
imagine that they had intelligence； but if you want to know anything
and put a question to one of them； the speaker always gives one
unvarying answer。 And when they have been once written down they are
tumbled about anywhere among those who may or may not understand them；
and know not to whom they should reply； to whom not： and； if they
are maltreated or abused； they have no parent to protect them； and
they cannot protect or defend themselves。
Phaedr。 That again is most true。
Soc。 Is there not another kind of w