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revenge； if the time past be onely considered； is nothing else but a certain triumph； and glory of minde； which points at no end； （for it contemplates onely what is past； but the end is a thing to come） but that which is directed to no end is vain； That revenge therefore which regards not the future； proceeds from vaine glory； and therefore without reason。 But to hurt another without reason introduces a warre； and is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature； It is therefore a precept of the Law of nature； that in revenge wee look not backwards but forward。 Now the breach of this Law； is commonly called CRUELTY。 XII。 But because all signes of hatred； and contempt provoke most of all to brawling and fighting； insomuch as most men would rather lose their lives； （that I say not their Peace） then suffer reproach； it followes in the seventh place； That it is prescribed by the Law of nature； that no man either by deeds； or words； countenance； or laughter； doe declare himselfe to hate； or scorne another。 The breach of which Law is called Reproach。 But although nothing be more frequent then the scoffes and jeers of the powerfull against the weak； and namely of Judges against guilty persons； which neither relate to the offence of the guilty； nor the duty of the Judges； yet these kind of men do act against the Law of nature； and are to be esteemed for contumelious。 XIII。 The question whether of two men be the more worthy； belongs not to the naturall； but civill state； for it hath been shewed before； Chap。 I。 Art。 3。 that all men by nature are equall； and therefore the inequality which now is； suppose from riches； power； nobility of kindred； is come from the civill Law。 I know that Aristotle in his first book of Politiques affirmes as a foundation of the whole politicall science； that some men by nature are made worthy to command； others onely to serve； as if Lord and Master were distinguished not by consent of men； but by an aptnesse； that is； a certain kind of naturall knowledge； or ignorance； which foundation is not onely against reason （as but now hath been shewed） but also against experience： for neither almost is any man so dull of understanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himselfe； then to yeeld himselfe to the government of another； neither if the wiser and stronger doe contest； have these ever； or often the upper hand of those。 Whether therefore men be equall by nature； the equality is to be acknowledged； or whether unequall； because they are like to contest for dominion； its necessary for the obtaining of Peace； that they be esteemed as equall； and therefore it is in the eight place a precept of the Law of nature； That every man be accounted by nature equall to another； the contrary to which Law is PRIDE。 XIV。 As it was necessary to the conservation of each man； that he should part with some of his Rights； so it is no lesse necessary to the same conservation； that he retain some others； to wit the Right of bodily protection； of free enjoyment of ayre； water； and all necessaries for life。 Since therefore many common Rights are retained by those who enter into a peaceable state； and that many peculiar ones are also acquired； hence ariseth this ninth dictate of the naturall Law； to wit； That what Rights soever any man challenges to himselfe； he also grant the same as due to all the rest： otherwise he frustrates the equality acknowledged in the former Article。 For what is it else to acknowledge an equality of persons in the making up of society； but to attribute equall Right and Power to those whom no reason would else engage to enter into society？ But to ascribe equall things to equalls； is the same with giving things proportionall to proportionals。 The observation of this Law is called MEEKNES； the violation pleonexia； the breakers by the Latines are styled Immodici & immodesti。 XV。 In the tenth place it is commanded by the Law of nature； That every man in dividing Right to others； shew himselfe equall to either party。 By the foregoing Law we are forbidden to assume more Right by nature to our selves； then we grant to others。 We may take lesse if we will； for that sometimes is an argument of modesty。 But if at any time matter of Right be to be divided by us unto others； we are forbidden by this Law to favour one more or lesse then another。 For he that by favouring one before another； observes not this naturall equality； reproaches him whom he thus undervalues： but it is declared above； that a reproach is against the Lawes of Nature。 The observance of this Precept is called EQUITY； the breach； Respect of Persons。 The Greeks in one word term it prosopolepsia。 XVI。 From the foregoing Law is collected this eleventh； Those things which cannot be divided； must be used in common； （if they can） and （that the quantity of the matter permit） every man as much as he lists； but if the quantity permit not； then with limitation； and proPortionally to the number of the users： for otherwise that equality can by no means be observed； which we have shewed in the forgoing Article to be commanded by the Law of Nature。 XVII。 Also what cannot be divided； nor had in common； it is provided by the Law of nature （which may be the twelfth Precept） that the use of that thing be either by turns； or adjudged to one onely by lot； and that in the using it by turns； it be also decided by lot who shall have the first use of it； For here also regard is to be had unto equality： but no other can be found； but that of lot。 XVIII。 But all lot is twofold； arbitrary； or naturall； Arbitrary is that which is cast by the consent of the Contenders； and it consists in meer chance （as they say） or fortune。 Naturall is primogeniture （in Greek klironomia； as it were given by lot） or first possession。 Therefore the things which can neither be divided； nor had in common； must be granted to the first possessour； as also those things which belonged to the Father are due to the Sonne； unlesse the Father himselfe have formerly conveighed away that Right to some other。 Let this therefore stand for the thirteenth Law of Nature。 XIX。 The 14 Precept of the Law of nature is； That safety must be assured to the mediators for Peace。 For the reason which commands the end； commands also the means necessary to the end。 But the first dictate of Reason is Peace。 All the rest are means to obtain it； and without which Peace cannot be had。 But neither can Peace be had without mediation； nor mediation without safety； it is therefore a dictate of Reason； that is； a Law of nature； That we must give all security to the Mediators for Peace。 XX。 Furthermore； because； although men should agree to make all these； and whatsoever other Lawes of Nature； and should endeavour to keep them； yet doubts； and controversies would daily arise concerning the application of them unto their actions； to wit； whether what was done； were against the Law； or not； （which we call； the question of Right） whence will follow a fight between Parties； either sides supposing themselves wronged； it is therefore necessary to the preservation of Peace （because in this case no other fit remedy can possibly be thought on） that both the disagreeing Parties refer the matter unto some third； and oblige themselves by mutuall compacts to stand to his judgement in deciding the controversie。 And he to whom they thus refer themselves is called an Arbiter。 It is therefore the 15。 Precept of the naturall Law； That both parties disputing concerning the matter of right submit themselves unto the opinion and judgement of some third。 XXI。 But from this ground； that an Arbiter or Judge is chosen by the differing Parties to determine the controversie； we gather； that the Arbiter must not be one of the Parties： for every man is presumed to seek what is good for himselfe naturally； and what is just； onely for Peaces sake； and accidentally。 and therefore cannot observe that same equality commanded by； the Law of nature so exactly as a third man would do： It is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the Law of nature； That no man must be Judge or Arbiter in his own cause。
XXII。 From the same ground followes in the seventeenth place； That no man must be Judge who propounds unto himself any hope of profit； or glory； from the victory of either part： for the like reason swayes here； as in the foregoing Law。
XXIII。 But when there is some controversie of the fact it selfe； to wit； whether that bee done or not； which is said to bee done； the naturall Law wills； that the Arbiter trust both Parties alike； that is； （because they affirm contradictories） that hee believe neither： He must therefore give credit to a third； or a third and fourth； or more； that he may be able to give judgement of the fact； as often as by other signes he cannot come to the knowledge of it。 The 18。 Law of nature therefore injoynes Arbiters； and Iudges of fact； That where firm and certain signes of the fact appear not； there they rule their sentence by such witnesses； as seem to be indifferent to both Parts。 XXIV。 From the above declared definition of an Arbiter may be furthermore understood； That no contract or promise must Passe between him and the parties whose Iudge he is appointed； by vertue whereof he may be engaged to s