liberty-第12章

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se　between　him　and　the　parties　whose　Iudge　he　is　appointed；　by　vertue　whereof　he　may　be　engaged　to　speak　in　favour　of　either　part；　nay；　or　be　oblig'd　to　judge　according　to　equity；　or　to　pronounce　such　sentence　as　he　shall　truly　judge　to　be　equall。　The　Judge　is　indeed　bound　to　give　such　sentence　as　he　shall　judge　to　be　equall　by　the　Law　of　Nature　re…counted　in　the　15。　Article。　To　the　obligation　of　which　Law　nothing　can　be　added　by　way　of　Compact。　Such　compact　therefore　would　be　in　vain。　Besides；　if　giving　wrong　judgement；　he　should　contend　for　the　equity　of　it；　except　such　Compact　be　of　no　force；　the　Controversie　would　remain　after　Judgement　given；　which　is　contrary　to　the　constitution　of　an　Arbiter；　who　is　so　chosen；　as　both　parties　have　oblig'd　themselves　to　stand　to　the　judgement　which　he　should　pronounce。　The　Law　of　Nature　therefore　commands　the　Judge　to　be　dis…engaged；　which　is　its　19　precept。　　　　　XXV。　Farthermore；　forasmuch　as　the　Lawes　of　Nature　are　nought　else　but　the　dictates　of　Reason；　so　as；　unlesse　a　man　endeavour　to　preserve　the　faculty　of　right　reasoning；　he　cannot　observe　the　Lawes　of　Nature；　it　is　manifest；　that　he；　who　knowingly；　or　willingly；　doth　ought；　whereby　the　rationall　faculty　may　be　destroyed；　or　weakned；　he　knowingly；　and　willingly；　breaks　the　Law　of　nature：　For　there　is　no　difference　between　a　man　who　performes　not　his　Duty；　and　him　who　does　such　things　willingly；　as　make　it　impossible　for　him　to　doe　it。　But　they　destroy　and　weaken　the　reasoning　faculty；　who　doe　that　which　disturbs　the　mind　from　its　naturall　state；　that　which　most　manifestly　happens　to　Drunkards　and　Gluttons；　we　therefore　sin　in　the　20　place　against　the　Law　of　Nature　by　Drunkennesse。　　　　　XXVI。　Perhaps　some　man；　who　sees　all　these　precepts　of　Nature　deriv'd　by　a　certain　artifice　from　the　single　dictate　of　Reason　advising　us　to　look　to　the　preservation；　and　safegard　of　our　selves；　will　say；　That　the　deduction　of　these　Lawes　is　so　hard；　that　it　is　not　to　be　expected　they　will　be　vulgarly　known；　and　therefore　neither　will　they　prove　obliging：　for　Lawes；　if　they　be　not　known；　oblige　not；　nay；　indeed　are　not　Lawes。　To　this　I　answer；　it's　true；　That　hope；　fear；　anger；　ambition；　covetousnesse；　vain　glory；　and　other　perturbations　of　mind；　doe　hinder　a　man　so；　as　he　cannot　attaine　to　the　knowledge　of　these　Lawes；　whilst　those　passions　prevail　in　him：　But　there　is　no　man　who　is　not　sometimes　in　a　quiet　mind；　At　that　time　therefore　there　is　nothing　easier　for　him　to　know；　though　he　be　never　so　rude　and　unlearn'd；　then　this　only　Rule；　That　when　he　doubts；　whether　what　he　is　now　doing　to　another；　may　be　done　by　the　Law　of　Nature；　or　not；　he　conceive　himselfe　to　be　in　that　others　stead。　Here　instantly　those　perturbations　which　perswaded　him　to　the　fact；　being　now　cast　into　the　other　scale；　disswade　him　as　much：　And　this　Rule　is　not　onely　easie；　but　is　Anciently　celebrated　in　these　words；　Quod　tibi　fieri　non　vis；　alteri　ne　feceris：　Do　not　that　to　others；　you　would　not　have　done　to　your　self。　　　　　XXVII。　But　because　most　men；　by　reason　of　their　perverse　desire　of　present　profit；　are　very　unapt　to　observe　these　Lawes；　although　acknowledg'd　by　them；　if　perhaps　some　others　more　humble　then　the　rest　should　exercise　that　equity　and　usefulnesse　which　Reason　dictates；　those　not　practising　the　same；　surely　they　would　not　follow　Reason　in　so　doing；　nor　would　they　hereby　procure　themselves　peace；　but　a　more　certain　quick　destruction；　and　the　keepers　of　the　Law　become　a　meer　prey　to　the　breakers　of　it。　It　is　not　therefore　to　be　imagin'd；　that　by　Nature；　（that　is；　by　Reason）　men　are　oblig'd　to　the　exercise　of　all　these　Lawes　in　that　state　of　men　wherein　they　are　not　practis'd　by　others。　We　are　oblig'd　yet　in　the　interim　to　a　readinesse　of　mind　to　observe　them　whensoever　their　observation　shall　seeme　to　conduce　to　the　end　for　which　they　were　ordain'd。　We　must　therefore　conclude；　that　the　Law　of　Nature　doth　alwayes；　and　every　where　oblige　in　the　internall　Court；　or　that　of　Conscience；　but　not　alwayes　in　the　externall　Court；　but　then　onely　when　it　may　be　done　with　safety。　　　　　The　exercise　of　all　these　Lawes＇　Nay　among　these　Lawes　some　things　there　are；　the　omission　whereof　（provided　it　be　done　for　Peace；　or　Self…preservation）　seemes　rather　to　be　the　fulfilling；　then　breach　of　the　Naturall　Law；　for　he　that　doth　all　things　against　those　that　doe　all　things；　and　plunders　plunderers；　doth　equity；　but　on　the　other　side；　to　doe　that　which　in　Peace　is　an　handsome　action；　and　becomming　an　honest　man；　is　dejectednesse；　and　Poornesse　of　spirit；　and　a　betraying　of　ones　self　in　the　time　of　War；　But　there　are　certain　naturall　Lawes；　whose　exercise　ceaseth　not　even　in　the　time　of　War　it　self；　for　I　cannot　understand　what　drunkennesse；　or　cruelty　（that　is；　Revenge　which　respects　not　the　future　good）　can　advance　toward　Peace；　or　the　preservation　of　any　man。　Briefly；　in　the　state　of　nature；　what's　just；　and　unjust；　is　not　to　be　esteem'd　by　the　Actions；　but　by　the　Counsell；　and　Conscience　of　the　Actor。　That　which　is　done　out　of　necessity；　out　of　endeavour　for　Peace；　for　the　preservation　of　our　selves；　is　done　with　Right；　otherwise　every　damage　done　to　a　man　would　be　a　breach　of　the　naturall　Law；　and　an　injury　against　God。　　　　　XXVIII。　But　the　Lawes　which　oblige　Conscience；　may　be　broken　by　an　act；　not　onely　contrary　to　them；　but　also　agreeable　with　them；　if　so　be　that　he　who　does　it　be　of　another　opinion：　for　though　the　act　it　self　be　answerable　to　the　Lawes；　yet　his　Conscience　is　against　them。　　　　　XXIX。　The　Lawes　of　Nature　are　immutable；　and　eternall；　What　they　forbid；　can　never　be　lawfull；　what　they　command；　can　never　be　unlawfull：　For　pride；　ingratitude；　breach　of　Contracts　（or　injury）；　inhumanity；　contumely；　will　never　be　lawfull；　nor　the　contrary　vertues　to　these　ever　unlawfull；　as　we　take　them　for　dispositions　of　the　mind；　that　is；　as　they　are　considered　in　the　Court　of　Conscience；　where　onely　they　oblige；　and　are　Lawes。　Yet　actions　may　be　so　diversified　by　circumstances；　and　the　Civill　Law；　that　what's　done　with　equity　at　one　time；　is　guilty　of　iniquity　at　another；　and　what　suits　with　reason　at　one　time；　is　contrary　to　it　another。　Yet　Reason　is　still　the　same；　and　changeth　not　her　end；　which　is　Peace；　and　Defence；　nor　of　the　minde　which　the　meanes　to　attaine　them；　to　wit；　those　vertues　we　have　declar'd　above；　and　which　cannot　be　abrogated　by　any　Custome；　or　Law　whatsoever。　　　　　XXX。　It's　evident　by　what　hath　hitherto　been　said；　how　easily　the　Lawes　of　Nature　are　to　be　observ'd；　because　they　require　the　endeavour　onely；　（but　that　must　be　true　and　constant）　which　who　so　shall　performe；　we　may　rightly　call　him　JUST。　For　he　who　tends　to　this　with　his　whole　might；　namely；　that　his　actions　be　squar'd　according　to　the　precepts　of　Nature；　he　shewes　clearly　that　he　hath　a　minde　to　fulfill　all　those　Lawes；　which　is　all　we　are　oblig'd　to　by　rationall　nature。　Now　he　that　hath　done　all　he　is　oblig'd　to；　is　a　Just　Man。　　　　　XXXI。　All　Writers　doe　agree　that　the　Naturall　Law　is　the　same　with　the　Morall。　Let　us　see　wherefore　this　is　true。　We　must　know　therefore；　that　Good　and　Evill　are　names　given　to　things　to　signifie　the　inclination；　or　aversion　of　them　by　whom　they　were　given。　But　the　inclinations　of　men　are　diverse；　according　to　their　diverse　Constitutions；　Customes；　Opinions；　as　we　may　see　in　those　things　we　apprehend　by　sense；　as　by　tasting；　touching；　smelling；　but　much　more　in　those　which　pertain　to　the　common　actions　of　life；　where　what　this　man　commends；　（that　is　to　say；　calls　Good）　the　other　undervalues；　as　being　Evil；　Nay；　very　often　the　same　man　at　diverse　times；　praises；　and　dispraises　the　same　thing。　Whilst　thus　they　doe；　necessary　it　is　there　should　be　discord；　and　strife：　They　are　therefore　so　long　in　the　state　of　War；　as　by　reason　of　the　diversity　of　the　present　appetites；　they　mete　Good　and　Evill　by　diverse　measures。　All　men　easily　acknowledge　this　state；　as　long　as　they　are　in　it；　to　be　evill；　and　by　consequence　that　Peace　is　good。　They　therefore　who　could　not　agree　concerning　a　present；　doe　agree　concerning　a　future　Good；　which　indeed　is　a　work　of　Reason；　for　things　present　are　obvious　to　the　sense；　things　to　come　to　our　Reason　only。　Reason　declaring　Peace　to　be　good；　it　followes　by　the　same　reason；　that　all　the　necessary　means　to　Peace　be　good　also；　and　therefore；　that　Modesty；　Equity；　Trust；　Humanity；　Mercy　（which　we　have　demonstrated　to　be　necessary　to　Peace）　are　good　Manners；　or　habits；　（that　is）　Vertues。　The　Law　therefore；　in　the　means　to　Peace；　commands　also　Good　Manners；　or　the　practise　of　Vertue：　And　therefore　it　is　call'd　Morall。　　　　　XXXII。　But　because　men　cannot　put　off　this　same　irrationall　appetite；　whereby　they　greedily　prefer　the　present　good　（to　which；　by　strict　consequence；　many　unfore…seen　evills　doe　adhere）　before　the　future；　it　happens；　that　though　all　men　doe　agree　in　the　commendation　of　the　foresaid　vertues；　yet　they　disagree　still　concerning　their　Nature；　to　wit；　in　what　each　of　them　doth　consist；　for　as　oft　as　anothers　good　action　displeaseth　any　man；　that　action　hath　the　name　given　of　some　neighbouring　vice；　likewise　the　bad　actions；　which　please　them；　are　ever　entituled　to　some　Vertue；　whence　it　comes　to　passe　that　the　same　Action　is　prais'd　by　these；　and　call'd　V