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drawing interest from them； not for the wants of the state as such；
which is rich； but for those of the people。 And this is not to be done
merely by voluntary contributions； but by compulsory exactions as
state…burdens； for we are here considering only the right of the state
in relation to the people。 Among the voluntary modes of raising such
contributions； lotteries ought not to be allowed； because they
increase the number of those who are poor； and involve danger to the
public property。 It may be asked whether the relief of the poor
ought to be administered out of current contributions； so that every
age should maintain its own poor； or whether this were better done
by means of permanent funds and charitable institutions； such as
widows' homes； hospitals； etc。？ And if the former method is the
better； it may also be considered whether the means necessary are to
be raised by a legal assessment rather than by begging； which is
generally nigh akin to robbing。 The former method must in reality be
regarded as the only one that is conformable to the right of the
state； which cannot withdraw its connection from any one who has to
live。 For a legal current provision does not make the profession of
poverty a means of gain for the indolent； as is to be feared is the
case with pious foundations when they grow with the number of the
poor； nor can it be charged with being an unjust or unrighteous burden
imposed by the government on the people。
2。 The state has also a right to impose upon the people the duty
of preserving children exposed from want or shame； and who would
otherwise perish； for it cannot knowingly allow this increase of its
power to be destroyed； however unwelcome in some respects it may be。
But it is a difficult question to determine how this may most justly
be carried out。 It might be considered whether it would not be right
to exact contributions for this purpose from the unmarried persons
of both sexes who are possessed of means； as being in part responsible
for the evil； and further； whether the end in view would be best
carried out by foundling hospitals； or in what other way consistent
with right。 But this is a problem of which no solution has yet been
offered that does not in some measure offend against right or
morality。
3。 The church is here regarded as an ecclesiastical establishment
merely； and as such it must be carefully distinguished from
religion； which as an internal mode of feeling lies wholly beyond
the sphere of the action of the civil power。 Viewed as an
institution for public worship founded for the people… to whose
opinion or conviction it owes its origin… the church establishment
responds to a real want in the state。 This is the need felt by the
people to regard themselves as also subjects of a Supreme Invisible
Power to which they must pay homage； and which may of be brought
into a very undesirable collision with the civil power。 The state
has therefore a right in this relation； but it is not to be regarded
as the right of constitutional legislation in the church； so as to
organize it as may seem most advantageous for itself； or to
prescribe and command its faith and ritual forms of worship （ritus）；
for all this must be left entirely to the teachers and rulers which
the church has chosen for itself。 The function of the state in this
connection； only includes the negative right of regulating the
influence of these public teachers upon the visible political
commonwealth； that it may not be prejudicial to the public peace and
tranquility。 Consequently the state has to take measures； on
occasion of any internal conflict in the church； or on occasion of any
collision of the several churches with each other； that civil
concord is not endangered； and this right falls within the province of
the police。 It is beneath the dignity of the supreme power to
interpose in determining what particular faith the church shall
profess； or to decree that a certain faith shall be unalterably
held； and that the church may not reform itself。 For in doing so；
the supreme power would be mixing itself up in a scholastic wrangle；
on a footing of equality with its subjects； the monarch would be
making himself a priest； and the churchmen might even reproach the
supreme power with understanding nothing about matters of faith。
Especially would this hold in respect of any prohibition of internal
reform in the church； for what the people as a whole cannot
determine upon for themselves cannot be determined for the people by
the legislator。 But no people can ever rationally determine that
they will never advance farther in their insight into matters of
faith； or resolve that they will never reform the institutions of
the church； because this would be opposed to the humanity in their own
persons and to their highest rights。 And therefore the supreme power
cannot of itself resolve and decree in these matters for the people。
As regards the cost of maintaining the ecclesiastical establishment；
for similar reasons this must be derived not from the public funds
of the state； but from the section of the people who profess the
particular faith of the church； and thus only ought it to fall as a
burden on the community。
D。 The Right of Assigning Offices and Dignities in the State。
The right of the supreme authority in the state also includes：
1。 The distribution of offices； as public and paid employments；
2。 The conferring of dignities； as unpaid distinctions of rank；
founded merely on honour； but establishing a gradation of higher and
lower orders in the political scale； the latter； although free in
themselves； being under obligation determined by the public law to
obey the former so far as they are also entitled to command；
3。 Besides these relatively beneficent rights； the supreme power
in the state is also invested with the right of administering
punishment。
As regards civil offices； the question arises as to whether the
sovereign has the right； after bestowing an office on an individual；
to take it again away at his mere pleasure； without any crime having
been committed by the holder of the office。 I say； 〃No。〃 For what
the united will of the people would never resolve； regarding their
civil officers； cannot （constitutionally） be determined by the
sovereign regarding them。 The people have to bear the cost incurred by
the appointment of an official； and undoubtedly it must be their
will that any one in office should be completely competent for its
duties。 But such competency can only be acquired by a long preparation
and training； and this process would necessarily occupy the time
that would be required for acquiring the means of support by a
different occupation。 Arbitrary and frequent changes would
therefore； as a rule； have the effect of filling offices with
functionaries who have not acquired the skill required for their
duties； and whose judgements had not attained maturity by practice。
All this is contrary to the purpose of the state。 And besides it is
requisite in the interest of the people that it should be possible for
every individual to rise from a lower office to the higher offices； as
these latter would otherwise fall into incompetent hands； and that
competent officials generally should have some guarantee of
life…long provision。
Civil dignities include not only such as are connected with a public
office； but also those which make the possessors of them； without
any accompanying services to the state； members of a higher class or
rank。 The latter constitute the nobility； whose members are
distinguished from the common citizens who form the mass of the
people。 The rank of the nobility is inherited by male descendants； and
these again communicate it to wives who are not nobly born。 Female
descendants of noble families； however； do not communicate their
rank to husbands who are not of noble birth； but they descend
themselves into the common civil status of the people。 This being
so； the question then emerges as to whether the sovereign has the
right to found a hereditary rank and class； intermediate between
himself and the other citizens？ The import of this question does not
turn on whether it is conformable to the prudence of the sovereign；
from regard to his own and the people's interests； to have such an
institution； but whether it is in accordance with the right of the
people that they should have a class of persons above them； who； while
being subjects like themselves； are yet born as their commanders； or
at least as privileged superiors？ The answer to this question； as in
previous instances； is to be derived from the principle that 〃what the
people； as constituting the whole mass of the subjects； could not
determine regarding themselves and their associated citizens； cannot
be constitutionally determined by the sovereign regarding the people。〃
Now a hereditary nobility is a rank which takes precedence of merit