按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
Hence it would be a contradiction to have anything external as one's
own； were not the conception of possession capable of two different
meanings； as sensible possession that is perceivable by the senses；
and rational possession that is perceivable only by the intellect。
By the former is to be understood a physical possession； and by the
latter； a purely juridical possession of the same object。
The description of an object as 〃external to me〃 may signify
either that it is merely 〃different and distinct from me as a
subject；〃 or that it is also 〃a thing placed outside of me； and to
be found elsewhere in space or time。〃 Taken in the first sense； the
term possession signifies rational possession； and； in the second
sense； it must mean empirical possession。 A rational or intelligible
possession； if such be possible； is possession viewed apart from
physical holding or detention （detentio）。
2。 Juridical Postulate of the Practical Reason。
It is possible to have any external object of my will as mine。 In
other words； a maxim to this effect… were it to become law… that any
object on which the will can be exerted must remain objectively in
itself without an owner； as res nullius； is contrary to the
principle of right。
For an object of any act of my will； is something that it would be
physically within my power to use。 Now； suppose there were things that
by right should absolutely not be in our power； or； in other words；
that it would be wrong or inconsistent with the freedom of all；
according to universal law； to make use of them。 On this
supposition； freedom would so far be depriving itself of the use of
its voluntary activity； in thus putting useable objects out of all
possibility of use。 In practical relations； this would be to
annihilate them； by making them res nullius； notwithstanding the
fact act acts of will in relation to such things would formally
harmonize； in the actual use of them； with the external freedom of all
according to universal laws。 Now the pure practical reason lays down
only formal laws as principles to regulate the exercise of the will；
and therefore abstracts from the matter of the act of will； as regards
the other qualities of the object； which is considered only in so
far as it is an object of the activity of the will。 Hence the
practical reason cannot contain； in reference to such an object； an
absolute prohibition of its use； because this would involve a
contradiction of external freedom with itself。 An object of my free
will； however； is one which I have the physical capability of making
some use of at will； since its use stands in my power （in potentia）。
This is to be distinguished from having the object brought under my
disposal （in postestatem meam reductum）； which supposes not a
capability merely； but also a particular act of the free…will。 But
in order to consider something merely as an object of my will as such；
it is sufficient to be conscious that I have it in my power。 It is
therefore an assumption a priori of the practical reason to regard and
treat every object within the range of my free exercise of will as
objectively a possible mine or thine。
This postulate may be called 〃a permissive law〃 of the practical
reason； as giving us a special title which we could not evolve out
of the mere conceptions of right generally。 And this title constitutes
the right to impose upon all others an obligation； not otherwise
laid upon them； to abstain from the use of certain objects of our free
choice； because we have already taken them into our possession。 Reason
wills that this shall be recognised as a valid principle； and it
does so as practical reason； and it is enabled by means of this
postulate a priori to enlarge its range of activity in practice。
3。 Possession and Ownership。
Any one who would assert the right to a thing as his must be in
possession of it as an object。 Were he not its actual possessor or
owner； he could not be wronged or injured by the use which another
might make of it without his consent。 For； should anything external to
him； and in no way connected with him by right； affect this object； it
could not affect himself as a subject； nor do him any wrong； unless he
stood in a relation of ownership to it。
4。 Exposition of the Conception of the。
External Mine and Thine。
There can only be three external objects of my will in the
activity of choice：
（1） A corporeal thing external to me；
（2） The free…will of another in the performance of a particular
act （praestatio）；
（3） The state of another in relation to myself。
These correspond to the categories of substance； causality； and
reciprocity； and they form the practical relations between me and
external objects； according to the laws of freedom。
A。 I can only call a corporeal thing or an object in space 〃mine；〃
when； even although not in physical possession of it； I am able to
assert that I am in possession of it in another real nonphysical
sense。 Thus； I am not entitled to call an apple mine merely because
I hold it in my hand or possess it physically； but only when I am
entitled to say； 〃I possess it； although I have laid it out of my
hand； and wherever it may lie。〃 In like manner； I am not entitled to
say of the ground； on which I may have laid myself down； that
therefore it is mine； but only when I can rightly assert that it still
remains in my possession； although I may have left the spot。 For any
one who； in the former appearances of empirical possession； might
wrench the apple out of my hand； or drag me away from my
resting…place； would； indeed； injure me in respect of the inner 〃mine〃
of freedom； but not in respect of the external 〃mine；〃 unless I
could assert that I was in the possession of the object； even when not
actually holding it physically。 And if I could not do this； neither
could I call the apple or the spot mine。
B。 I cannot call the performance of something by the action of the
will of another 〃mine；〃 if I can only say 〃it has come into my
possession at the same time with a promise〃 （pactum re initum）； but
only if I am able to assert 〃I am in possession of the will of the
other； so as to determine him to the performance of a particular
act； although the time for the performance of it has not yet come。〃 In
the latter case； the promise belongs to the nature of things
actually held as possessed； and as an active obligation I can reckon
it mine； and this holds good not only if I have the thing promised… as
in the first case… already in my possession； but even although I do
not yet possess it in fact。 Hence； I must be able to regard myself
in thought as independent of that empirical form of possession that is
limited by the condition of time and as being； nevertheless； in
possession of the object。
C。 I cannot call a wife； a child； a domestic； or； generally； any
other person 〃mine〃 merely because I command them at present as
belonging to my household； or because I have them under control； and
in my power and possession。 But I can call them mine； if； although
they may have withdrawn themselves from my control and I do not
therefore possess them empirically； I can still say 〃I possess them by
my mere will； provided they exist anywhere in space or time； and；
consequently； my possession of them is purely juridical。〃 They belong；
in fact； to my possessions； only when and so far as I can assert
this as a matter of right。
5。 Definition of the Conception of the
External Mine and Thine。
Definitions are nominal or real。 A nominal definition is
sufficient merely to distinguish the object defined from all other
objects； and it springs out of a complete and definite exposition of
its conception。 A real definition further suffices for a deduction
of the conception defined； so as to furnish a knowledge of the reality
of the object。 The nominal definition of the external 〃mine〃 would
thus be： 〃The external mine is anything outside of myself； such that
any hindrance of my use of it at will would be doing me an injury or
wrong as an infringement of that freedom of mine which may coexist
with the freedom of all others according to a universal law。〃 The real
definition of this conception may be put thus： 〃The external mine is
anything outside of myself； such that any prevention of my use of it
would be a wrong； although I may not be in possession of it so as to
be actually holding it as an object。〃 I must be in some kind of
possession of an external object； if the object is to be regarded as
mine； for； otherwise； anyone interfering with this object would not；
in doing so； affect me； nor； consequently； would he thereby do me
any wrong。 Hence； according to SS 4； a rational possession
（possessio noumenon） must be assumed as possible； if there is to be
rightly an external mine and thine。 Empirical possession