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the science of right-第8章

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juridical possession (possessio noumenon)。 It is founded upon the fact

that; as all these acts are juridical; they consequently proceed

from the practical reason; and therefore; in the question as to what

is right; abstraction may be made of the empirical conditions

involved; and the conclusion; 〃the external object is mine;〃 thus

becomes a correct inference from the external fact of sensible

possession to the internal right of rational possession。

  The original primary acquisition of an external object of the action

of the will; is called occupancy。 It can only take place in

reference to substances or corporeal things。 Now when this

occupation of an external object does take place; the act presupposes;

as a condition of such empirical possession; its priority in time

before the act of any other who may also be willing to enter upon

occupation of it。 Hence the legal maxim: 〃qui prior tempore; potior

jure。〃 Such occupation as original or primary is; further; the

effect only of a single or unilateral will; for were a bilateral or

twofold will requisite for it; it would be derived from a contract

of two or more persons with each other; and consequently it would be

based upon what another or others had already made their own。 It is

not easy to see how such an act of free…will as this would be could

really form a foundation for every one having his own。 However; the

first acquisition of a thing is on that account not quite exactly

the same as the original acquisition of it。 For the acquisition of a

public juridical state by union of the wills of all in a universal

legislation would be such an original acquisition; seeing that no

other of the kind could precede it; and yet it would be derived from

the particular wills of all the individuals; and consequently become

all…sided or omnilateral; for a properly primary acquisition can

only proceed from an individual or unilateral or unilateral will。





    DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE EXTERNAL

                        MINE AND THINE。



  I。 In respect of the matter of object of acquisition; I acquire

either a corporeal thing (substance); or the performance of

something by another (causality); or this other as a person in respect

of his state; so far as I have a right to dispose of the same (in a

relation of reciprocity with him)。

  II。 In respect of the form or mode of acquisition; it is either a

real right (jus reale); or a personal right (jus personale); or a

real…personal right (jus realiter personale); to the possession

although not to the use; of another person as if he were a thing。

  III。 In respect of the ground of right or the title (titulus) of

acquisition… which; properly; is not a particular member of the

division of rights; but rather a constituent element of the mode of

exercising them… anything external is acquired by a certain free

exercise of will that is either unilateral; as the act of a single

will (facto); or bilateral; as the act of two wills (pacto); or

omnilateral; as the act of all the wills of a community together

(lege)。



           SECTION I。 Principles of Real Right。

                   11。 What is a Real Right?



  The usual definition of real right; or 〃right in a thing〃 (jus

reale; jus in re); is that 〃it is a right as against every possessor

of it。〃 This is a correct nominal definition。 But what is it that

entitles me to claim an external object from any one who may appear as

its possessor; and to compel him; per vindicationem; to put me

again; in place of himself; into possession of it? Is this external

juridical relation of my will a kind of immediate relation to an

external thing? If so; whoever might think of his right as referring

not immediately to persons but to things would have to represent it;

although only in an obscure way; somewhat thus。 A right on one side

has always a duty corresponding to it on the other; so that an

external thing; although away from the hands of its first possessor;

continues to be still connected with him by a continuing obligation;

and thus it refuses to fall under the claim of any other possessor;

because it is already bound to another。 In this way my right; viewed

as a kind of good genius accompanying a thing and preserving it from

all external attack; would refer an alien possessor always to me! It

is; however; absurd to think of an obligation of persons towards

things; and conversely; although it may be allowed in any particular

case to represent the juridical relation by a sensible image of this

kind; and to express it in this way。

  The real definition would run thus: 〃Right in a thing is a right

to the private use of a thing; of which I am in possession… original

or derivative… in common with all others。〃 For this is the one

condition under which it is alone possible that I can exclude every

others possessor from the private use of the thing (jus contra

quemlibet hujus rei possessorem)。 For; except by presupposing such a

common collective possession; it cannot be conceived how; when I am

not in actual possession of a thing; I could be injured or wronged

by others who are in possession of it and use it。 By an individual act

of my own will I cannot oblige any other person to abstain from the

use of a thing in respect of which he would otherwise be under no

obligation; and; accordingly; such an obligation can only arise from

the collective will of all united in a relation of common

possession。 Otherwise; I would have to think of a right in a thing; as

if the thing has an obligation towards me; and as if the right as

against every possessor of it had to be derived from this obligation

in the thing; which is an absurd way of representing the subject。

  Further; by the term real right (jus reale) is meant not only the

right in a thing (jus in re); but also the constitutive principle of

all the laws which relate to the real mine and thine。 It is;

however; evident that a man entirely alone upon the earth could

properly neither have nor acquire any external thing as his own;

because; between him as a person and all external things as material

objects; there could be no relations of obligation。 There is

therefore; literally; no direct right in a thing; but only that

right is to be properly called 〃real〃 which belongs to any one as

constituted against a person; who is in common possession of things

with all others in the civil state of society。



        12。 The First Acquisition of a Thing can only

                  be that of the Soil。



  By the soil is understood all habitable Land。 In relation to

everything that is moveable upon it; it is to be regarded as a

substance; and the mode of the existence of the moveables is viewed as

an inherence in it。 And just as; in the theoretical acceptance;

accidents cannot exist apart from their substances; so; in the

practical relation; moveables upon the soil cannot be regarded as

belonging to any one unless he is supposed to have been previously

in juridical possession of the soil; so that it is thus considered

to be his。

  For; let it be supposed that the soil belongs to no one。 Then I

would be entitled to remove every moveable thing found upon it from

its place; even to total loss of it; in order to occupy that place;

without infringing thereby on the freedom of any other; there being;

by the hypothesis; no possessor of it at all。 But everything that

can be destroyed; such as a tree; a house; and such like… as regards

its matter at least… is moveable; and if we call a thing which

cannot be moved without destruction of its form an immoveable; the

mine and thine in it is not understood as applying to its substance;

but to that which is adherent to it and which does not essentially

constitute the thing itself。



     13。 Every Part of the Soil may be Originally Acquired; and

        the Principle of the Possibility of such Acquisition

         is the Original Community of the Soil Generally。



  The first clause of this proposition is founded upon the postulate

of the practical reason (SS 2); the second is established by the

following proof。

  All men are originally and before any juridical act of will in

rightful possession of the soil; that is; they have a right to be

wherever nature or chance has placed them without their will。

Possession (possessio); which is to be distinguished from

residential settlement (sedes) as a voluntary; acquired; and permanent

possession; becomes common possession; on account of the connection

with each other of all the places on the surface of the earth as a

globe。 For; had the surface of the earth been an infinite plain; men

could have been so dispersed upon it that they might not have come

into any necessary communion with each other; and a state of social

community would not have been a necessary consequence of their

existence upon the earth。 Now that possession proper to all men upon

the earth; which is prior 
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