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divining that Cervera would make for San Juan； the capital and chief seaport of Porto Rico； detached from his blockading force a fighting squadron with which he sailed east； but not finding the Spanish fleet he turned back to Key West。 Schley； with the Flying Squadron； was then ordered to Cienfuegos。 In the meantime Cervera was escaping detection by the American scouts by taking an extremely southerly course； and with the information that Sampson was off San Juan； the Spanish Admiral sailed for Santiago de Cuba； where he arrived on May 19； 1898。
Though Cervera was safe in harbor； the maneuver of the American fleet cannot be called unsuccessful。 Cervera would have preferred to be at San Juan； where there was a navy yard and where his position would have obliged the American fleet either to split into two divisions separated by eight hundred miles or to leave him free range of action。 Next to San Juan he would have preferred Havana or； Cienfuegos； which were connected by railroad and near which lay the bulk of the Spanish Army。 He found himself instead at the extreme eastern end of Cuba in a port with no railroad connection with Havana； partly blocked by the insurgents； and totally unable to supply him with necessities。
Unless Cervera could leave Santiago； his expedition would obviously have been useless。 Though it was the natural function of the American fleet to blockade him； for a week after his arrival there was an interesting game of hide and seek between the two fleets。 The harbors of Cienfuegos and of Santiago are both landlocked by high hills； and Cervera had entered Santiago without being noticed by the Americans； as that part of the coast was not under blockade。 Schley thought Cervera was at Cienfuegos； Sampson was of the opinion that he was at Santiago。 When it became known that the enemy had taken refuge in Santiago； Schley began the blockade on the 28th of May； but stated that he could not continue long in position owing to lack of coal。 On the 1st of June Sampson arrived and assumed command of the blockading squadron。
With the bottling up of Cervera； the first stage of the war passed。 The navy had performed its primary function： it had established its superiority and had obtained the control of the seas。 The American coast was safe； American commerce was safe except in the vicinity of Spain； and the sea was open for the passage of an American expeditionary force。 Nearly the whole island of Cuba was now under blockade； and the insurgents were receiving supplies from the United States。 It had been proved that the fairly even balance of the two fleets； so anxiously scanned when it was reported in the newspapers in April； was entirely deceptive when it came to real efficiency in action。 Moreover； the skillful handling of the fleets by the Naval War Board as well as by the immediate commanders had redoubled the actual superiority of the American naval forces。
A fleet in being； even though inferior and immobilized； still counts as a factor in naval warfare； and Cervera； though immobilized by Sampson； himself immobilized the greater number of American vessels necessary to blockade him。 The importance of this fact was evident to every one when； in the middle of June； the remainder of the Spanish home fleet； whipped hastily into a semblance of fighting condition； set out eastward under Admiral Camara to contest the Philippines with Dewey。 It was impossible for the United States to detach a force sufficient to cross the Atlantic and； without a base； meet this fleet in its home waters。 Even if a smaller squadron were dispatched from the Atlantic round Cape Horn； it would arrive in the Philippines too late to be of assistance to Dewey。 The two monitors on the Pacific coast； the Monterey and the Monadnock； had already been ordered across the Pacific； a voyage perilous for vessels of their structure and agonizing to their crews； but it was doubtful whether they or Camara would arrive first in the Philippines。
The logic of the situation demanded that the main American fleet be released。 Cervera must be destroyed or held in some other way than at the expense of inactivity on the part of the American warships。 Santiago could not be forced by the navy。 Two methods remained。 The first and simpler expedient was to make the harbor mouth impassable and in this way to bottle up the Spanish fleet。 It was decided to sink the collier Merrimac at a narrow point in the channel； where； lying full length； she would completely prevent egress。 It was a delicate task and one of extraordinary danger。 It was characteristic of the spirit of the fleet that； as Admiral Chadwick says； practically all the men were volunteers。 The honor of the command was given to Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson； Assistant Naval Constructor； who had been in charge of the preparations。 With a crew of six men he entered the harbor mouth on the night of the 3d of June。 A shell disabled the steering gear of the Merrimac； and the ship sank too far within the harbor to block the entrance entirely。 Admiral Cervera himself rescued the crew； assured Sampson of their safety in an appreciative note； and one of the best designed and most heroic episodes in our history just missed success。
The failure of the Merrimac experiment left the situation as it had been and forced the American command to consider the second method which would release the American fleet。 This new plan contemplated the reduction of Santiago by a combined military and naval attack。 Cervera's choice of Santiago therefore practically determined the direction of the first American overseas military expedition； which had been in preparation since the war began。
CHAPTER X。 The Preparation Of The Army
When one compares the conditions under which the Spanish American War was fought with those of the Great War； he feels himself living in a different age。 Twenty years ago hysteria and sudden panics swept the nation。 Cheers and waving handkerchiefs and laughing girls sped the troops on their way。 It cannot be denied that the most popular song of the war time was 〃There'll be a hot time in the old town to…night；〃 though it may be believed that the energy and swing of the music rather than the words made it so。 The atmosphere of the country was one of a great national picnic where each one was expected to carry his own lunch。 There was apparent none of the concentration of effort and of the calm foresight so necessary for efficiency in modern warfare。 For youth the Spanish American War was a great adventure； for the nation it was a diversion sanctioned by a high purpose。
This abandon was doubtless in part due to a comfortable consciousness of the vast disparity in resources between Spain and the United States； which； it was supposed； meant automatically a corresponding difference in fighting strength。 The United States did； indeed； have vast superiorities which rendered unnecessary any worry over many of the essentials which gripped the popular mind during the Great War。 People believed that the country could supply the munitions needed； and that of facilities for transport it had enough。 If the United States did not have at hand exactly the munitions needed； if the transportation system had not been built to launch an army into Cuba； it was popularly supposed that the wealth of the country rendered such trifles negligible； and that； if insufficient attention had been given to the study of such matters in the past； American ingenuity would quickly offset the lack of skilled military experience。 The fact that American soldiers traveled in sleeping cars while European armies were transported in freight cars blinded Americans for a while to the significant fact that there was but a single track leading to Tampa； the principal point of embarkation for Cuba； and no one thought of building another。
Nothing so strongly marks the amateur character of the conduct of the Spanish War as the activity of the American press。 The navy was dogged by press dispatch boats which revealed its every move。 When Admiral Sampson started upon his cruise to San Juan； he requested the press boats to observe secrecy； and Admiral Chadwick comments with satisfaction upon the fact that this request was observed 〃fully and honorably。。。by every person except one。〃 When Lieutenant Whitney risked his life as a spy in order to investigate conditions in Porto Rico； his plans and purpose were blazoned in the press。 Incredible as it may now seem； the newspaper men appear to have felt themselves part of the army。 They offered their services as equals； and William Randolph Hearst even ordered one of his staff to sink a vessel in the Suez Canal to delay Camara on his expedition against Dewey。 This order； fortunately for the international reputation of the United States； was not executed。 With all their blare and childish enthusiasm； the reporters do not seem to have been so successful in revealing to Americans the plans of Spain as they were in furnishing her with itemized accounts of all the doings of the American forces。
While the press not only revealed but formulated courses of action in the case of the army； the navy； at least； was able to follow its own plans。 For this difference there were several causes； chief of which was the fac